Concept
Power Over Lower Federal Courts
Congressional power to define and limit
Power Over Lower Federal Courts
Congress's power over federal jurisdiction is broadest at the lower-court level, because Congress decides whether those courts exist at all. Article III vests the judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,”1 and Section 2 lists the cases that power reaches. For the Supreme Court, Section 2 divides jurisdiction into original and appellate and makes the appellate part subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”2 Nothing in the clause says how much of the list any lower court must receive. Congress may also decline to create lower courts and rely on state courts as courts of first instance for federal claims,3 so the jurisdiction of the courts it does create is Congress's to set, within the list.
The contested questions sit on the Supreme Court's appellate docket. Ex parte McCardle has long been read to give Congress full control over that docket. Some argue that this reads too much into the decision, because the Court could still reach a case like McCardle's through original writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, and on that view depriving litigants of all access to the Court in cases about the supremacy of federal law would be invalid. That reading has little or no direct authority.4 For the lower courts the Court's rulings seem to recognize a broad power to confine jurisdiction, although they are sparse and dated.5
Two questions organize what follows. The first is how much of Article III's list Congress may confer and how freely it may take jurisdiction back. The second is the technique Congress uses once it decides what to confer: sending claims to a specialized tribunal, making a forum exclusive or concurrent, and limiting remedies. Broad discretion is not unlimited discretion. The separation-of-powers limit that restrains the exceptions power restrains the power to define lower-court jurisdiction in the same way,6 and later sections take up the external limits. On an exam, a statute that limits a lower federal court calls for two steps: place the case within Article III's list, then ask what Congress chose to confer.
Defining and Withholding Jurisdiction
The power to ordain and establish lower courts carries the authority to define their jurisdiction, so long as Congress stays within the subject matters that Section 2 enumerates.7 Congress may give those courts the full range of Article III judicial power or only a portion of it, and within Article III's outer limits it may grant or deny them subject matter jurisdiction.8 The Section 2 list works in one direction. It marks the outer edge of what any lower court may receive, and it imposes no duty to confer any of it.9
The two halves of that rule rest on different reasons. The authority to withhold follows from the greater power. A Congress that could have left the lower federal courts unbuilt, relying on state courts for federal claims, may build them with part of the jurisdiction instead.10 The ceiling rests on Article III's own terms. Congress cannot vest an Article III court with authority over a subject matter Article III does not list, because Article III supplies no jurisdiction for such a case.11
History shows the withholding power in use. In 1802 the Jeffersonian Congress repealed a controversial judiciary law that had created federal circuit courts as freestanding courts with their own judges and a general grant of federal-question jurisdiction. In the process it turned sitting judges out of office and returned many federal-question cases to the state courts.12 Judges today would presumably keep their offices and their pay, because Article III guarantees inferior-court judges tenure during good behavior and compensation that may not be diminished.13 The Jeffersonian precedent still shows how far Congress controls both the existence and the jurisdiction of the lower courts.14
One scholarly position resists that conclusion. Professor Robert Clinton contends that Congress must vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over the entire menu in Article III, Section 2.15 The 1802 repeal points the other way, and so do the Court's rulings, which seem to recognize a broad congressional power to confine lower-court jurisdiction.16
Modern statutes trim listed categories without eliminating them. Article III lists controversies between citizens of different states without any dollar figure, yet the district courts lack diversity jurisdiction where $75,000 or less is at stake, and the Supreme Court may not grant a certiorari petition in a civil case that is filed out of time.17 At the far end of the range, Congress could withdraw diversity jurisdiction from the lower courts entirely and leave those controversies to the state courts, because the power to grant or deny jurisdiction extends everywhere inside Article III's outer limits.18
The Court has said little on the subject, and what it has said is dated, but it recognizes a broad power to confine lower-court jurisdiction and has not yet recognized any express restriction on that power.19 Sheldon v. Sill is the classic illustration. The Court upheld a statute that denied diversity jurisdiction over a suit on a promissory note by an assignee unless the original holder could have sued, and it rejected the argument that Article III itself had given the lower court jurisdiction. The Article III list shows what Congress could have conferred, and the statute shows what Congress actually conferred.20
The ceiling is where a congressional grant fails.
Change one fact and the result flips. If the neighbor lives in Kentucky, the suit is a controversy between citizens of different states, a category Section 2 names, so Congress may confer jurisdiction over it.22 Congress has done so, subject to a statutory amount threshold.23 The single fact that moved, one party's citizenship, decides whether the case lies inside or outside Congress's reach.
Wide discretion ends where the structural limits begin. The separation-of-powers limit applies to the power to constitute inferior tribunals just as it applies to the exceptions power, so Congress may not manipulate lower-court jurisdiction to achieve a particular result in a pending case.24 Nor may it reopen and re-determine cases that the courts have fully and finally resolved.25 What remains unclear is whether Congress may go further and keep some or all federal courts from hearing whole categories of constitutional cases that legislators, for ideological reasons, do not want decided.26
Students tend to err in two directions. The first treats the Section 2 list as a command and assumes that every category it names must be vested in some lower federal court, when the history and the Court's rulings treat it as a ceiling. The second treats the power to create courts as a license to confer anything, which ignores both the ceiling and the structural limits. The authority is also steadier over the lower courts than over the Supreme Court's appellate docket, where McCardle's apparent support for all-but-plenary control still draws challenge.27
Channeling, Exclusivity, and Remedies
Article III's list says which cases the judicial power reaches, not which federal court hears them first, so Congress can sort them. Its authority to define lower-court jurisdiction supports three techniques: channeling a category of federal claims to a tribunal other than the district court, making a forum exclusive or concurrent, and limiting the remedies a lower federal court may award.30 All three follow from one structural point. A Congress that could have built no lower courts may build them on terms, and the terms may govern where a case is heard, who else may hear it, and what relief the court may give.
Channeling is the most visible technique. In Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, Congress gave the Merit Systems Protection Board exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal employee claims that would otherwise fall within the district courts' federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, with the Board's decisions reviewable in the Federal Circuit.31 The statute displaced the district court's § 1331 jurisdiction, but the claims stayed inside the federal system, because an Article III court of appeals reviews the Board's decisions.
The wartime price-control cases test the technique at larger scale. The Emergency Price Control Act sent challenges to price regulations to a single specialized court, the Emergency Court of Appeals, and Lockerty v. Phillips upheld that arrangement as a way of routing cases that might otherwise have gone to federal or state trial courts. Yakus v. United States went further and sustained the Act's bar on raising a regulation's invalidity as a defense in a criminal prosecution. Even so, the Court suggested a narrow holding and stressed the special circumstances of wartime inflation.32 It left open whether a person charged with violating a duly promulgated regulation could defend on the ground that the regulation was unconstitutional on its face, and whether a defendant who had diligently pursued the statutory procedure could be denied the defense that the regulation was invalid.33
Courts read such schemes narrowly when no emergency is present. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States involved a Clean Air Act provision that allowed only a short period after promulgation to challenge an emission standard in the D.C. Circuit. The Court still let a criminal defendant argue that the regulation was not really an emission standard, because Congress had precluded review of only a limited type of regulation. Justice Powell's concurrence added that so short a window would rarely give small businesses a realistic chance to challenge a regulation, which is the due process concern the later section on closed forums takes up.
Exclusivity asks which forums may hear a claim at all. A grant of jurisdiction adds a forum without removing any other, so a court's jurisdiction is exclusive only when Congress makes it so. Congress can make a tribunal's jurisdiction exclusive, as with the Board in Elgin. It can also make jurisdiction concurrent. Even within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Congress may provide that the jurisdiction be concurrent with the district courts, and it may give appellate jurisdiction in cases that might also fall within the original jurisdiction.34
When a statute names one forum and is silent about another, a presumption decides the case. In federal-question cases there is a presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction, and a statute that merely provides that a certain type of federal claim may be brought in an appropriate state court does not overcome it.35 In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, the district court kept its § 1331 jurisdiction, because a federal statute displaces that jurisdiction only if it “expressly or by fair implication, excludes federal-court adjudication.”36 Set beside Elgin, Mims marks the dividing line. The Elgin statute assigned the claims to another tribunal and so displaced the district court, while the Mims statute added a state forum and displaced nothing. The state courts stand in the same position from the other side. They serve as courts of first instance for federal claims whenever Congress builds no federal trial court.37 A bare grant of federal jurisdiction does not take that role away unless Congress makes federal jurisdiction exclusive, expressly or by fair implication.
The third technique reaches what a lower federal court may order once it has jurisdiction. The power to limit federal jurisdiction includes the authority to limit lower-court remedies.38 In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., a federal district court was held to have no jurisdiction to issue an injunction in a labor dispute except as Congress provided, and in Kline v. Burke Construction Co. a district court was held to have no jurisdiction to enjoin a parallel state proceeding.39 The federal anti-injunction statute generally forbids federal injunctions of state court proceedings but exempts injunctions expressly authorized by Act of Congress. Section 1983 of title 42 is such an authorization, so federal courts may enjoin state proceedings when necessary to protect constitutional rights, and the cases upholding the statute, read carefully, do not support a broad view of congressional power over lower-court jurisdiction.40 Congress has used limits of this kind repeatedly in recent legislation. The Prison Litigation Reform Act restricted the federal courts' remedial authority in prison-conditions litigation, AEDPA cut back their authority over habeas petitions, immigration reform sought to curtail judicial review for those under deportation orders, and the Detainee Treatment Act restricted habeas and other review for enemy combatants held at Guantanamo.41
None of these techniques is unlimited. Congress once amended a statute to disallow pardons as proof and purported to deny all courts jurisdiction to return property to someone holding a pardon. The Court held the amended statute unconstitutional because it attempted to dictate the result in pending cases and to limit the effect of a pardon, and because it closed all avenues of relief, unlike the statute in McCardle, it denied substantive rights.42 The next section develops that principle. For now, the point is that forum and remedy restrictions are valid, but they may not be used to manipulate lower-court jurisdiction to achieve a particular result in a pending case.43
The second step does the most work on exams, because a statute that mentions one forum is often offered as proof that it forbids another. Without an express or fairly implied exclusion, the presumption keeps the federal courts open for federal-question claims, and the state courts remain available for federal claims generally.