585 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2018)
Following the 2010 census, Wisconsin's Republican-controlled Legislature passed Act 43, which established new boundaries for the State's 99 Assembly districts.1 The plan took effect for the 2012 and 2014 elections, in which Republican candidates won 60 and 63 seats respectively while receiving 48.6 percent and 52 percent of the statewide two-party vote.2
In July 2015, twelve registered Democratic voters filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against several members of the state election commission.3 The plaintiffs alleged that Act 43 unfairly favored Republicans by cracking Democratic voters across multiple districts and packing them into a few others.4
Four plaintiffs specifically alleged residence in districts that had been cracked or packed under the plan.5 Lead plaintiff William Whitford testified that Act 43 had not affected his ability to vote for and elect a Democrat in his district.6 He nevertheless suffered a harm related to his ability to engage in campaign activity to achieve a majority in the Assembly and the Senate.7 The plaintiffs also introduced testimony from legislative aides and a political scientist involved in drafting the map, along with expert analyses comparing the efficiency gap under Act 43 to alternative maps.8
The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.9 The case proceeded to a four-day trial that included fact witnesses and four expert witnesses.10 The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs.11 The court enjoined further use of the Act 43 map and directed the Legislature to adopt a new plan by November 1, 2017.12 The defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which stayed the District Court's order pending resolution of the appeal.13
Whether the plaintiffs have established an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and traceable to the challenged districting plan for purposes of Article III standing?14
To meet the standing requirements of Article III, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized.
No. The plaintiffs alleged that Act 43 diluted Democratic votes through cracking and packing.15 They supported this claim with efficiency gap calculations and expert testimony on statewide partisan effects.16 Yet none of the plaintiffs proved residence in a packed or cracked district.17 Lead plaintiff Whitford testified that Act 43 had not affected his ability to vote for and elect a Democrat in his district.18
The District Court found a personal injury to equal protection rights based on statewide harm.19 But the evidence of mapmakers' intent and partisan asymmetry studies addressed group political interests rather than individual burdens on particular voters' votes.20
The plaintiffs failed to establish the required injury in fact traceable to the Act 43 map, so they lack Article III standing.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Thomas joined the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove Article III standing.22 He would have gone further and held that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable in their entirety.23 The Constitution does not provide judicially manageable standards for evaluating such claims.24
The Framers understood that districting would involve political considerations, and they committed the task of districting to the state legislatures.25 The District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear this case, and its judgment should be vacated on that basis rather than remanded for further proceedings.26
Whether the plaintiffs' claims fall within the exception to the particularized injury requirement recognized in Baker v. Carr for vote dilution claims?27
Claims of vote dilution present justiciable issues under Baker v. Carr when plaintiffs allege denial of a vote of equal weight to that of other voters.28
No. The plaintiffs relied on Baker and Reynolds to argue that their claims of diluted Democratic votes were statewide in nature and thus exempt from strict particularity requirements.29 They alleged harm to Democrats as a group through the efficiency gap.30 They did not show that their individual votes were diluted in their own districts.31 This theory differs from the individual and personal injuries recognized in those precedents where malapportionment affected specific voters' weighted votes.32
The plaintiffs' claims do not fall within the Baker v. Carr exception because they rest on statewide group interests rather than particularized individual injuries.33
Whether the plaintiffs' claims fit within the exception recognized in United States v. Hays for challenges involving racially gerrymandered districts?34
Under United States v. Hays, a plaintiff who does not live in a racially gerrymandered district generally may not challenge it.35
No. The plaintiffs invoked Hays to support standing for their partisan gerrymandering claims.36 They failed to show that any plaintiff lived in a district that was packed or cracked under Act 43 or in an adjacent district.37 The four plaintiffs who initially alleged such residence did not pursue or prove those allegations at trial.38 The statewide efficiency gap evidence did not establish district-specific effects on individual voters.39
The plaintiffs cannot invoke the Hays exception, leaving them without standing under that line of authority.40
Whether the plaintiffs have identified any other basis for Article III standing arising from harm to their interest in the overall composition of the legislature?41
A citizen's interest in the overall composition of the legislature is embodied in the right to vote for a representative.42
No. The plaintiffs argued that Act 43 harmed their interest in collective representation and the legislature's composition by producing a large efficiency gap favoring Republicans.43 This asserted harm is not particularized to any individual plaintiff.44 It instead reflects a collective political interest in statewide outcomes rather than a concrete injury to any specific voter.45 The Court has consistently refused to recognize such an interest as a basis for standing separate from district-specific vote dilution.46
The plaintiffs have identified no other basis for Article III standing.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, And Sotomayor
Justice Kagan agreed that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing under a vote dilution theory because they did not prove residence in packed or cracked districts.48 She wrote separately to note that the decision leaves open the possibility of proving standing on remand with district-specific evidence.49 She also observed that an alternative associational injury theory under the First Amendment would not require district-specific proof of packing or cracking.50
The harm to a party's ability to function would be statewide in nature.51