Also known as:weighted votes · weighted voting · weighted voting system
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An arrangement under which particular shareholders or directors cast votes that receive greater weight than those of others in corporate decision-making. The mechanism reallocates authority over specified matters by assigning multiple votes to designated participants or committees.
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Common Examples
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Weighted Committee Vote on Franchises
Watershed Pharmaceuticals shareholders signed a written agreement delivered to the corporation requiring any new franchise decision to go through a three-director Franchise Committee where Director X's vote counts as three and the others count as one each. The full board later approved franchises by ordinary majority vote without committee action. Wanda Weaver sued to invalidate the approvals because the board bypassed the weighted committee process required by the agreement.
Legislative Apportionment Challenge
State legislators drew districts giving rural counties disproportionate representation so that a rural voter's ballot carried more effective weight than an urban voter's ballot. Wilma Wright, an urban resident, sued claiming the scheme impaired the right to an adequately weighted vote. The court examined whether the population deviations violated equal protection.
Reynolds v. Sims377 U.S. 533 (1964)
The 1901 Alabama Constitution and implementing statutes fixed the structure of the state legislature at a 35-member Senate and a 106-member House of Representatives. Seats were allocated among the state's 67 counties according to detailed formulas that guaranteed each county at least one House seat and prevented any county from receiving more than one Senate seat.
Those provisions, last implemented after the 1900 federal census, remained in force without substantial change through 1961. The state's population had grown from roughly 1.8 million to more than 3.2 million, with the great majority of the increase occurring in urban counties.
On August 26, 1961, residents, taxpayers, and voters of Jefferson County filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against various state and party officials responsible for conducting elections. The plaintiffs alleged that the existing apportionment, based on the 1900 census, produced severe population disparities. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a court-ordered at-large election if the legislature failed to act.
Three groups of voters from Jefferson, Mobile, and Etowah Counties later intervened as plaintiffs. After this Court decided Baker v. Carr, the three-judge District Court convened and set the case for hearing. In July 1962 the Alabama Legislature, meeting in special session, adopted two measures. One was a proposed constitutional amendment known as the 67-Senator Amendment that would give each county one senator and distribute additional House seats by population. The other was a statutory standby plan called the Crawford-Webb Act that made only modest changes to Senate districts while retaining the county-based House structure.
Trial evidence consisted primarily of 1960 census figures showing Senate population-variance ratios as high as 41-to-1 and House ratios as high as 16-to-1 under all three plans. On July 21, 1962, the District Court held the existing apportionment and both legislative proposals invalid. It ordered into effect a temporary plan drawn from portions of the two new measures for use in the November 1962 elections and retained jurisdiction to permit the legislature an opportunity to enact a permanent plan. Notices of appeal to this Court from the District Court's decision were timely filed by defendants below and by two groups of intervenor-plaintiffs. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 10, 1963.
Landowner Voting in Water District
A water storage district limited voting for its board to landowners and assigned votes in proportion to acreage owned. Wayne Walker, a non-landowner resident, challenged the system after large corporate landowners secured permanent control. The court considered whether the weighted acreage scheme satisfied equal protection.
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District410 U.S. 719 (1973)
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District consists of 193,000 acres of intensively cultivated, highly fertile farm land located in the Tulare Lake Basin. Its population consists of 77 persons, including 18 children, most of whom are employees of one or another of the four corporations that farm 85% of the land in the district.
The district was organized pursuant to the California Water Storage District Act. Such districts are authorized to plan projects and execute approved projects for the acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of water.
Incidental to this general power, districts may acquire, improve, and operate any necessary works for the storage and distribution of water as well as any drainage or reclamation works connected therewith. The costs of the projects are assessed against district land in accordance with the benefits accruing to each tract held in separate ownership. They may fix tolls and charges for the use of water and collect them from all persons receiving the benefit of the water or other services in proportion to the services rendered.
Governance of the districts is undertaken by a board of directors. Each director is elected from one of the divisions within the district. General elections for the directors are to be held in odd-numbered years. Only the holders of title to land are entitled to vote at a general election. Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars, or fraction thereof, worth of his land, exclusive of improvements, minerals, and mineral rights therein, in the precinct.
Appellants are landowners, a landowner-lessee, and residents within the area, included in the appellee’s water storage district. They brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in an effort to prevent appellee from giving effect to certain provisions of the California Water Code. They allege that §§ 41000 and 41001 unconstitutionally deny to them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that only landowners are permitted to vote in water storage district general elections, and votes in those elections are apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land.
A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and the case was submitted on factual statements of the parties and briefs, without testimony or oral argument. A majority of the District Court held that both statutes comported with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause, and appellants have appealed that judgment directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Age-Based Voting Restriction
A state law permitted only taxpayers over twenty-one to vote on certain bond issues, effectively giving their ballots greater weight on fiscal matters than those of younger citizens. Winter Wolfe, an eighteen-year-old resident, sued claiming the restriction denied equal voting weight. The court assessed the constitutionality of the age and property qualifications.
Oregon v. Mitchell400 U.S. 112 (1970).
In 1970 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act Amendments, Pub. L. 91-285.
By its terms the Act lowered the minimum voting age from 21 to 18 in both state and federal elections. It also barred the use of literacy tests in all elections for a five-year period based on findings of racial discrimination. The Act eliminated durational residency requirements while providing uniform absentee voting rules for presidential and vice-presidential elections.
Oregon, Texas, Arizona, and Idaho resisted compliance. Oregon and Texas sought to enjoin the 18-year-old voting provisions. The United States sought orders requiring Arizona and Idaho to conform their laws to the Act. Arizona required voters to be 21 and to read the Constitution in English and write their names. Idaho imposed a 60-day state residency requirement for presidential elections along with other restrictions.
The suits were argued on October 19, 1970. The record before Congress included evidence of past discriminatory use of literacy tests, statistics showing lower minority registration, and data on educational disparities from prior segregation. Congress also received testimony that 18-year-olds had assumed military service responsibilities and that Georgia and Kentucky had permitted younger voters without difficulty.
The Court announced its judgments on December 21, 1970. Separate opinions addressed the three provisions and their application to federal versus state elections.
Partisan Gerrymandering Claim
State mapmakers drew legislative districts that concentrated opposition voters into a few districts while spreading supporters across many, diluting the weight of opposition ballots. Winona Walsh, a voter in a packed district, sued alleging the plan impaired the right to an equally weighted vote. The court evaluated whether the partisan skew created a justiciable injury.
Gill v. Whitford585 U.S. _, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2018)
Following the 2010 census, Wisconsin's Republican-controlled Legislature passed Act 43, which established new boundaries for the State's 99 Assembly districts. The plan took effect for the 2012 and 2014 elections, in which Republican candidates won 60 and 63 seats respectively while receiving 48.6 percent and 52 percent of the statewide two-party vote.
In July 2015, twelve registered Democratic voters filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against several members of the state election commission. The plaintiffs alleged that Act 43 unfairly favored Republicans by cracking Democratic voters across multiple districts and packing them into a few others.
Four plaintiffs specifically alleged residence in districts that had been cracked or packed under the plan. Lead plaintiff William Whitford testified that Act 43 had not affected his ability to vote for and elect a Democrat in his district. He nevertheless suffered a harm related to his ability to engage in campaign activity to achieve a majority in the Assembly and the Senate. The plaintiffs also introduced testimony from legislative aides and a political scientist involved in drafting the map, along with expert analyses comparing the efficiency gap under Act 43 to alternative maps.
The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The case proceeded to a four-day trial that included fact witnesses and four expert witnesses. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The court enjoined further use of the Act 43 map and directed the Legislature to adopt a new plan by November 1, 2017. The defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which stayed the District Court's order pending resolution of the appeal.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What formal requirements must a shareholder agreement satisfy to create weighted voting on specific corporate matters?
The agreement must be in writing and signed by all shareholders at the time it is made. It must also be made known to the corporation. Once these steps are completed the weighted voting arrangement is effective even if it conflicts with default bylaws or statutory rules on director voting.
Does failure to note the weighted voting agreement on stock certificates invalidate the arrangement?
No. The statute expressly provides that omission of certificate notation does not affect the validity of the agreement or any action taken under it. Shareholders who signed the agreement remain bound regardless of the missing notation.
Supporting sources
Can a later shareholder challenge a weighted voting agreement that was valid when adopted?
A later purchaser generally takes subject to a properly adopted agreement. The statute focuses on unanimous consent among shareholders at the time of formation and actual knowledge by the corporation rather than requiring fresh ratification by each new owner.
Supporting sources
Does weighted voting among directors violate public policy?
No. Modern statutes expressly authorize shareholder agreements that assign different voting weights to directors on designated subjects. Such arrangements are enforceable provided they meet the formation requirements and do not contravene other public policy limits.
Supporting sources
How does a weighted voting agreement interact with the board's ordinary management authority?
The agreement can withdraw specified decisions from the full board and assign them to a committee or weighted body. The board must follow the reallocated process on those matters even though directors normally hold broad management powers under default rules.
Supporting sources
or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise.” Provisions authorizing a selective franchise are disfavored, because they “always pose the danger of denying some…
is part of the one-person, one-
vote
right that we have recognized. But the majority declines to find such a right in the Equal Protection Clause. Ante, at 1132-1133. Rather, the majority…
was outlawed. Rather, it allowed a county unit
system
to be used in weighting the
votes
if the
system
showed no greater disparity against a county than exists against any State in the…
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