Also known as: universal malices · implied malice
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A culpable mental state consisting of extreme recklessness toward human life in general. The actor forms an intent to kill on slight provocation while remaining indifferent to the identity of any particular victim. This state supplies implied malice for common-law murder even without a formed purpose to kill or injure a specific person.
Grant ordered unstable chemical drums lashed to the open deck of a cargo ship despite a severe storm forecast. When the storm arrived the drums exploded and killed a deckhand. The captain's decision to expose multiple crew members to the known risk of explosion without regard to any one person's safety demonstrated universal malice sufficient for murder.
Joe pumped hazardous waste into a storm channel at night knowing fumes could kill anyone nearby. A homeless man sleeping in the channel inhaled concentrated fumes and died. Joe's willingness to create a lethal risk to any person in the area without caring which victim might die established universal malice.
Aidan locked Alfred inside a conference room and repeatedly struck him in the head with a heavy stapler until Alfred lost consciousness. Alfred later died from brain hemorrhage. Aidan's attack formed on slight provocation and showed indifference to whether the victim lived or died, supplying universal malice.
A defendant killed his wife after she admitted an affair and then claimed the killing occurred in sudden heat of passion. The prosecution proved the defendant had previously threatened to kill any man who approached her. The prior threats showed a formed intent to kill on slight provocation without regard to the specific victim, establishing universal malice.
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court. The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing. Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance. The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder. Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision. After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.
View caseTwo men entered a business to commit robbery and bound the employees. During the robbery one employee suffered a fatal heart attack after the defendants fired warning shots into the ceiling. Their readiness to kill any person present on slight resistance demonstrated universal malice that converted the death into murder.
On October 26, 1965, at 10:45 a.m., Jonathan Earl Stamp and Michael John Koory, armed with a gun and a blackjack, entered the rear of the building housing the offices of General Amusement Company. They ordered the employees they found there to go to the front of the premises, where the two secretaries were working. Stamp went into the office of Carl Honeyman, the owner and manager, and Honeyman emerged looking very frightened and pale. The robbery victims were required to lie down on the floor while the robbers took the money and fled out the back door after being on the premises for 10 to 15 minutes. As the robbers were leaving, they told the victims to remain on the floor for five minutes. Honeyman, who had been lying next to the counter, had to use it to steady himself in getting up off the floor. Still pale, he was short of breath, sucking air, and pounding and rubbing his chest. As he walked down the hall in an unsteady manner, he said he was having trouble keeping the pounding down inside and that his heart was pumping too fast for him. A few minutes later, although still looking very upset, he collapsed on the floor, and at 11:25 a.m. he was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The employees noted that during the hours before the robbery Honeyman had appeared to be in normal health and good spirits. The victim was an obese, 60-year-old man with a history of heart disease who was under a great deal of pressure due to the intensely competitive nature of his business. Three doctors testified that although Honeyman had an advanced case of atherosclerosis, there must have been some immediate upset to his system which precipitated the attack, and it was their conclusion that but for the robbery there would have been no fatal seizure at that time. There was opposing expert testimony to the effect that it could not be said with reasonable medical certainty that fright could ever be fatal. Lehman, the driver of the getaway car, was apprehended a few minutes after the robbery when the car was stopped at 11:08 a.m. Several weeks later Stamp was arrested in Ohio and Koory in Nebraska. Each confessed to his part in the crime after having been advised of his right to counsel, to remain silent, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. Following jury verdicts of guilty of robbery and murder, both in the first degree, each defendant was given a life sentence on the murder charge together with the time prescribed by law on the robbery count. The defendants appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District. Acting Presiding Justice Cobey authored the opinion in which Justices Schweitzer and Allport concurred. The Supreme Court denied the petitions for hearing on January 28, 1970.
View caseA man fired several shots into a crowded street after an argument with one person. A bystander who had no connection to the dispute was struck and killed. The shooter's willingness to endanger multiple lives without caring which person died established the universal malice required for murder.
An indictment was returned charging two counts under the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890. The first count alleged a conspiracy in restraint of trade and the second a conspiracy to monopolize trade. A third count for monopolizing was held bad on demurrer and struck out. The American Naval Stores Company, a West Virginia corporation with its principal office in Savannah and branch offices in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and elsewhere, was engaged in buying, selling, shipping and exporting spirits of turpentine and rosin. The National Transportation and Terminal Company, a New Jersey corporation, maintained warehouses and terminals in Fernandina and other locations in Florida, Alabama and Mississippi and issued warehouse receipts for naval stores. The individual defendants held corporate offices in one or both companies. Nash served as president of the American Naval Stores Company, Shotter as chairman of its board of directors, Myers as vice-president, Boardman as treasurer, DeLoach as secretary and Moller as manager of its Jacksonville, Florida branch. Myers, DeLoach and Moller held corresponding positions with the National Transportation and Terminal Company. The indictment alleged that on May 1, 1907 these corporations and individuals conspired to restrain commerce in turpentine and rosin among the states and with foreign nations through twelve specified means, including bidding down prices, diverting receipts to closed ports, coercing factors into storage contracts, circulating false statements about production and stocks, issuing fraudulent warehouse receipts, fraudulently grading and gauging products, attempting to bribe competitors' employees, inducing consumers to postpone deliveries, making tentative large offers to depress the market, selling below cost and fixing prices below the cost of production. The two counts were demurred to on the grounds that the statute was too vague for criminal enforcement, that no overt act was alleged, that the contemplated acts would not have been offenses if performed and that the charges were too vague. The demurrer was overruled. The defendants then pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict finding Nash, Shotter, Myers, Moller and Boardman guilty, finding DeLoach not guilty and remaining silent as to the two corporations. Numerous exceptions were taken at trial. The defendants sought review in the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to consider the questions raised by the demurrer and by the conduct of the trial.
View caseUniversal malice requires indifference to human life generally rather than risk to one identified victim. Some jurisdictions limit depraved-heart murder to cases in which multiple persons are endangered. An attack on a single victim may then support only manslaughter.
No. The doctrine is satisfied when the defendant forms an intent to kill on slight provocation while remaining indifferent to the identity of the eventual victim. The focus is the actor's disregard for any particular life rather than a plan to kill multiple victims.
Yes. Prior threats or planning that show a settled willingness to kill on slight provocation can rebut a heat-of-passion defense even if the fatal act occurred during an argument. The earlier statements demonstrate that the malice was not formed in the sudden moment of provocation.
Supporting sources
…either express or implied." Manslaughter was a killing "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought." Id. , at 686, and n. 3. Although "express malice" at one point may have had its own significant independent meaning, see Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43…