Concept
External Constitutional Limits
Congressional power to define and limit
External Constitutional Limits
A jurisdictional statute can satisfy Article III and still fail because of what the rest of the Constitution forbids. Article III gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in the cases outside its original categories “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”1 The earlier sections tested a statute against two limits that grow out of Article III and the separation of powers: whether it is a true exception, and whether Congress is using it to take over a judicial function, as it did in Klein. The third limit comes from outside Article III, and the general rule is easy to state. Congress may not use its exceptions power in a manner that violates constitutional limitations on government power.2
The rule exists because a jurisdictional label would otherwise cancel every guarantee. If calling a statute an exception exempted it from the Bill of Rights, Congress could achieve through drafting what it could not command directly, since it would only need to describe a burden on a disfavored group as a limit on which cases the Court may hear. The inquiry therefore looks past the label to what the statute does to the people it reaches.
Two guarantees do most of the work, and they work differently. The Bill of Rights asks whether a statute classifies litigants, or burdens an underlying right, in a way an amendment forbids. Due process asks what the statute leaves a litigant who holds a protected interest, and in particular whether any court remains in which to press the claim. On an exam, run both after the definitional and structural questions, because a jurisdictional statute is judged as any other act of Congress would be.
Bill of Rights Constraints
The standard illustration is a statute that excepted from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction all cases brought by members of a particular religious denomination. It would be an exception in form and would still run afoul of the First Amendment religion clauses.3 The two inquiries do not overlap. The exceptions power settles who controls the Court’s docket, the First Amendment independently settles whether Congress may sort people by belief, and a statute must satisfy both.
Direct violations are the easy cases. Congress could not bar Supreme Court review by excluding litigants on the basis of race or political beliefs, and legislation singling out litigants by race or another suspect classification is presumptively invalid.4 In each, the statute itself draws the line the guarantee forbids, so the jurisdictional form changes nothing. The Court is quite likely to strike down an exception that directly and unequivocally violates a provision of the Bill of Rights.5
Ex parte McCardle shows the contrast. The famous case tested the power to make exceptions after an Act of 1867 gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in habeas-corpus cases, and McCardle, a civilian held for trial by a military commission in Mississippi, relied on that grant.6 Congress withdrew only that one avenue of appeal, and the Court could still issue original writs of habeas corpus and certiorari.7 Yerger confirms how little the withdrawal changed in practice, because alternative review remained available for similar cases.8 Nothing in the withdrawal sorted litigants by a forbidden characteristic. A decision recognizing a broad power to except cases says nothing about the constitutional limits on how that power is used, and McCardle, which can be read as a minor exception or as the removal of a single remedy, should not be read to support a radical revision of the federal judiciary’s role.9 It gives no support to a statute that itself classifies by religion or race.
The second statute is the indirect case. It imposes no burden of its own, and the objection is that it makes burdens imposed by other laws harder to challenge. The source’s example is a statute denying the Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case arising out of a state abortion law. Such a statute restricts nothing directly, yet by insulating abortion challenges from Supreme Court review it may impose an undue burden on the right to procure an abortion, because it makes challenges to burdensome state laws significantly harder to bring.11 The undue-burdens test belongs to the doctrine as the source wrote it, and what carries over is the template: the claim has something to attach to only where a protected right exists and federal review is a meaningful means of enforcing it.
The strength of the claim depends partly on what happens next in the state courts. If the restriction curtails only the federal courts, the state courts can keep hearing the claims free from the threat of reversal on appeal, and many predict that some of them would reject the Court’s precedent and develop their own constitutional doctrine.12 Proponents of the restriction would then have changed constitutional law by ordinary legislation instead of by amendment. Others doubt it, because the precedents remain on the books and state courts may keep applying them, which would make the restriction self-defeating, since it keeps the federal courts from reconsidering prior decisions.13 The first prediction gives the indirect-burden argument more force, since the right would be left to unsupervised state courts, and the second weakens it. Because the question is open, an answer should argue each side. A Justice’s perception of the underlying right could be a major factor, and it is far from clear that the Court would strike down an exception when the claimed violation is indirect.14
A related dispute concerns statutes that route a class of issues to state courts without closing any court. Legislation singling out litigants by race or another suspect classification is presumptively invalid, but it is contested whether singling out classes of issues for primary or exclusive adjudication in state rather than federal courts is similarly vulnerable.15 The dispute is the issue-based version of the indirect argument. A litigant-based line is itself the burden, while an issue-based line burdens a right only through the further claim that federal review is how the right is enforced.
Judge Bork’s dissent in Bartlett v. Bowen shows that a rights claim does not automatically defeat a limit on review. He would have rejected a free exercise challenge to a benefits rule because, in his view, Congress’s reservation of sovereign immunity was a source of authority outside Article III for keeping some matters out of the federal courts. It is a dissent, so it marks an argument available against a rights claim and settles no rule.
Step two does the sorting work. A statute that sorts litigants by religion or race fails directly, while one that sorts by subject matter raises only the indirect argument. Treating the jurisdictional label as immune from the amendments skips the third limit entirely, and treating every subject-matter exception as a direct violation overlooks that such a statute imposes no burden of its own.
Due Process and Closed Forums
Due process approaches a jurisdictional statute from the litigant’s side and asks what the statute leaves a person who holds a protected interest. The Second Circuit answered in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp. that Congress’s jurisdictional power may not be exercised to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process, or to take private property without just compensation.18 Battaglia is a court of appeals decision and not a Supreme Court holding. Congress’s control over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is the widest of its jurisdictional powers, as the earlier sections showed, so if any limit constrains it, due process is the likely outer boundary.
The limit exists because a closed forum can destroy a right as completely as repeal. In Klein, Congress purported to deny all courts jurisdiction to return property to someone holding a pardon, and because the statute closed all avenues of relief, unlike the statute in McCardle, it denied substantive rights.19 The sharpest version of the question remains open in the source: would Congress violate due process by withdrawing the ability of federal courts to review, on constitutional matters, criminal convictions?20
Battaglia shows a court taking the limit seriously and still upholding the statute. The employees there faced the portal-to-portal Amendment, a jurisdictional limitation that Congress enacted to cut off their claims. The Second Circuit considered and rejected their constitutional argument, and in doing so it explicitly recognized that congressional power over the jurisdiction of the courts is limited by the due process clause.21 The amendment did not take property, so the jurisdictional limitation was valid. The plaintiffs had no vested property right, only a cause of action based on a statute not repealed, which is a mere expectancy, and applying the new law deprived no one of any vested property right or other constitutional right.22
A vested right would have changed the answer. If Congress had tried to eliminate a claim for back pay after the claimant had already reduced it to a money judgment and collected, Congress would have to pay just compensation, and it may not impose a jurisdictional limitation to avoid its obligation not to take property without due process. That is the lesson of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., and the Supreme Court has recognized and applied the principle since at least the time of Chief Justice John Marshall.23 The line between the two cases is the line between an expectancy and an interest that has already ripened into property, and due process attaches only to the second.
Two features explain why the limit rarely invalidates a statute. Due process protects interests that have vested and rights the Constitution confers, and it gives no protection to a litigant’s hope of a particular result. In addition, a restriction that curtails only the federal courts leaves the state courts free to hear the claims.24 The harder problem of a litigant with no court at all arises only when a restriction forecloses every forum, and the preceding paragraphs show why that case is the dangerous one.
Placed beside Battaglia, the hypothetical shows which fact carries the analysis. In both, Congress closed the courts, yet the employees held an expectancy and the claimant here holds a vested interest. Closing the courthouse is therefore never the violation by itself. The violation exists when the closed courthouse is the only means of enforcing an interest the Constitution protects.
The Selective Service cases show the limit working through construction in place of invalidation. Courts have traditionally reviewed selective service cases deferentially, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged constitutional issues concerning Congress’s power to restrain federal court review in this area and has interpreted the law to avoid them, while rejecting the claim that Congress has no power to place some limits on federal jurisdiction there.26 A narrow reading in effect serves both interests: it keeps the constitutional problem from arising, it leaves Congress its authority to limit review, and it postpones the question whether Congress could close every forum. That is the avoidance move taught in the clear-statement discussion.
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee shows the limit meeting a restriction on review that the Court sustained. The Court nevertheless left the door open to future cases, saying that “to resolve the present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome.”27 The reservation keeps the constitutional question alive without answering it, since a restriction on review survives unless the claimed discrimination is extreme.
The decisions share a structure. Each court can be read as asking what the statute, as applied, took from the litigant that the Constitution protects, and none struck the statute down. Battaglia found an expectancy, the Selective Service decisions construed the statute to avoid the problem, and Reno sustained the restriction while reserving a rare case. The McCardle withdrawal fits the pattern, because it took away one avenue of appeal and left alternative review available.28 The limit is real and seldom dispositive.
The first step separates most fact patterns, because a litigant who holds only an expectancy has nothing for due process to protect, however completely the courts are closed. An answer that treats a jurisdictional form as immune from the due process clause skips the limit, and an answer that treats every withdrawal of jurisdiction as a taking overlooks that the statutes in Battaglia and Reno were both sustained.