Also known as: turpitudes · moral turpitude
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Conduct involving moral delinquency or base behavior. Such conduct is regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude when it reflects serious wrongdoing such as crimes involving dishonesty or harm to others.
Tristan Thompson, an insurance broker, faced statements from Tyler Taylor accusing him of faking accident claims and facing felony charges. The statements were published to other agents during a sales call. Because the accusation imputed criminal conduct involving moral turpitude, Thompson could recover without proving specific economic loss.
Theresa Tucker and Tanya Tang were co-defendants in a negligence suit arising from a joint venture. Tucker sought indemnity from Tang after paying the full judgment. Because the underlying conduct involved moral turpitude, the court refused to apportion liability between them.
On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club. Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs. Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents. The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child. The second cause of action sought declaratory relief. It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence. The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint. The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate. Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.
View caseTabitha Taylor faced proceedings under a state habitual-criminal sterilization law after multiple felony convictions. The statute defined habitual criminals by reference to felonies involving moral turpitude. The court examined whether the prior offenses met that standard before ordering sterilization.
In 1926 Jack T. Skinner was convicted of stealing chickens and sentenced to the Oklahoma State Reformatory. In 1929 he was convicted of robbery with firearms and sentenced to the reformatory. In 1934 he was convicted again of robbery with firearms and sentenced to the penitentiary. In 1935 the Oklahoma legislature passed the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. The statute defined an habitual criminal as a person who had been convicted two or more times for crimes amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude. This conviction could occur in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other State. The person must thereafter be convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution. The Act excluded offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses from its terms. It provided for proceedings by the Attorney General in Oklahoma courts for a judgment that the person be rendered sexually sterile by vasectomy in the case of a male or salpingectomy in the case of a female. This judgment would follow if the court or jury found the person was an habitual criminal and the operation could be performed without detriment to general health. In 1936, while Skinner was confined in the penitentiary, the Attorney General instituted proceedings against him under the Act. A jury trial was held in which the court instructed the jury that the crimes of which Skinner had been convicted were felonies involving moral turpitude. The only question was whether the operation of vasectomy could be performed without detriment to his general health. The jury found that it could be. The trial court entered judgment directing that the operation be performed on Skinner. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment by a five to four decision. The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari because the decision raised grave and substantial constitutional questions.
View caseTaliah Tang, a noncitizen defendant, pleaded guilty to a theft offense on counsel's advice. The offense carried potential deportation consequences because it involved moral turpitude. Counsel's failure to warn about those consequences rendered the plea invalid.
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He faced criminal charges in Kentucky after being arrested for transporting a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer. Before entering a guilty plea to the drug distribution charges, Padilla's counsel did not advise him that the conviction would trigger deportation proceedings. Counsel instead told him that he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had lived in the country so long. Padilla relied on that advice when he pleaded guilty and later alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had received accurate information. In postconviction proceedings Padilla claimed that his attorney's erroneous advice about deportation constituted ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, treating deportation as a collateral consequence outside the protection of the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether federal law imposed on counsel an obligation to advise Padilla that his guilty plea would result in removal from the country.
View caseTriumph Manufacturing employees sought entry after prior convictions. The government barred them under a proclamation targeting individuals convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The court upheld the exclusion as within executive authority over immigration.
Shortly after taking office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 directing a review of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking entry and temporarily restricting entry from seven countries previously identified as posing terrorism risks. After courts enjoined that order, the President revoked it and issued Executive Order 13780, which again directed a worldwide review and temporarily restricted entry from six of the countries. Following completion of the review, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645 on September 24, 2017, placing entry restrictions on nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—whose systems for managing and sharing information the President deemed inadequate. The Proclamation imposed varying restrictions by country, exempted lawful permanent residents and asylees, provided for case-by-case waivers, and directed ongoing 180-day reviews; restrictions on Chad were later lifted after it improved its practices. Plaintiffs including the State of Hawaii, three U.S. citizens with foreign-national relatives from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for visas, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii challenged the Proclamation in the District of Hawaii on statutory and Establishment Clause grounds. The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on statutory grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseTwin Rivers Bank security officers stopped a patron suspected of prior thefts. The officers relied on the patron's record of offenses involving moral turpitude. The court assessed whether that history supplied reasonable suspicion for the detention.
In March 1965, New York City police officer Anthony Martin observed appellant Sibron over an eight-hour period in the vicinity of 742 Broadway in Brooklyn. During this time, Martin saw Sibron speaking with six to eight known narcotics addicts but did not overhear the conversations or see any objects pass between them. Later in the evening, after Sibron entered a restaurant and spoke with three more addicts, Martin approached him, directed him outside, and reached into Sibron's pocket to seize several glassine envelopes containing heroin. On July 10, 1964, Mount Vernon police officer Samuel Lasky, while at home in his apartment building where he had lived for twelve years, heard noises at his door and observed two men he did not recognize tiptoeing in the hallway. After the men fled down the stairs upon Lasky emerging from his apartment armed, Lasky pursued and apprehended appellant Peters between the fourth and fifth floors. Lasky then frisked Peters and removed a plastic envelope containing burglar's tools from his pocket. Both Sibron and Peters were charged with crimes based on the seized evidence. They moved to suppress the items prior to trial on Fourth Amendment grounds. After the trial courts denied the motions, both pleaded guilty while preserving their right to appeal the suppression rulings. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the searches under New York's stop-and-frisk statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to address the constitutional questions presented by the application of the statute. Sibron received a six-month sentence and was released after serving his term before his appeal could be fully processed through the state courts. He was arrested on March 9, 1965, remained in jail due to indigency until his sentence expired on July 10, 1965, and could not obtain bail pending appeal under state law. Delays in the New York court system meant his case reached the Court of Appeals only after release.
View caseAn accusation qualifies when it imputes a serious offense punishable by imprisonment or regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude. The statement must be understood by listeners as asserting actual criminal conduct rather than mere speculation or exaggeration. Once that threshold is met, the plaintiff need not prove special damages.
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Yes. A felony conviction for tax evasion that demonstrates willful deceit and concealment for personal gain reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty and fitness to practice. The conviction itself establishes the requisite moral turpitude even when the conduct concerned only personal tax obligations.
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When the prior conviction involves moral turpitude, its details carry a heightened risk of unfair prejudice. If the defendant stipulates to felon status, the probative value of the full record drops sharply and the danger of propensity reasoning usually requires exclusion under Rule 403.
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…many crimes enumerated in the statute is inadmissible and therefore ineligible to receive a visa. See §1182(a)(2)(A) (crime of moral turpitude or drug offense); §1182(a)(2)(C) (drug trafficking or benefiting from a relative who recently trafficked drugs); §1182(a)(2)(D) (prostitution or “unlawful commercialized vice”);…