2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1969)
On October 26, 1965, at 10:45 a.m., Jonathan Earl Stamp and Michael John Koory, armed with a gun and a blackjack, entered the rear of the building housing the offices of General Amusement Company.1 They ordered the employees they found there to go to the front of the premises, where the two secretaries were working.2 Stamp went into the office of Carl Honeyman, the owner and manager, and Honeyman emerged looking very frightened and pale.3 The robbery victims were required to lie down on the floor while the robbers took the money and fled out the back door after being on the premises for 10 to 15 minutes.4
As the robbers were leaving, they told the victims to remain on the floor for five minutes.5 Honeyman, who had been lying next to the counter, had to use it to steady himself in getting up off the floor.6 Still pale, he was short of breath, sucking air, and pounding and rubbing his chest.7 As he walked down the hall in an unsteady manner, he said he was having trouble keeping the pounding down inside and that his heart was pumping too fast for him.8 A few minutes later, although still looking very upset, he collapsed on the floor, and at 11:25 a.m. he was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.9
The employees noted that during the hours before the robbery Honeyman had appeared to be in normal health and good spirits.10 The victim was an obese, 60-year-old man with a history of heart disease who was under a great deal of pressure due to the intensely competitive nature of his business.11 Three doctors testified that although Honeyman had an advanced case of atherosclerosis, there must have been some immediate upset to his system which precipitated the attack, and it was their conclusion that but for the robbery there would have been no fatal seizure at that time.12 There was opposing expert testimony to the effect that it could not be said with reasonable medical certainty that fright could ever be fatal.13
Lehman, the driver of the getaway car, was apprehended a few minutes after the robbery when the car was stopped at 11:08 a.m.14 Several weeks later Stamp was arrested in Ohio and Koory in Nebraska.15 Each confessed to his part in the crime after having been advised of his right to counsel, to remain silent, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.16
Following jury verdicts of guilty of robbery and murder, both in the first degree, each defendant was given a life sentence on the murder charge together with the time prescribed by law on the robbery count.17 The defendants appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District.18 Acting Presiding Justice Cobey authored the opinion in which Justices Schweitzer and Allport concurred.19 The Supreme Court denied the petitions for hearing on January 28, 1970.20
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the robbery caused Honeyman's death?21
Yes. The established facts demonstrate substantial evidence that Stamp and Koory committed the robbery at General Amusement Company.24 But for the robbery Honeyman would not have experienced the fright which brought on the fatal heart attack.25 The three doctors concluded that the fright induced by the robbery was too much of a shock to his system given his advanced atherosclerosis.26
The evidence was sufficient to prove that the robbery caused Honeyman's death.27
Whether the felony-murder rule was applicable to the facts of this case?28
Under the felony-murder rule of section 189 of the Penal Code, a killing committed in either the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate robbery is murder of the first degree.29 This is true whether the killing is wilfull, deliberate and premeditated, or merely accidental or unintentional.30 The doctrine presumes malice aforethought on the basis of the commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human life.31 The doctrine is not limited to those deaths which are foreseeable.32 A felon is held strictly liable for all killings committed by him or his accomplices in the course of the felony.33
Yes. Honeyman died from a heart attack precipitated by the fright of the armed robbery committed by Stamp and Koory while they were on the premises.34 The rule applies even though the death was not a natural or probable consequence.35 The victim had a predisposing physical condition.36 The robber takes his victim as he finds him so long as that condition is not the only substantial factor bringing about death.37
The felony-murder rule was applicable to the facts of this case.38
Whether the trial court erred in refusing the proffered instruction on proximate cause?39
The evidence before the jury was not such that the jury could have reasonably assumed that negligent or reckless conduct by Honeyman was the sole cause of his death.40 The three instructions given on the issue of the proximate causation of Honeyman’s death were much more complete and accurate than appellant’s quoted instruction.41 Any error in this respect was harmless.42
No. The established facts contain no indication that Honeyman engaged in negligent or reckless conduct that could be viewed as the sole proximate cause of his death.43 Honeyman used the counter to steady himself while complaining of chest pain and shortness of breath, but the record shows no negligent or reckless conduct by him.44 The three instructions given on the issue of the proximate causation of Honeyman’s death were much more complete and accurate than appellant’s quoted instruction. Any error in this respect was harmless.
The trial court did not err in refusing the proffered instruction on proximate cause.45
Whether the jury should have been instructed on the need for specific intent to commit the robbery before applying the felony-murder rule?46
Since the jury was fully instructed both as to what constitutes robbery and as to what constitutes felony murder, the court was not required to instruct them on its own motion that in order to apply the felony-murder rule, appellants must have had the specific intent to commit the robbery.47 Failure to so instruct does not constitute prejudicial error where the evidence permits of no other interpretation than that appellants had the specific intent to steal.48
No. The established facts show that the jury could not have found the defendants guilty of murder under the felony-murder doctrine without first having found them guilty of robbery.49 The evidence of the armed entry and taking of money permits of no other interpretation than that Stamp, Koory, and Lehman had the specific intent to steal.50
The jury did not need to be instructed on the need for specific intent to commit the robbery before applying the felony-murder rule.51
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of Stamp and Koory and the incriminating statement of Lehman were erroneously admitted in evidence?52
Since appellants failed to object on these grounds at trial, they are not entitled to raise these issues for the first time on appeal.53 The trial court followed the recommended procedure in People v. Aranda of deleting from each statement received in evidence all direct and indirect identifications of codefendants as well as any material which could be used against codefendants once their identities had been otherwise established.54 The jury was instructed that each statement was received only against the particular declarant.55
No. The established facts show that appellants failed to object at trial to the admission of the confessions and statement on the grounds now asserted.56 The statements were properly redacted to remove references to codefendants.57 The jury was instructed that each statement was received only against the particular declarant.
The extrajudicial confessions of Stamp and Koory and the incriminating statement of Lehman were not erroneously admitted in evidence.58