two-step inquiry

On August 15, 2008, around 3 a.m., Joffre Ullon reported to the Nashua, New Hampshire, Police Department that an African-American male was attempting to break into cars in the parking lot of his apartment building. Officer Nicole Clay responded and observed petitioner Barion Perry standing between two cars holding two car-stereo amplifiers, with a metal bat on the ground nearby. Perry stated that he had found the amplifiers on the ground. Nubia Blandón, Ullon's wife, had woken her neighbor Alex Clavijo and informed him that she had seen someone break into his car. Clavijo inspected his vehicle and found a shattered rear window along with missing speakers, amplifiers, a bat, and a wrench. Blandón later described to Clay and Clavijo from her fourth-floor apartment hallway that she had seen from her kitchen window a tall African-American man roaming the parking lot, circling Clavijo's car, opening the trunk, and removing a large box. When asked for a more specific description, Blandón pointed out the window to Perry, who was standing in the parking lot next to a police officer. Perry's arrest followed this identification. Approximately one month later, police presented Blandón with a photographic array including Perry's picture, but she was unable to identify him. Perry was charged in New Hampshire state court with one count of theft by unauthorized taking and one count of criminal mischief. Before trial, he moved to suppress Blandón’s identification on the ground that admitting it at trial would violate due process. Blandón witnessed what amounted to a one-person showup in the parking lot, Perry asserted, which all but guaranteed that she would identify him as the culprit. The New Hampshire Superior Court denied the motion after finding that the identification did not stem from an unnecessarily suggestive procedure manufactured by the police, as Blandón pointed to Perry spontaneously without inducement. At trial, Blandón and Clay testified regarding the out-of-court identification, and the jury convicted Perry of theft while acquitting him of criminal mischief. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Due Process Clause requires a trial court to assess the reliability of identification evidence before permitting a jury to consider it only where the police employ suggestive identification techniques. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The question presented was whether the Due Process Clause requires a trial judge to conduct a preliminary assessment of the reliability of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive circumstances not arranged by the police.

On July 2, 1980, President Carter signed Proclamation No. 4771 requiring males born in 1960 to register with the Selective Service System during the period July 21–August 2, 1980. David Alan Wayte, who fell within that class, did not register as required. Instead, he wrote several letters to Government officials, including the President, stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. His letters were placed in a Selective Service file of young men who advised that they had failed to register or who were reported by others. Selective Service adopted a policy of passive enforcement under which it would investigate and prosecute only the cases of nonregistration contained in this file of self-reporters and third-party reports. In June 1981, Selective Service sent a letter to Wayte explaining the duty to register and warning of criminal prosecution. Wayte did not respond to the letter. On July 20, 1981, Selective Service transmitted Wayte's name to the Department of Justice along with 133 others. The Department of Justice followed a "beg" policy, notifying nonregistrants by mail that prosecution would be considered unless they registered, and often sending FBI agents to interview them. Wayte received such a letter in October 1981 but failed to respond. After a presidential grace period ending February 28, 1982, during which Wayte still did not register, the Department decided to prosecute under the passive system. On June 28, 1982, FBI agents interviewed Wayte, who continued to refuse to register, leading to his indictment on July 22, 1982. Wayte moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution, contending that he and other indicted nonregistrants were vocal opponents targeted because of their exercise of First Amendment rights. He sought broad discovery of government documents. The District Court for the Central District of California ordered discovery, found that Wayte had made out a prima facie case, and dismissed the indictment when the Government declined to produce the documents the District Court had ordered produced citing deliberative process privilege. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the selective prosecution issue.

On July 21, 1983, petitioner Earline Martin and her husband, Walter Martin, argued over grocery money. Petitioner claimed that her husband struck her in the head during the argument. Petitioner's version of what then transpired was that she went upstairs, put on a robe, and later came back down with her husband's gun which she intended to dispose of. Her husband saw something in her hand and questioned her about it. He came at her, and she lost her head and fired the gun at him. Five or six shots were fired, three of them striking and killing Mr. Martin. She was charged with and tried for aggravated murder. She pleaded self-defense and testified in her own defense. The judge charged the jury with respect to the elements of the crime and of self-defense and rejected petitioner's Due Process Clause challenge to the charge placing on her the burden of proving self-defense. The jury found her guilty. Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction. Both rejected the constitutional challenge to the instruction requiring petitioner to prove self-defense. The latter court, relying upon Patterson v. New York, concluded that the State was required to prove the three elements of aggravated murder but that Patterson did not require it to disprove self-defense. The court said, "the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant purposely, and with prior calculation and design, caused the death of her husband. Appellant did not dispute the existence of these elements, but rather sought to justify her actions on grounds she acted in self defense." The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986).

On August 2, 1984, Richard Allan Moran entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Las Vegas, Nevada, and shot the bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol before removing the cash register. Nine days later, Moran arrived at the apartment of his former wife and opened fire on her, hitting her with five of seven shots. Moran then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted unsuccessfully to slit his wrists. Of the four victims, only Moran survived. On August 13, Moran summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the killings. Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder. The trial court ordered psychiatric examinations by two psychiatrists, both of whom concluded that Moran was competent to stand trial. The State announced its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 28, 1984, Moran informed the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing. On January 21, 1985, a three-judge court sentenced Moran to death for each murder. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the sentences for the saloon murders but reversed the ex-wife murder sentence to life without parole. On July 30, 1987, Moran filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the claim of mental incompetence to represent himself. Moran then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which was denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding the record should have led to a good faith doubt about competency to waive rights, requiring a hearing, and that the state postconviction ruling used the wrong standard. It held that competency to waive rights requires a higher "reasoned choice" standard than for standing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among courts on the competency standard.