Concept
After a Case Becomes Moot
Mootness
After a Case Becomes Moot
A finding of mootness ends the merits inquiry but not the court's work. In DeFunis v. Odegaard, the petitioner would finish law school at the end of the term for which he had registered no matter what the Court decided, so the Court held that Article III barred it from considering the constitutional issues the parties had tendered.1 The merits were off the table, but a state supreme court's judgment still stood on the docket, and the Court had to do something with it. Every holding of mootness therefore raises two questions. What becomes of the judgment under review? And what changes when that judgment came from a state court, which Article III does not govern?
Both questions assume the case really is moot, and that conclusion is not automatic. When a defendant says its own conduct has mooted the case, the defendant must show that it is absolutely clear the injury will not recur, while the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing.2 Courts also look hard at mootness that a party produces after the Court has agreed to hear the case, because “such postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from review by this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.”3 A legislative change can moot a case more readily than a defendant's voluntary change of internal policy, because legislation has more staying power, although dissenting Justices have objected that such a ruling encourages legislative bodies to manipulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction.4 And the Court did not treat as moot a 1969 challenge to ballot-access limits on independent candidates for presidential elector, even though the election had passed, because the rule remained in place and the problem was “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”5 A court reaches the dispositions below only when these inquiries fail.
Vacatur of Lower-Court Judgments
Mootness can arrive after an appeal or a petition for certiorari has been filed. A criminal defendant dies, an enjoined book is published, or, most commonly, the parties settle.6 In a federal case that becomes moot on appeal, the Supreme Court's practice is to vacate the appellate judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint, and the case then has no binding effect on the parties.7 The Court's decisions call this its ordinary practice, and lawyers often label the disposition by reference to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.8 DeFunis came up from a state court and received a related but different order. The Court vacated the Washington Supreme Court's judgment and remanded for such proceedings as that court deemed appropriate, without directing dismissal.9
Vacatur wipes the judgment away so that it binds no one, and the Court treats it as an equitable remedy, not an entitlement. In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership the Court held that the “ordinary practice” of automatic vacatur applies only to mootness by “happenstance,” or where the party seeking vacatur was otherwise blameless in causing the mootness.10 A settlement is different. It represents the losing party's voluntary forfeiture of appellate review and a surrender of its claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur, so “mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review.”11 Because the determination is equitable, a court keeps authority to vacate in “exceptional circumstances.” Those circumstances, however, “do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement provides for vacatur.”12
The cases sort by who ended the appeal and how. In DeFunis the mootness came from the petitioner's progress toward his degree and the school's settled policy of letting him finish the term. No deal to end review was involved, and the Court vacated and remanded.13 A losing party that settles has made the choice itself. Later cases such as Alvarez v. Smith apply the same line to the particular facts of how a case became moot.
A stem that says a case became moot on appeal therefore does not, by itself, call for vacatur. The question to ask is who ended the appeal. Events that overtake the losing party leave it the ordinary clean slate, while a bargain to end its own appeal forfeits the remedy unless exceptional circumstances exist.
State Courts and Mootness
Article III confines federal courts to live controversies, and that limit follows a case into the Supreme Court even when the case comes from a state court whose own law would keep it alive. DeFunis shows how. The Court noted that Washington law appeared to save the case from mootness because of “the great public interest in the continuing issues raised by this appeal,” and then held that this did not matter, since “[e]ven in cases arising in the state courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction.”15 Three propositions follow: state courts may hear moot cases, the Supreme Court applies the federal rule anyway when it reviews them, and it disposes of a moot state case differently from a moot federal one.
The first proposition rests on the fact that Article III and the federal rules of self-restraint do not bind state courts, and a state constitution may even authorize its courts to issue advisory opinions.16 A state court may therefore rely on a public-interest exception. As commonly stated, the exception lets an appellate court decide a moot case, although such decisions are generally prohibited, if the question is of considerable public importance, is likely to arise again, and has evaded appellate review.17 The last two elements resemble the federal formula “capable of repetition, yet evading review,”18 but the first element, public importance, did not enter the Court's analysis in DeFunis.
The second proposition follows from the source of the Court's own power. When the Court reviews a state judgment, it exercises the judicial power of Article III, which reaches only a live controversy, so Washington's willingness to hear a moot case decided nothing about the Court's. The Court looked instead at the respondents' representation that DeFunis would remain a student through any term in which he had enrolled and would receive his diploma regardless of the Court's decision. All parties agreed he was entitled to finish his studies and take his degree, so a ruling could not affect his rights.19 The dispute was live under state law and moot under Article III, and the second view controlled in the Supreme Court.
The third proposition concerns the disposition. For a federal case, the Court can vacate and instruct the lower court to dismiss. In Doremus v. Board of Education the Court held that it cannot decide a case that originated in state court once it is moot. It must normally dismiss the appeal, but it will not require the state court to vacate its judgment or dismiss the complaint, because the Court has no supervisory power over state courts.20 DeFunis fits that limit: the Court vacated the Washington judgment and left that court to proceed as it saw fit, without instructing it to dismiss.21
Dismissal is the right course only when the state judgment leaves the petitioner no worse off than the dead dispute does. The Court will not treat the case as moot if the state judgment causes a “direct, specific, and concrete injury” to the parties who petition for review, assuming the other requisites of a case or controversy are met.22 The injury supplies the stake that keeps the case from being premature or moot for federal purposes, even though the plaintiffs would have lacked standing had they sued in federal court. The result is a paradox: Doremus still closes the federal door to plaintiffs who lack standing and lose in state court, but it does not apply to plaintiffs who lack standing and win on their federal claim, because the judgment injures the defendants who petition.23
Students often stop once the original dispute has died and announce dismissal. For a case from a state court, the remaining question is what the state judgment still does to the party seeking review.
The same caution applies when the party who won in state court is the one suggesting mootness. In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., the owner of a nude-dancing establishment had won a state high-court ruling against the city's public-nudity ordinance. After the Court granted the city's petition, the owner suggested the case was moot because the club had closed. The Court refused to accept that suggestion. A cessation that comes only after the Court has agreed to review a case is inherently suspect, and the Court's interest in preventing litigants from manipulating its jurisdiction to insulate a favorable decision from review counseled against finding the case moot.24