use by the public

Chickasaw, Alabama, is a suburb of Mobile owned entirely by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The property includes residential buildings, streets, a sewage system and disposal plant, and a business block containing stores and a United States post office. A deputy sheriff of Mobile County, paid by the corporation, serves as the town policeman. The business block and its sidewalks serve as a regular shopping center for residents and the public. Company-owned roads connect to a nearby four-lane public highway. Nothing distinguishes the area from any other town except corporate title. Grace Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness, entered the sidewalk in front of the business block near the post office and began distributing religious literature. The corporation had posted notices declaring the property private and prohibiting street vendors, agents, or solicitation of any kind without written permission. Marsh was warned that distribution required a permit, was told no permit would be issued, and was asked to leave. She refused and was arrested by the company-paid deputy. Marsh was charged in state court with violating Title 14, § 426 of the 1940 Alabama Code, which makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. She was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed at 21 So. 2d 558, holding the statute constitutional as applied because title remained in the corporation and public use had not created an irrevocable dedication under Alabama law. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari at 246 Ala. 539, 21 So. 2d 564. The case reached the United States Supreme Court on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a). Many people across the United States live in company-owned towns, particularly in industries such as bituminous coal mining where, in the period 1922–1923, roughly half of miners resided in employer-owned housing.

In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.

In 1976, Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Disney Productions, owners of copyrights in motion pictures and other audiovisual works, commenced a copyright infringement action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Sony Corporation of America and related entities that manufacture and sell Betamax video tape recorders. The Betamax consists of a tuner that receives signals from the public airwaves, a recorder that places those signals on magnetic tape, and an adapter that converts the signals for playback on a television set. It includes a timer for unattended recording, a pause button to omit commercials, and a fast-forward control. Surveys of several hundred Betamax owners conducted by both parties in 1978 showed that the primary use for most owners was time-shifting, recording a program for single later viewing and then erasing it. Sony's survey indicated that over 80 percent of interviewees watched at least as much regular television as before owning a Betamax. Seven point three percent of use was to record sports events whose professional leagues had no objection to home recording, and representatives of religious and educational broadcasters also testified they had no objection. After a lengthy trial, the District Court in 1979 denied all relief to the respondents, finding that time-shifting was fair use, that Sony had no direct involvement with any infringing activity, and that the Betamax was a staple article of commerce capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The court noted Sony's instruction booklet warned that unauthorized recording of copyrighted material may violate copyright laws. The Ninth Circuit in 1981 reversed the District Court's judgment on the copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringement without setting aside any findings of fact, and remanded for consideration of damages or a continuing royalty. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982, ordered reargument in 1983, and issued its decision in January 1984.

The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.