Also known as: unfairly prejudicial · unfairly prejudice · FRE 403 prejudice · probative value vs prejudice
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A risk that relevant evidence will prompt a factfinder to decide a case on an improper basis such as an emotional response rather than the evidence's logical force. The danger arises when evidence invites jury misuse or arouses hostility or sympathy that distorts the evaluative process. Courts weigh this risk against the evidence's probative value under a substantial-outweighing standard.
Ulrike Ulrich offers photographs of the victim's severe injuries in her civil battery suit against Ugo Ucelli. The images show graphic wounds that could inflame the jury's sympathy for Ulrike and hostility toward Ugo. The court excludes the photographs because the risk that jurors will decide on an emotional basis substantially outweighs their modest additional probative value on the extent of harm.
Umar Underwood faces a felon-in-possession charge after a handgun is found in his lab. The government seeks to introduce the full record of his earlier national-security conviction for unauthorized satellite-technology exports. The court bars the details because the name and nature of the prior offense create a substantial danger that the jury will convict on propensity grounds rather than on the current possession element.
Usha Upton is charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. She offers to stipulate to her prior felony status so the jury learns only that she is a prohibited person. The government insists on introducing the full record of her assault conviction. The court excludes the details because the name and nature of the prior offense carry a risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs any remaining probative value once the stipulation removes the need for those facts.
Urban Utley is tried for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. The government offers a hearsay statement by an alleged co-conspirator that implicates Urban. Urban objects that the statement is unreliable and will cause the jury to convict on the basis of an untested accusation. The court admits the statement after finding its probative value on the existence of the conspiracy is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.
Umar Usmani is charged with illegal reentry after deportation. The indictment alleges he was previously removed following an aggravated felony conviction. Umar objects that revealing the nature of the prior offense will prejudice the jury on the current charge. The court allows the allegation because the statutory element requires proof of the aggravated nature and the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value on that element.
In September 1995, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner, Hugo Almendarez-Torres, with having been found in the United States after being deported without the permission and consent of the Attorney General in violation of Section 1326. In December 1995, Almendarez-Torres entered a plea of guilty. At a hearing before the District Court accepted his plea, Almendarez-Torres admitted that he had been deported, that he had later unlawfully returned to the United States, and that the earlier deportation had taken place pursuant to three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies. In March 1996, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. Almendarez-Torres argued that his indictment had not mentioned his earlier aggravated felony convictions and that the court therefore could not sentence him to more than two years' imprisonment. The District Court rejected this argument, found applicable a Sentencing Guideline range of 77 to 96 months, and imposed a sentence of 85 months' imprisonment. On appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected Almendarez-Torres's argument and affirmed the sentence. Like seven other circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision. It simply permits a sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions. The Ninth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the difference among the circuits.
Upland Industries' employee Ugo Ucelli is prosecuted for deliberate homicide. He seeks to introduce evidence of his extreme intoxication to negate the mental state required for the offense. The state objects that the evidence invites the jury to acquit on sympathy rather than on the facts. The court excludes the intoxication evidence because its probative value on mens rea is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.
On July 12, 1992, respondent James Egelhoff was camping in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana with Roberta Pavola and John Christenson to pick mushrooms. The three sold the mushrooms they had collected and spent the rest of the day and evening drinking in bars and at a private party in Troy, Montana. After leaving the party after 9 p.m. in Christenson's 1974 Ford Galaxy station wagon, the drinking continued, as Egelhoff was seen buying beer at 9:20 p.m. and recalled passing a bottle of Black Velvet with Christenson. Around midnight, officers of the Lincoln County sheriff's department discovered the station wagon stuck in a ditch along U.S. Highway 2. Pavola and Christenson were in the front seat, each dead from a single gunshot to the head. Egelhoff lay in the rear of the car, alive and yelling obscenities, with a blood-alcohol content of .36 percent measured over an hour later. His .38-caliber handgun lay on the floor near the brake pedal with four loaded rounds and two empty casings, and he had gunshot residue on his hands. Egelhoff was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide under Montana law requiring that he purposely or knowingly caused the deaths of another human being. At trial he claimed an unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders, that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing them, and that it accounted for his inability to recall the events. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 that it could not consider respondent's intoxicated condition in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. The jury found Egelhoff guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to 84 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Unfair prejudice refers to the danger that evidence will prompt the jury to decide on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence's logical force. It is distinct from the ordinary harm that any damaging evidence causes to an opponent's case. Courts exclude evidence only when this danger substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value.
…require additional safeguards. The admission of uncorroborated hearsay statements in conspiracy cases poses a serious risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Such statements are often made by witnesses who have a strong motive to lie or exaggerate in order to obtain a better deal from the Government. Without the requirement of…
…“substantially outweighs [any] prejudicial effect,” Fed. Rule Evid. 703, or “the probative value
…403 provides: " Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
…that evidence of the . . . nature of the prior offense," here, that it was "aggravated" or serious, "carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant." Id. , at 185 (emphasis added). Like several lower courts, we do not believe, other things being equal, that Congress would have wanted to create this kind of unfairness…
…have held that the admission in a federal prosecution of details of prior crimes to which the defendant had admitted guilt was unfairly prejudicial and constituted reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Tumblin , 551 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Harding , 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.1975) ("The rule that it is error to…
The name and nature of a prior conviction generally carry a risk of unfair prejudice that exceeds probative value when the defendant's status as a felon is the only fact at issue. A defendant's offer to stipulate to that status removes the need for details and heightens the danger that the jury will misuse the evidence as propensity proof.
When a defendant offers to stipulate to felon status, the government's refusal to accept the stipulation and introduction of the full prior-conviction record may result in unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs probative value. The court must weigh whether the added details are necessary or whether they merely inflame the jury.
Yes. A hearsay statement admissible against one defendant but not another can create unfair prejudice if the jury is likely to misuse it against the non-offering party despite a limiting instruction. The court may exclude the statement entirely when the risk of misuse substantially outweighs its probative value.