509 U.S. 389 (1993)
On August 2, 1984, Richard Allan Moran entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Las Vegas, Nevada, and shot the bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol before removing the cash register.1 Nine days later, Moran arrived at the apartment of his former wife and opened fire on her, hitting her with five of seven shots. Moran then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted unsuccessfully to slit his wrists. Of the four victims, only Moran survived. On August 13, Moran summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the killings.2
Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder. The trial court ordered psychiatric examinations by two psychiatrists, both of whom concluded that Moran was competent to stand trial.3 The State announced its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 28, 1984, Moran informed the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing.4
On January 21, 1985, a three-judge court sentenced Moran to death for each murder. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the sentences for the saloon murders but reversed the ex-wife murder sentence to life without parole.5
On July 30, 1987, Moran filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the claim of mental incompetence to represent himself.6 Moran then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which was denied.7 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding the record should have led to a good faith doubt about competency to waive rights, requiring a hearing, and that the state postconviction ruling used the wrong standard.8 It held that competency to waive rights requires a higher "reasoned choice" standard than for standing trial.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among courts on the competency standard.10
Whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial?11
A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent.12 The Dusky standard requires sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.13 The same competency standard applies to pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel.14 In addition, the court must ensure that any waiver is knowing and voluntary.15
No. The trial court relied on the psychiatric reports concluding that Moran was competent to stand trial, finding that he knew the nature and quality of his acts and could assist in his defense.16 The court then advised Moran of his rights to counsel and self-representation, warned him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and accepted his waiver after determining that he understood the proceedings and that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.17 The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that a higher standard of reasoned choice was required, because the Dusky standard is adequate for all defendants whether they plead guilty or go to trial, as the decisions at trial are equally complex, and the competence to waive counsel is distinct from the competence to represent oneself effectively.18
The competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is not higher than the competency standard for standing trial.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Scalia, J.
Justice Kennedy agreed that the competency standard is the same for all stages of criminal proceedings.20 He drew on common law authorities from Blackstone and American cases that applied a single standard of competency throughout arraignment, pleading, and trial.21 Kennedy emphasized that the Dusky standard focuses on a level of mental functioning rather than the specific decisions made.22
Due process does not require heightened standards for different choices, as that would be unworkable.23 He concurred in the judgment while expressing reservations about the majority's comparison of decisions at trial and guilty plea.24
Joined by Stevens, J.
Justice Blackmun argued that the Dusky standard is designed for defendants with counsel and does not translate to the ability to proceed without counsel.25 A defendant competent with assistance may lack capacity to represent himself.26 Blackmun highlighted the facts of Moran's recent suicide attempt, depression noted by psychiatrists, and the four medications he was taking, which could affect his mental state.27
He also noted Moran's monosyllabic responses during the plea colloquy.28 He concluded that the trial court should have conducted a specific inquiry into Moran's competency to waive counsel and represent himself rather than relying on the prior evaluations.29