Also known as: waiting periods · wait period · waiting time
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A mandatory interval that must elapse before a legal right or remedy becomes available or enforceable. The interval protects privacy, prevents hasty decisions, or ensures procedural fairness before the right or remedy may be exercised.
Wilma Wright moved from State X to State Y and applied for welfare benefits. State Y's statute limited her payments to the amount she would have received in State X for the first year. The one-year waiting period for full benefits prevented Wilma from receiving equal treatment with longer-term residents. The court held the waiting period unconstitutional under the right to travel.
Wanda Weaver suffered injuries in a bus crash. Thirty days later an attorney sent her a letter stating that liability was clear and offering representation. The state ethics rule barred such targeted solicitations during the thirty-day waiting period after the accident. The court upheld the waiting period as a reasonable, content-neutral restriction protecting vulnerable victims.
Warren Woods and his former partner signed a surrogacy agreement providing that the partner would relinquish the child at birth. The agreement contained no reasonable waiting period allowing the surrogate to change her mind. The court refused to enforce the agreement because the absence of a waiting period rendered it contrary to public policy.
A.Z. and B.Z. married in 1977. For the first two years they resided in Virginia, where both served in the armed forces. They underwent fertility testing after difficulties conceiving. The wife suffered an ectopic pregnancy that resulted in miscarriage and removal of her left fallopian tube. In 1980 the couple moved to Maryland for a year of additional fertility treatment that produced no pregnancy. The wife transferred to Massachusetts in 1988 while the husband remained in Maryland for schooling. He joined her in Massachusetts in 1991. After arriving in Massachusetts the wife began IVF treatments at a clinic. The couple first attempted a GIFT procedure on November 6, 1988, which produced another ectopic pregnancy and removal of the wife's remaining fallopian tube. They then pursued IVF from 1988 through 1991. Each time before egg retrieval the couple signed a clinic consent form. They executed seven such forms in total, the last in August 1991. On every form the wife wrote that the preembryos should be returned to her for implantation should the couple separate. The husband usually signed the forms while blank and before the wife completed the disposition language. The 1991 treatment produced twin daughters born in 1992, and two vials of preembryos were frozen for possible later use. In spring 1995, before the couple separated, the wife thawed one vial and had a preembryo implanted without informing the husband. He learned of the procedure from an insurance notice. Relations deteriorated, the wife obtained a protective order against the husband, the couple separated, and the husband filed for divorce. At the time of divorce one vial containing four frozen preembryos remained in storage. The husband moved for a permanent injunction prohibiting the wife from using the preembryos. The Probate and Family Court bifurcated the preembryos issue from the divorce action and held a hearing at which both parties were represented by counsel. The probate judge found the consent form unenforceable because of changed circumstances since 1991 and balanced the parties' interests, granting the husband a permanent injunction. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion. On February 8, 2000, it issued an order affirming the Probate and Family Court judgment, with this opinion to follow.
Wyatt Wilson launched a tender offer for shares of a target company incorporated in Illinois. The state statute imposed a twenty-day waiting period after filing before the offer could proceed and allowed the secretary to call a hearing during that period. The court struck down the waiting period as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
MITE Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary MITE Holdings, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal executive offices in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation, on January 19, 1979, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. MITE offered $28 per share, approximately $4 above the prevailing market price, but did not register the offer under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. On the same day MITE filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause, together with temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief. Chicago Rivet responded three days later by suing in Pennsylvania to enjoin the offer under that state's takeover disclosure law, but its efforts there proved unsuccessful. On February 1, 1979, the Illinois Secretary of State notified MITE of his intent to issue a cease-and-desist order. The following day Chicago Rivet informed MITE it would file suit in Illinois state court, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE's tender offer. MITE published its nationwide tender offer in the February 5, 1979, edition of the Wall Street Journal. Chicago Rivet simultaneously offered to purchase approximately 40 percent of its own shares at $30 per share. On February 9 the district court entered final judgment declaring the Illinois Act preempted by the Williams Act and violative of the Commerce Clause, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The parties then entered an agreement withdrawing both offers and granting MITE thirty days to examine Chicago Rivet's books and records. On March 2, 1979, MITE announced it would not proceed with any tender offer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Whitney White sought an abortion at a Pennsylvania clinic. The statute required a twenty-four-hour waiting period after receiving state-mandated information before the procedure could occur. The court upheld the waiting period because it did not impose an undue burden on the right to choose.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
Whitney Washington obtained cancellation of deportation. Federal law then imposed a five-year waiting period before she could apply for citizenship. The court noted that the waiting period began only after her status was adjusted and that the period must be completed before naturalization eligibility arose.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
A waiting period ensures that a right or remedy is not exercised immediately. It protects vulnerable parties, prevents hasty decisions, or allows time for procedural safeguards. Courts evaluate whether the period is reasonable and narrowly tailored to its purpose.
A one-year waiting period that limits new residents to benefits available in their former state violates equal protection and the privileges or immunities clause. The period treats new arrivals differently from longer-term residents without sufficient justification. The Supreme Court has invalidated such durational residency requirements.
…is such a provision. It is an undue burden, and therefore unconstitutional. The informed consent provisions, the 24-hour waiting period, the parental consent provision with judicial bypass, and the reporting requirements do not impose an undue burden and are therefore constitutional. Concurring opinions Concurring…
…of Chadha's deportation from ripening into cancellation of deportation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's 5-year waiting period
…the Secretary unless the Secretary calls a hearing. ¶ 137.54.E. The Secretary may call a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he believes it is necessary to protect the shareholders of the target company, and a hearing must be held if requested by a majority…
…of the fifth month of pregnancy was constitutional; he agreed with the majority, however, that the three-month post-delivery waiting period
…for use of public highway violates public policy); Parsons v. Trask , 7 Gray 473, 478 (1856) (contract establishing unlimited period of servitude violates public policy). : We have enforced agreements regarding the family relationship once the parties have freely entered into that relationship, but these cases…
States may impose a short, content-neutral waiting period to protect accident victims from overreaching during a vulnerable time. The period prevents misleading claims of clear liability from reaching potential clients too soon. Courts uphold such rules when they are reasonable and do not suppress truthful speech.
The waiting period runs from the filing of a registration statement until its effectiveness. During this interval issuers may make oral offers but not sales, and written offers must use a compliant prospectus. The period allows SEC review while restricting premature sales.
A creditor must send written notice of default and right to cure to each obligor and then wait at least thirty days before initiating foreclosure. The period gives borrowers time to cure and ensures proper notice. Failure to observe the full waiting period renders the foreclosure defective.