Concept
Younger v. Harris
Younger abstention
Younger v. Harris
Younger v. Harris turned a routine state indictment into the case in which the Supreme Court explained when a federal court should stand aside from a pending state criminal prosecution. California had indicted John Harris, Jr., under its Criminal Syndicalism Act, Penal Code §§ 11400 and 11401. Harris answered by suing in federal district court to enjoin District Attorney Younger from prosecuting him, alleging that the prosecution, and even the presence of the Act, inhibited his freedoms of speech and press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1
Three more plaintiffs joined him. Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch intervened as members of the Progressive Labor Party, claiming that Harris's prosecution would inhibit them from peacefully advocating the party's program of replacing capitalism with socialism and abolishing the profit system of production. A third plaintiff, Broslawsky, sued alongside them. None of the three had been indicted, arrested, or even threatened by the prosecutor, so Harris alone had an acute, live controversy with the State.2 A three-judge district court, convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, held that it had jurisdiction and power to restrain the prosecutor, held the Act void for vagueness and overbreadth, and restrained “further prosecution of the currently pending action against plaintiff Harris.”3 The intervenors' separate difficulty has its own section below. Harris's case supplies the core rule.
Harris had already tried the state courts. At his criminal trial he moved to dismiss the indictment under the First Amendment, and he later petitioned the state appellate court for a writ of prohibition against the prosecution. Both efforts failed, because the Supreme Court in 1927 had held the California act constitutional in Whitney v. California.4
The Supreme Court reversed. Harris was being prosecuted when he filed his federal suit, and the Court, setting aside both Brandenburg v. Ohio, a 1969 decision discussing the California act, and the constitutionality of the state law, held that the injunction violated the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.5 It expressed no view about when federal courts may act if no prosecution is pending in state court at the time the federal proceeding begins.6 The case thus decides who may halt a state prosecution, and when. It does not decide whether California's statute was valid.
The Court's reasoning rests on the ordinary prerequisites of equity. A person charged under an unconstitutional statute normally has an adequate remedy at law, because he can raise the constitutional defense in the state proceeding. Federal courts had recognized that this practice could be departed from if necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and Dombrowski v. Pfister found such injury in the substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression that would follow if the plaintiffs had to await disposition of the state criminal actions.7 Harris made no comparable showing. The Court held that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute “on its face” does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that Harris had failed to show bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance calling for equitable relief.8 The strength of his constitutional claim therefore did not control. What mattered was that the state prosecution gave him a place to raise it.
A federal injunction would also have set a district judge over the state prosecution. A consistent theme in the Younger doctrine is that federal district courts may not sit in review of state court decisions, because the constitutional system treats the state courts as on par with the federal courts.9
Dombrowski shows what Harris lacked. There the Court enjoined enforcement of Louisiana criminal laws on behalf of members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, a group working for civil rights for Black people in the South. Louisiana officials viewed the group as a Communist front or subversive organization and raided its offices under state law, and the decision seemed to invite federal courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings that threaten speech and associational rights.10 The Dombrowski plaintiffs, moreover, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before any state criminal case had begun.11 Harris had already been indicted when he sued, and he never alleged that the prosecution was brought in bad faith to harass him.12 The Court accordingly read Dombrowski narrowly. It held that the decision did not upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions, and that it does not stand for the proposition that a federal court may enjoin enforcement of a statute solely because the statute “on its face” abridges First Amendment rights. The Court allowed that extraordinary circumstances might show the necessary irreparable injury even without the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.13
The doctrine goes by several names. “Younger abstention” and “equitable restraint” both describe a federal court's decision not to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding by injunction or declaratory relief unless the prosecution has been brought in bad faith or merely as harassment. The dictionary entry also points to “Our Federalism,” the comity-based label the next section explains, and it extends the doctrine by analogy to a federal court's decision not to interfere with a state civil proceeding used to enforce the criminal law, as in abating an obscene nuisance.14 Because the holding rests on the absence of the factors equity requires, the Court declined to consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which bars injunctions against state court proceedings “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,” would itself have controlled.15
Declaratory relief falls under the same bar. Harris's complaint did not ask for a declaratory judgment by name, but it prayed for “such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper,” and the district court in fact granted a declaration. For the reasons given in the companion case Samuels v. Mackell, the Supreme Court held that declaratory relief is also improper when a prosecution involving the challenged statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated.16
A concurring opinion reached the same result on the narrowest ground. Harris had been indicted before he sued in federal court, he did not allege that the prosecution was brought in bad faith to harass him, and his constitutional contentions could be adequately adjudicated in the state criminal proceeding, so federal intervention at his instance was improper.17
Two facts control most exam problems on this case. The first is pendency. The Younger doctrine bars a federal court only when a state proceeding involving the federal plaintiff is pending or ongoing; otherwise the court may issue declaratory or injunctive relief against future enforcement, provided the plaintiff shows a threat of prosecution sufficient for standing and ripeness.18 The second is whether the plaintiff has alleged bad faith, harassment, or another unusual circumstance. A strong constitutional claim supplies neither.