Also known as: where the action might have been brought · venue transfer · 28 USC 1404
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory precondition in federal venue law that limits transfer to a district possessing subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and proper venue.
NebulaSoft sued TitanCloud in a Midwestern federal court. TitanCloud moved to transfer to the Northern District of California. The court granted the motion after confirming that the California district had subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over TitanCloud, and proper venue because nearly all witnesses and documents were located there.
Albert Ferens filed suit in Pennsylvania after losing his hand in a combine harvester. He later moved to transfer the case to Mississippi. The Supreme Court held that the transferee court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the original forum because the Mississippi district was one where the action might have been brought.
Albert Ferens, a Pennsylvania resident, lost his right hand when it became caught in a combine harvester manufactured by Deere & Company while he was working on his farm in Pennsylvania. For reasons not explained in the record, Ferens delayed filing a tort suit, and Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period expired. In the third year after the accident, Ferens and his wife filed a diversity action against Deere in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, raising contract and warranty claims as to which the Pennsylvania limitations period had not yet run. The Ferenses are Pennsylvania residents, and Deere is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Illinois. In the same year the Ferenses filed a second diversity suit against Deere in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging negligence and products liability. They chose the Mississippi forum because they knew that under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. the federal court would apply the same choice-of-law rules that Mississippi state courts would apply. A Mississippi court would apply Mississippi’s six-year statute of limitations to the tort claim arising under Pennsylvania law. The Ferenses then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the Mississippi action to the Western District of Pennsylvania on the ground that Pennsylvania was a more convenient forum. They acted on the assumption that after transfer the Mississippi choice-of-law rules, including application of the Mississippi statute of limitations, would continue to govern the suit. Deere did not oppose the motion, and the District Court in Mississippi granted the transfer after accepting that the Ferenses resided in Pennsylvania, the accident occurred there, the claim had no connection to Mississippi, a substantial number of witnesses resided in the Western District of Pennsylvania but none in Mississippi, most documentary evidence was located in Pennsylvania but none in Mississippi, and the warranty action pending in Pennsylvania presented common questions of law and fact. The District Court in Pennsylvania consolidated the transferred tort action with the pending warranty action but declined to apply the Mississippi statute of limitations. It ruled that because the Ferenses had moved for transfer as plaintiffs the rule from Van Dusen v. Barrack did not apply, and it dismissed the tort action under Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially affirmed on due process grounds. After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Third Circuit again affirmed. This time it held that a transferor court’s choice-of-law rules do not apply after a § 1404(a) transfer on a motion by a plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseStewart Organization sued Ricoh in Alabama despite a contractual clause designating Manhattan as the forum. Ricoh moved to transfer under section 1404(a). The Court ruled that the statute governs the motion and that Manhattan was a district where the action might have been brought because the clause supplied consent.
Stewart Organization, Inc., an Alabama corporation, entered into a dealership agreement with Ricoh Corporation, a nationwide manufacturer whose principal place of business is in New Jersey, obligating Stewart to market Ricoh copier products. The agreement contained a forum-selection clause stating that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with the agreement. Business relations between the parties soured, and in September 1984 Stewart filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging breach of the dealership agreement together with claims for breach of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations. Relying on the forum-selection clause, Ricoh moved the district court to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406; the district court denied the motion after concluding that Alabama law governed and disfavored enforcement of such clauses, then certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that federal law governs venue questions in diversity actions and that the clause is enforceable; after rehearing en banc the full court adopted the panel result and reasoning, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSurvivors of a Boston plane crash sued in Pennsylvania. The airline moved to transfer to Massachusetts. The Court confirmed that Massachusetts was a district where the actions might have been brought because the crash occurred there and the airline was subject to jurisdiction there.
On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.
View caseBurger King sued Rudzewicz in Florida for breach of a franchise agreement. Rudzewicz moved to transfer to Michigan. The Court noted that Michigan was a district where the action might have been brought because Rudzewicz had sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction there.
In 1978 John Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident and senior partner in a Detroit accounting firm, was approached by Brian MacShara about jointly applying for a Burger King franchise in the Detroit area. They submitted their application to Burger King’s Birmingham, Michigan district office, which forwarded it to the company’s Miami headquarters. During the ensuing four months Rudzewicz and MacShara negotiated with both the Birmingham district office and Miami headquarters over site-development fees, building design, computation of monthly rent, and assignment of liabilities. With some misgivings they obtained limited concessions from the Miami headquarters, signed the final agreements, and commenced operations in June 1979 for the Drayton Plains facility. The agreements stated that the franchise relationship was established in Miami and governed by Florida law, required all royalty, advertising, and rent payments to be sent to Miami, and obligated Rudzewicz to attend training in Miami. MacShara completed the training course there and the franchisees purchased $165,000 in equipment from Burger King’s Miami division. The Drayton Plains restaurant enjoyed steady business during the summer of 1979 but patronage declined after a recession began later that year. Rudzewicz and MacShara fell far behind on their monthly payments to Miami. Burger King headquarters sent notices of default and conducted prolonged negotiations by mail and telephone with the franchisees, but the negotiations failed and headquarters terminated the franchise. Rudzewicz and MacShara refused to vacate and continued to operate the facility as a Burger King restaurant. Burger King commenced suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in May 1981. It invoked diversity and federal trademark jurisdiction. Burger King alleged breach of the franchise agreements by failure to make required payments in Miami together with trademark infringement. The district court denied Rudzewicz’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, conducted a three-day bench trial, entered judgment against Rudzewicz and MacShara jointly and severally for $228,875 in contract damages, ordered them to close the restaurant or surrender possession, and awarded costs and attorney’s fees. Rudzewicz appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed on the ground that the circumstances left Rudzewicz without reasonable notice of suit in Florida. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional ruling.
View caseA seaman injured on a vessel sued in Louisiana. The defendant moved to transfer to Texas. The Court observed that Texas was a district where the action might have been brought because the injury occurred in Texas waters and the defendant conducted substantial business there.
In 1987, William Robert Miller, a resident of Mississippi, moved to Pennsylvania to seek employment. He was hired by American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, to work as a seaman aboard the MV John R., a tug operating on the Delaware River. During the course of that employment Miller was injured. After receiving medical treatment in Pennsylvania and New York, he returned to Mississippi where he continued to be treated by local physicians. On December 1, 1989, Miller filed this action in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. He sought relief under the Jones Act, which authorizes a seaman who suffers personal injury in the course of his employment to bring an action for damages at law. State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such claims. Miller also requested relief under general maritime law for unseaworthiness, for wages, and for maintenance and cure. The trial court granted American Dredging Company's motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that it was bound to apply that doctrine by federal maritime law. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that Article 123(C) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which renders the doctrine of forum non conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and maritime law cases brought in Louisiana state courts, is not preempted by federal maritime law. American Dredging Company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted.
View caseThe court must confirm that the transferee district has subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and proper venue under the general venue statute. This threshold ensures the plaintiff could have filed there originally.
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No. The plaintiff's choice receives deference but yields when convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice strongly favor the transferee district that could have hosted the original filing.
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Yes. The statute expressly permits transfer to any district to which all parties have consented even if that district would not independently satisfy the might-have-been-brought test.
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The requirement preserves the original forum's choice-of-law rules in the transferee court. This rule prevents plaintiffs from using transfer to obtain more favorable substantive law.
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…and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought"). This provision embodies in an expanded version the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens , under which a court in appropriate circumstances may decline to exercise its…