Concept
The Long Presumption
The “adequate and independent state ground”
The Long Presumption
A state supreme court that reverses a conviction by leaning on federal precedent, with a passing nod to its own constitution, leaves the United States Supreme Court with a puzzle: did federal law compel the result, or would the state constitution have produced it anyway? The question matters because the Court will not review a judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state ground, the most important and most difficult limit on its review of state-court decisions.1 Michigan v. Long tells the Court what to do when a state opinion does not say which law controlled.
The case began on a rural road shortly after midnight. Two deputies on patrol saw a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed turn down a side road and swerve into a shallow ditch, and they stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant, met them at the rear of the car, which protruded from the ditch onto the road, with the driver's door left open.2 The trial court denied Long's motion to suppress marijuana taken from the car's interior and trunk, and he was convicted of possession. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, upholding the search of the passenger compartment as a protective search under Terry and the search of the trunk as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It held that the sole justification of a Terry search, protection of the officers and others nearby, could not justify this search, and it suppressed the trunk marijuana as the fruit of the illegal search of the interior.3
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court held the protective search of the passenger compartment reasonable under Terry, but it first decided that the Court had jurisdiction.4 The Fourth Amendment holding belongs to criminal procedure; this chapter follows the jurisdictional ruling. Long argued that the Michigan decision rested on an adequate and independent state ground. The state court referred twice to its constitution but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law, and Long contended that Michigan courts protect against searches and seizures more broadly under the state constitution than the Fourth Amendment does, so those two references established an independent ground. The Court conceded that it had “not developed a satisfying and consistent approach” to this “vexing issue,” and that it had sometimes taken the strict view that it would dismiss any case whose ground of decision was at all unclear.5 The Court was not unanimous. Justice Blackmun concurred in part and in the judgment, Justice Brennan dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens dissented separately.6
Long's answer has three working parts: a presumption that applies when an opinion's ground is unclear, a plain statement that keeps the presumption from arising, and the federal-floor principle that explains why neither step strips states of the power to protect individuals more generously than the federal Constitution does. We take them in that order.
The Presumption Rule
Michigan v. Long resolves an ambiguous opinion by presumption. When a state decision “fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,” and the adequacy and independence of any possible state ground “is not clear from the face of the opinion,” the Court accepts “as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.”7
The presumption fills a gap in the record. An opinion that never says what drove its judgment makes the Court infer the answer from what the opinion contains, and an opinion built on federal precedent invites the inference that federal law drove it. Once the Court draws that inference, no state ground can count as independent, because an interpretation of state law that federal constitutional considerations compel is not an independent state ground.8
The first two questions work together: the presumption arises only when federal law dominates the opinion and any state ground stays hidden.
The Michigan opinion met both conditions. Apart from two references to the state constitution, the court relied on federal law, chiefly its reading of Terry v. Ohio and other federal cases, and it cited no state case for its holding.9 The two references did no analytical work, and nothing in them showed a ground independent of the court's interpretation of federal law. Long's point that Michigan courts protect against searches more broadly under the state constitution therefore did not help him, because what mattered was whether this opinion rested on that broader protection, and nothing in it said so. With no plain statement of an independent ground, the Court found jurisdiction, because the state court appeared to have “felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the manner it did.”10
A footnote in the opinion shows that the shortcut and the longer route lead to the same place. Even if the Court looked to Michigan law, it would conclude that the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to any “higher standard” than applies to other items, and because an interpretation of state law compelled by federal constitutional considerations is not an independent state ground, it would still have jurisdiction.11 The presumption exists so that the Court need not run that inquiry in most cases.12
The presumption also settles who bears the cost of an unclear opinion. Outright dismissal was never a cure, because the need for uniformity in federal law goes unmet when the Court declines to review an opinion that rests primarily on federal grounds and whose alleged state ground is not apparent from its four corners. The Court had long recognized that dismissal is inappropriate “where there is strong indication . . . that the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the decision below.”13 The presumption spares the Court from examining state law in most instances and from requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to its satisfaction, and it gives state judges a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference while preserving the integrity of federal law.14 The Court borrowed its balance from an earlier decision: “It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action.”15
The presumption invites an objection, because the Court may not issue advisory opinions. Its power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions, and if the state court would render the same judgment after the Court corrected its view of federal law, review “could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.”16 Long answered that its plain-statement requirement does not authorize advisory opinions. The Court must decide whether it has jurisdiction in every case, and in deciding it the Court merely assumes that no adequate and independent state ground exists when the opinion does not make one clear and fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law.17 The presumption is thus a rule for answering the jurisdictional question, and it operates before the Court reaches the merits. Critics note that on remand the Michigan court adhered to its view that the search violated the state constitution, so Long's conviction stayed overturned. One treatise replies that a ruling on a federal question the Court has found fairly interwoven with state law and potentially dispositive “should not necessarily be deemed advisory based upon what happens in subsequent litigation after remand.”18 A later section returns to the dispute.
The presumption has a limited domain. It applies only in cases of uncertainty, where the state ground fairly appears to depend on, or to be interwoven with, federal law, and a state court overcomes it by clearly stating that its decision rests on an independent state ground, which bars review.19 Where state law visibly carries the judgment, no presumption is needed. In an Indiana case, the Court granted certiorari but dismissed the writ as improvidently granted after finding that Indiana law defined usable air space above private property as part of the property and that an ordinance effectively took that property without compensation. The state supreme court's opinion did not discuss the state constitutional issue separately from the Fourteenth Amendment issue, but it explicitly relied on Indiana law, so a ruling that the ordinance did not offend the federal Constitution would not have changed the result and would have been advisory.20 The state ground there did visible work, which is exactly what the Michigan opinion lacked.
Both this opinion and the Michigan opinion cite federal decisions, so the mere citation of federal cases cannot be the trigger. The trigger is federal law doing the analytical work. A state court that cites federal cases only as persuasive support for a reading grounded in its own text and precedent has made its state ground visible, and a plain statement removes whatever doubt remains.22
The Plain Statement Rule
A state court escapes the presumption by saying so. In the same passage that creates the presumption, Long tells state courts how to keep a judgment out of the Court's reach: by a “plain statement in its judgment or opinion.” A court that relies on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of any other jurisdiction “need only make clear” that the federal cases are used “only for the purpose of guidance” and “do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.” And a decision that “indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds” will not be reviewed.24
The rule thus offers two forms of statement, matched to the two ways an opinion comes to cite federal law:
- A guidance statement, for a court that cites federal decisions as persuasive authority in construing its own law, says that those decisions serve only for guidance and do not compel the result.
- An alternative-grounds statement, for a court that has decided the case under both federal and state law, says clearly and expressly that the judgment also rests on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds.
Each statement removes the doubt that triggers the presumption. The guidance statement tells the Court that the state-law answer did not depend on federal law, and the alternative-grounds statement tells it that the state ground would sustain the judgment without the federal one, which are the independence and adequacy requirements developed earlier in this chapter.
The rule asks the court that knows its own reasoning to record it, at the cost of one sentence in an opinion it is already writing. The older alternatives cost more. Herb v. Pitcairn had said it was desirable that state courts “be asked rather than told what they have intended,” but asking has a price of its own. In Dixon v. Duffy the Court continued the case twice to obtain clarification and none came, because the California court advised petitioner's counsel informally that it doubted its jurisdiction to render such a determination, and the Court then vacated the state judgment and remanded. Long departs from Herb: it disfavors further requests for clarification and requires a clear and express statement that a decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds, a requirement the Court says protects the integrity of state courts. The Court kept some room, noting that circumstances may arise in which clarification is necessary or desirable.25
The Michigan opinion shows the cost of silence. Nothing in it said that its federal citations were guidance only, so the Court found jurisdiction “in the absence of a plain statement that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground.”26 State courts have also asserted their independence in pointed terms. The Oregon Supreme Court, in an opinion affirming a judgment, first delivered a verbal slap to the United States Supreme Court, and other states have echoed Oregon's sentiments.27
The reasoning of that opinion looks much like Michigan's, with federal authority carrying most of the analysis. The closing statement turns an opinion the presumption would have captured into one that announces its own independence.
The statement matters only where the presumption could otherwise apply. When an opinion does not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with it, the Court needs no plain statement to decline review.29 Even where the statement does matter, the safe harbor reaches only “bona fide” grounds, which implies that a bare recital of independence does not control when the opinion's own reasoning shows that federal law drove the result. If any recital ended review, a sentence of boilerplate would defeat the uniformity in federal law that Long refused to give up when it rejected outright dismissal, and a state-law interpretation that federal constitutional considerations compel is not independent whatever label it carries.30
Reversal on the federal question does not end the state court's power to protect the right. After the Court ruled against it in Long, the Michigan court on remand adhered to its view that the search violated the state constitution, so Long's conviction stayed overturned and the Fourth Amendment ruling did not change the case's disposition.31 A judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state ground can stand whatever the Court thinks of the federal issue, and a state ground is adequate when it conflicts with no federal law.32 The Court sometimes makes the invitation to rest on state law explicit: in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown it remanded so that the state court could consider whether its decision might rest on purely state contract law. A court that could have made the statement at the outset can therefore still supply it afterward, at the price of a trip to the Supreme Court. Critics point to that sequence when they call the Court's merits ruling advisory, an objection the next section takes up.
Federal Floor, State Ceiling
Federal constitutional doctrine sets a floor, and state law may raise the ceiling above it. The Supreme Court's interpretations of the United States Constitution establish the floor below which state courts cannot go in protecting individual rights, while state supreme courts can afford greater protection by interpreting rights under their own constitutions.34 A state court that speaks as an interpreter of federal law has no room between floor and ceiling, because the federal meaning is whatever the Supreme Court has said it is. The room opens only when the court speaks as an interpreter of its own law.
Each boundary has its own reason. The ceiling rests on state authority over state law: the state court has the last word on the meaning of its own constitution, the federal Constitution establishes minimum guarantees, and granting additional liberties violates none of its provisions.35 Suppose a state court holds that Jones, a second-degree murderer, cannot be executed, citing the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and also its own constitution. Second-degree murderers may have no federal right against execution, but the state may give them one under its own law. Because the state court has the last word on that constitution, the Supreme Court could reverse the ruling only if it conflicted with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and it does not. The state ground is adequate, and it sustains the result whatever the Court thinks about the federal amendments.36 The floor rests on the other half of that sentence: a state ground that does conflict with federal law is invalid, so a state may not use its own law to take away a federal right.37
State courts have used the freedom above the floor to go beyond what the Supreme Court requires. They have declared sex classifications suspect, required equal financing of state schools, actively reviewed economic classifications, and held that a state must recognize same-sex marriages.38 The freedom carries a proviso: the state court must act on the basis of state law, and it cannot stretch the federal guarantee itself, because a court that construes the Fourth Amendment applies a law whose meaning the Supreme Court controls. Oregon v. Hass drew the line in these terms: a State “is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards,” but it “may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.” Arkansas v. Sullivan applied the same rule and held that a state supreme court may not grant greater protections under the United States Constitution than the Supreme Court provides.
Long itself shows the proviso at work. Michigan read the Fourth Amendment to forbid a search that the Supreme Court held reasonable under Terry, and its opinion rested on federal law with only two passing references to the state constitution.39 No independent state ground sheltered it, so the Court took jurisdiction and decided the federal question. An expansion of rights seldom raises doubt about adequacy, since a state that adds to federal rights takes nothing away, and the contest centers on independence.40 The presumption therefore falls hardest on a state court that wants to protect individuals more generously but writes an opinion that leans on federal cases. A ruling that favors the individual escapes review only when it rests independently on state law.
The First Amendment offers a clean pair. Once the Court held that commercial speech receives First Amendment protection, a state supreme court could not reinterpret the First Amendment, or some provision of its own constitution, to say that commercial speech is unprotected, because that ruling would drop below the floor. Once the Court held that obscene material falls outside the First Amendment, a state supreme court could still read its constitution's guarantee of conscience to protect obscene material, and that ruling would raise the ceiling.41 The first ruling takes away a right federal law confers, so no state ground can be adequate, however firmly it rests on state text. The second adds a right federal law does not confer and conflicts with no federal rule, so the state ground is adequate and, if it stands on state law alone, independent as well, which leaves the Court no federal question to decide.
The obscenity example shows that the source of law the opinion names decides whether the Court may touch the ruling. A state court that protected the same material because the First Amendment required it would have read the federal guarantee more generously than the Court does, the error the Court corrected in Long and Sullivan, and because federal law would then supply the whole ground, the Court could reverse. The identical result, resting on the state conscience clause and on the court's own reasoning, is insulated.
The third step does the real work in an expansion case, and it is the step the state court controls. A court that wants to raise the ceiling must rest the result on its state constitution and laws and make its interpretation of them independent of federal law.42 Citing federal decisions for guidance is permissible, but resting the state holding on them turns an expansion of rights into a federal question the Court may reverse.