Concept
Ex parte McCardle
Congressional power to define and limit
Ex parte McCardle
Article III gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in every case outside its original jurisdiction, “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”1 The clause confers a power on Congress without saying how far it reaches. The power was tested in the famous case of Ex parte McCardle.2 Congress there repealed the statute that had opened one route of appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Court dismissed an appeal it had already heard argued.
The stakes explain the attention the case still draws. Supporters of jurisdiction-stripping proposals predict that, once federal courts stop hearing a class of cases, some state courts will reject the Supreme Court’s precedent and develop their own constitutional doctrine, which would change constitutional law by ordinary legislation instead of amendment. Skeptics reply that the precedents stay on the books and state courts may feel bound by them, so a restriction may defeat itself by keeping the federal courts from reconsidering prior decisions.3 Readers have long taken McCardle as giving Congress full control over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, though some say that reads too much into it.4
The safe statement of the holding is narrow. Congress may repeal a particular statutory route of Supreme Court review, even for an appeal already argued, and the Court must then dismiss. Whether Congress could close every federal route to a constitutional claim, the case does not settle.5 The sections below take the case in order: the facts and the repeal, the Court’s reasoning, the route that stayed open, and the neutrality of the withdrawal. The last two features set the limits of what the decision can be cited to prove.
Facts and the Repeal
Congress widened habeas corpus in 1867. The act of February 5 of that year let federal courts and judges grant the writ, an order requiring a jailer to justify a detention, whenever a person was restrained of liberty in violation of the Constitution, a treaty, or a federal law. It also allowed an appeal from the lower court to the Circuit Court and from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court.6 Before 1867 the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases, although it could issue original writs of habeas corpus and certiorari and review a lower court’s denial of habeas that way.7 The appeal route therefore existed only because the 1867 act created it.
William McCardle invoked the new statute. He was a civilian, not in the military service, held by military authority in Mississippi for trial before a military commission under the Reconstruction statutes. The charges rested on articles, alleged to be incendiary and libelous, in a newspaper he edited.8 Alleging unlawful restraint by military force, he petitioned the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for a writ of habeas corpus under the 1867 act.9
The case reached the Supreme Court, which heard argument on the merits on March 2, 3, 4, and 9 and took the case under advisement.10 The Justices had finished hearing the case and had not yet voted, and the merits put the validity of the Reconstruction legislation in question.11
Congress then moved. Before the Court conferred, it passed an act repealing the provision of the 1867 act that authorized appeals to the Supreme Court in these habeas cases. President Andrew Johnson returned the act with objections, and Congress repassed it by the constitutional majority on March 27.12 The Justices delayed their vote to give Congress time to override the veto.13 Congress’s aim was to avoid a Supreme Court determination that the Reconstruction legislation was unconstitutional.14
Counsel then asked to be heard on what the repeal did to the case. The Chief Justice was detained by his duties in the Court of Impeachment, so the cause stayed under advisement until the Court heard argument on the effect of the repealing act.15 The Court gave the repeal effect against McCardle’s own pending appeal, and it did not matter that the repeal took effect after argument.16
The timing makes the case a hard test of congressional power. A repeal enacted before McCardle took his appeal would look like ordinary management of the Court’s docket. This repeal came after full argument and before decision, it reached the appeal already pending, and Congress passed it to avoid a ruling on Reconstruction. Whether that purpose matters, and whether Congress can bind the Court at that moment, were the questions the Court had to answer.
The Holding and Its Reasoning
The Court held that Congress may repeal a statutory route of Supreme Court review even as to an appeal already argued, and that a court without jurisdiction can only announce the fact and dismiss. Chief Justice Chase reached that result in four steps.
The first step grants the petitioner his best point. The Court’s appellate jurisdiction is, “strictly speaking, conferred by the Constitution,” but the same grant carries a qualification: it is conferred “with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.”17 The grant and the power to except from it arrive together, so a constitutional source gives the petitioner no shield against a valid exception. Exceptions can be inferred from a statute that affirms other appellate jurisdiction, but this one required no inference. The 1867 provision affirming appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases was expressly repealed, and “[i]t is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception.”18 That plainness is one reason the decision anchors the traditional, or plenary power, reading of the Exceptions Clause, under which Congress may withdraw whole subject matters from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.19
The second step takes motive out of the case. Congress had acted to avoid a ruling on Reconstruction, but the Court said: “We can only examine its power under the Constitution, and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is given by express words.”20 If the power exists, the reason for using it does not remove it. A test keyed to purpose would also ask the Court to reconstruct what a majority of legislators wanted and to decide which wants were allowed, and nothing in the clause supplies a standard for that. Motive therefore drops out of the McCardle analysis, though other limits on the power survive that silence, as Klein shows below.
The third step carries the result to a case already argued. “Without jurisdiction the Court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist the only function remaining to the Court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”21 The appeal existed only because the 1867 act created that route, so the Court’s authority to decide it lasted only as long as the act did. Argument changed nothing, because the Court had decided nothing that the repeal could undo. A judgment entered after the repeal would be one the Court had no power to render, and the Chief Justice added that “judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer.”22 The Court also relied on its earlier decisions, such as Norris v. Crocker, that no judgment may be rendered in a suit after repeal of the act under which it was brought. For the same reason, repeal of an act pending an appeal under it is not an exercise of judicial power by the legislature, whether the repeal takes effect before or after argument.23
The reasoning stops short of final judgments. Congress may not reopen and redetermine a case the courts have fully and finally resolved, because that would intrude on the Third Branch and violate the separation of powers, as the Court held in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.24
The fourth step answers the petitioner’s cases. Counsel cited several decisions for the view that the repeal could not reach a pending case, and the Court found that none helped, because they involved either the exercise of judicial power by a legislature or legislative interference with courts in the exercise of continuing jurisdiction.25 Two state decisions show the category. In State v. Fleming, Tennessee had indicted the defendant under an 1838 liquor-sales statute, and in 1846, while the prosecution was pending, the legislature legalized such sales and provided that no one could be punished for violating the earlier statute. The Tennessee Supreme Court held the 1846 act invalid because the legislature had no power to interfere with the judicial function. In Fairchild, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a statute that granted a new trial to the unsuccessful defendant in a trespass suit, reasoning that the legislature was trying to exercise judicial power.26
Each of those statutes interfered with the judicial function in a specific matter. The 1868 repeal did not. Congress exercised its constitutional power to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and did not use that power to control the substantive results of a particular case; it withdrew only one avenue of appeal to the Supreme Court.27 The line the Court drew therefore separates a legislature that decides a case from a legislature that changes which court may hear it.
That line also tells you how to attack or defend a similar repeal. An argument that points to the legislators’ evident wish to avoid a ruling raises a question the Court treated as beside the point. The better questions are whether the statute withdraws a route to the Court or dictates a result in a pending case, and whether any avenue of federal review remains.
An Alternate Avenue Remained
The opinion’s last paragraph limits what the decision can be cited to prove. Counsel had assumed that giving the repeal effect would deny the Court all appellate power in habeas cases. The Chief Justice called that an error: “The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”28
Two routes could therefore bring a habeas case to the Court. Before 1867 the Court could issue original writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, a writ directing a lower court to send up its record for review, and could use them to examine a lower court’s denial of habeas relief.29 The 1867 act added a statutory appeal, and McCardle’s appeal was taken under it.30 The 1868 repeal removed that appeal and nothing else.31 A prisoner in McCardle’s position lost one door and kept another, so the repeal changed the path to the Court without removing the Court’s authority over habeas claims.32
Ex parte Yerger tested that closing paragraph soon afterward. The Court held that the repeal at issue in McCardle did not affect its certiorari jurisdiction, and that writs of habeas corpus and certiorari could revise the circuit court’s decision and free a prisoner from unlawful restraint.33 The Judiciary Act of 1789 had continued to give the Court appellate jurisdiction over habeas petitions, and the Court exercised it.34 Yerger shows that the limit that cost McCardle his appeal had little practical effect on similar cases, because an alternative review remained.35
Felker v. Turpin shows the same pattern later. Congress withdrew Supreme Court jurisdiction over second or successive habeas corpus petitions filed in the federal courts, and the withdrawal was charged with unconstitutionally ousting the Court of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court upheld it because it still retained jurisdiction over original habeas corpus petitions.36 In McCardle and Felker, a statute closed one route and another stayed open.
These cases separate two kinds of jurisdictional statute. A repeal that closes one route and leaves another changes only the path to the Court. A statute that closes every federal route to a class of constitutional claims does something the 1868 act did not do, and the closing paragraph of McCardle records that the 1868 act left the earlier habeas jurisdiction untouched.37
A common mistake is to cite McCardle for the bare proposition that Congress may remove federal jurisdiction over any subject it chooses. That reads the first half of the holding and drops the Court’s own observation that the repeal left the earlier habeas jurisdiction untouched. Courts also avoid the harder question by construing a statute to leave a route open, as in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, where a purported jurisdiction-stripping measure about deportation proceedings was read to preserve federal habeas review.41
Whether the open alternative was essential to the result in McCardle remains unclear.42 Scholars have debated the meaning of the closing paragraph for more than a century, and the Supreme Court has never chosen between the readings.43 On the first reading, the paragraph is a passing remark that another path existed, and McCardle supports the plenary view that Congress may withdraw whole subject matters from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.44 On the second, the paragraph is essential: Congress may not use the Exceptions power to destroy the Court’s essential role in the constitutional plan, and that role survives the loss of one avenue of review only because another remained open.45 Henry Hart gave this view its best-known form when he argued that the exceptions power may not interfere with the Court’s core functions.46 The second reading has little or no direct authority, though Yerger’s survival of the repeal fortifies it, and on that reasoning a total denial of access in cases involving the supremacy of federal law would be invalid.47
A last point of scope limits the case. In McCardle, Congress took no jurisdiction from the lower federal courts; it withdrew only one avenue of appeal to the Supreme Court.48 Congress’s control over the lower courts is older than McCardle. In 1802 the Jeffersonian Congress repealed a judiciary law that had created freestanding circuit courts with a general grant of federal-question jurisdiction, turned sitting judges out of office, and returned many federal-question cases to the state courts.49 A later section takes up the lower courts.
A Neutral Withdrawal
The 1868 repeal operated the same way whoever stood to win. The denial of appeal applied to the Government and to a private party alike. Had the Government lost a habeas action below in some later case, it would have been denied an appellate remedy in the Supreme Court exactly as McCardle was.50 A limit with that shape is neutral: it decides which routes to the Court exist without deciding who benefits from the Court’s decisions.
Neutrality matters because of what a jurisdictional statute can be made to do. A limit that applies whoever would win only rearranges where cases may be heard, and Congress cannot know which side the rearrangement will favor in the cases still to come. A limit that bites only when a favored side would lose settles the outcome in advance and labels the settlement jurisdiction. Neutrality therefore helps assure that a congressional withdrawal is not an attempt to alter the results of specific cases.51 That observation eases a tension inside McCardle. Congress acted out of fear that the Court would hold the Reconstruction legislation unconstitutional,52 yet the Court examined only Congress’s power and left its motive alone. Because the repeal bound both sides, it did not itself dictate who would prevail. It said nothing about whether the Reconstruction Acts were valid or whether McCardle should go free, and it removed one route of review for whichever party lost below.
The contrast case is United States v. Klein. The Court had held that a presidential pardon was equivalent to proof of loyalty in claims like the one before it,53 and a claimant had won a judgment in the Court of Claims on that basis. While an appeal from that judgment was pending, Congress enacted a law, written as a jurisdictional statute, that did three things. A pardon would not support a claim for captured property. Acceptance of a pardon without disclaimer was conclusive evidence that the claimant had aided the enemy. And if the Court of Claims based its judgment for the claimant on a pardon, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction on appeal.54
The Court conceded that Congress controls the Court of Claims and may confer or withhold the right of appeal from its decisions, and that a simple denial of appeal in a particular class of cases would have to be given effect as an exception to the appellate jurisdiction.55 The proviso was different. It withheld jurisdiction only as a means to an end, and its controlling purpose was to deny pardons the effect the Court had adjudged them to have.56 The Court would have jurisdiction up to a point, find that a pardon existed, and then be required to dismiss, so the denial of jurisdiction rested solely on a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.57 The Court asked whether it could comply without “allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor,” and it concluded that Congress had “inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power.”58
The two statutes share a timing: each arrived while a case was pending. The 1868 repeal removed a route of appeal from whichever party lost below and left the constitutional question in McCardle unanswered. The Klein proviso worked only against a claimant holding a pardon, and it told the Court to treat a pardon as having an effect opposite to the one the Court had already held it had. The practical question is therefore who loses under the statute. If the answer is whichever side loses below, the statute resembles McCardle; if the answer is only the side Congress disfavors in the pending case, it resembles Klein. Neutrality is one marker among several, and a neutral statute that closed every federal forum to a constitutional claim would still face the limit described in the preceding section. A later section of this chapter develops the Klein principle in full.