Also known as:vehicle exceptions · automobile exception · car exception
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Fourth Amendment doctrine that allows law enforcement officers to search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. The doctrine rests on the vehicle's ready mobility and the reduced expectation of privacy associated with automobiles compared to homes. Officers may search the vehicle and any containers that could hold the object of the search.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Towed Vehicle Searched at Station
Officer Ramirez stops Vanessa Vinson for speeding and smells marijuana. He has probable cause at the roadside. Ramirez seizes the car, tows it to the station, and searches the trunk two hours later without a warrant, finding drugs. The search is valid because the initial probable cause supports the later stationhouse search.
Driveway Search Blocked by Curtilage
Officers receive a tip that Vivian Vaughn keeps stolen goods in her car parked in the driveway next to her house. Without a warrant they walk onto the driveway and open the trunk. The search is invalid because the driveway is curtilage and the automobile exception does not justify entry onto protected residential property.
Officer Torres stops Vincent Valdez and his passenger Valerie Viera. A trained dog alerts at the car door. Torres searches the vehicle and opens Valerie's purse on the back seat, finding pills. The search of the purse is lawful because the dog alert supplied probable cause to search the car and its containers.
Plain-View Seizure During Lawful Vehicle Search
During a traffic stop of Vaughn Valentine's truck, an officer sees a firearm in plain view on the floorboard while lawfully searching for drugs. The officer seizes the gun. The seizure is valid because the item was discovered in plain view during a search justified by probable cause under the vehicle exception.
Horton v. California496 U.S. 128 (1990)
Petitioner Terry Brice Horton was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. When Wallaker returned to his home after the Club's annual show, he entered his garage and was accosted by two masked men, one armed with a machine gun and the other with an electrical shocking device. The two men shocked Wallaker, bound and handcuffed him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During the encounter sufficient conversation took place to enable Wallaker subsequently to identify petitioner's distinctive voice.
Sergeant LaRault, an experienced police officer, investigated the crime and determined that there was probable cause to search petitioner's home for the proceeds of the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. His affidavit for a search warrant referred to police reports that described the weapons as well as the proceeds, but the warrant issued by the Magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds, including three specifically described rings.
Pursuant to the warrant, LaRault searched petitioner's residence, but he did not find the stolen property. During the course of the search, however, he discovered the weapons in plain view and seized them. Specifically, he seized an Uzi machine gun, a .38-caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing identified by the victim. LaRault testified that while he was searching for the rings, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting petitioner to the robbery.
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in petitioner's home and, after a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected petitioner's argument that the decision in Coolidge required suppression of the seized evidence that had not been listed in the warrant because its discovery was not inadvertent. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Police develop probable cause that Vincente Vukovic's car contains evidence but the vehicle sits parked in his driveway for days. Officers tow and search it without a warrant. The search is valid because the initial probable cause at the time of seizure supports the later search even after impoundment.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire403 U.S. 443 (1971)
In January 1964, fourteen-year-old Pamela Mason disappeared from her home in Manchester, New Hampshire, during a heavy snowstorm after receiving a telephone call about a babysitting job. Her body was discovered eight days later beside a major highway, prompting a massive police investigation.
On January 28, officers visited Edward Coolidge at his home after learning he had been absent on the night of the disappearance. Coolidge produced three guns for inspection and agreed to take a lie-detector test. On February 2, while Coolidge was at the police station undergoing the test, two plainclothes officers arrived at his house and spoke with his wife. Mrs. Coolidge provided four guns belonging to her husband and some clothing she believed he might have worn on the night in question. Coolidge was held overnight on an unrelated charge but released the next day.
Over the following two and a half weeks, the State accumulated evidence implicating Coolidge. On February 19, the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial. Coolidge was arrested at his home that day. His 1951 Pontiac automobile parked in the driveway was seized and towed to the police station two and a half hours later.
The Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21, again in January 1965, and a third time in April 1965. At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial for murder, vacuum sweepings from the car were introduced into evidence. One of the guns taken from the home was also introduced. Vacuum sweepings from the clothing were introduced into evidence. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction after upholding the admissibility of the evidence, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Officers stop a motor home driven by Venture Holdings employees on the highway and develop probable cause that it contains contraband. They search the vehicle without a warrant. The search is lawful because the motor home was readily mobile and possessed the attributes of an automobile at the time of the stop.
California v. Carney471 U.S. 386 (1985)
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams watched respondent Charles Carney approach a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth accompanied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across the front window. Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney and the youth remained inside.
When the youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts. At the agents’ request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table. Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and refrigerator.
Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion. Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim. Respondent then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him, and was placed on probation for three years.
Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
Does a trained and certified narcotics dog's alert alone establish probable cause to search a vehicle under the vehicle exception?
Yes. When officers show that a narcotics-detection dog completed a bona fide training program and holds current certification, the dog's alert ordinarily supplies probable cause to search the vehicle and its containers, absent specific evidence that undermines the dog's reliability.
Supporting sources
May officers search containers inside a vehicle under the vehicle exception even if the containers are sealed or marked with privilege labels?
Yes. Once probable cause exists to search the vehicle, officers may open any container that could reasonably hold the object of the search, including sealed or labeled containers such as file boxes.
Supporting sources
Does the vehicle exception permit a warrantless search of a motor home or RV that is being used as a residence?
No. The exception does not apply when the vehicle is situated in a way that objectively indicates it is being used as a residence, such as being elevated on blocks or connected to utilities at a fixed site.
Supporting sources
Can officers rely on the vehicle exception to enter the curtilage of a home to search a vehicle parked in the driveway?
No. The automobile exception does not authorize officers to enter the curtilage of a home to search a vehicle without a warrant. Separate justification is required for the entry onto protected residential property.
Supporting sources
403 U.S. 443 (1971)
…imagination can this be made into a case where "it is not practicable to secure a warrant," Carroll, supra , at 153, and the "automobile exception," despite its label, is simply irrelevant. Since Carroll would not have justified a warrantless search of the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested, the later search at the…
Criminal Law Constitutional ProtectionsConstitutional protections of accused persons · Arrest, search, and seizure [Fourth Amendment]NEXTGENFoundational