Also known as:trust doctrines · public trust doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legal principle under which a state holds title to navigable waterways and tidelands in trust for the benefit of the public. The doctrine imposes a fiduciary obligation on the state to manage those resources for public uses such as navigation, fishing, and recreation. Private agreements cannot convert these public rights into servitudes that run with the land.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Recorded Littoral Privilege Excluded
The Coastal Museum owned property bordering a tidal inlet designated for public use. It executed a recorded document granting Warren a perpetual private dock privilege across submerged land for his gallery's commercial shipments. Warren sold the gallery to Gina, who continued the use. The museum asserted that the privilege remained subject to public rights and could not be enforced as a private interest. The court held that the littoral access right fell outside servitude doctrine because it originated under the public trust doctrine.
Wetland Fill Permit Denied
Tobias Thomas owned shoreland property containing wetlands adjacent to a navigable lake. He applied for a permit to fill the wetlands for residential development. The county denied the permit to preserve the natural filtration function that protected lake water quality. Thomas sued, claiming the denial constituted a taking. The court upheld the denial, reasoning that the state held the lake and connected wetlands in trust for the public and had a duty to prevent pollution.
Just v. Marinette County201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972)
In September 1967 Marinette County adopted shoreland zoning ordinance number 24, which became effective the following month. The ordinance followed a model published by the Wisconsin Department of Resource Development and implemented standards required by state statutes sections 59.971 and 144.26, enacted in 1965 as part of the Water Quality Act.
It established conservancy districts covering all shorelands designated as swamps or marshes on United States Geological Survey maps. The ordinance defined wetlands as areas where groundwater is at or near the surface much of the year or where any segment of plant cover is deemed an aquatic according to N. C. Fassett's Manual of Aquatic Plants. It required a conditional use permit and a fee of twenty dollars before any person could fill more than five hundred square feet of wetlands contiguous to navigable water. It also required a permit for filling more than two thousand square feet on slopes of twelve percent or less within three hundred feet of such water.
In April 1961 the Justs purchased 36.4 acres of land with 1,266.7 feet of frontage on the south shore of Lake Noquebay, a navigable lake in Marinette County. Between 1964 and 1967 they sold five parcels and retained the southernmost lot, which has 366.7 feet of lake frontage. The northern half of the retained parcel lies within one thousand feet of the lake's normal high-water elevation, appears as swamp or marsh on the USGS map, contains plants classified as aquatic by N. C. Fassett's Manual of Aquatic Plants, and therefore qualifies as wetlands under the ordinance.
In February and March 1968 Ronald Just, without obtaining a conditional-use permit, hauled 1,040 square yards of sand onto the retained parcel and created a fill strip approximately twenty feet wide that ran nearly six hundred feet along the western boundary and then eastward along the shoreline. The fill covered more than five hundred square feet of wetlands with surface drainage toward the lake. It also covered more than two thousand square feet on a slope of less than twelve percent within three hundred feet of the lake.
The Justs filed a declaratory-judgment action asserting that the ordinance's conservancy-district and filling restrictions were unconstitutional. After trial the circuit court dismissed the Justs' declaratory action and entered judgment against them in the forfeiture proceeding, after which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin granted review.
Talia Torres murdered her uncle and stood to inherit his estate under his will. The probate court refused to allow her to take the property. Instead, the court imposed a constructive trust directing the estate assets to the uncle's other heirs. The trust prevented Torres from retaining any benefit from her criminal act while still recognizing that title had passed by operation of law.
Mahoney, In re Estate of220 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1966)
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland.
Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow.
The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband.
In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
True North Logistics owned a beachfront parcel and sought a permit to build a larger home. The coastal commission granted the permit only on condition that the owner dedicate a public access easement across the property to the tidelands. The owner sued, arguing the condition amounted to an uncompensated taking. The Court held that the commission could not require the easement without showing a direct nexus to the proposed development's impact on public access rights protected by the public trust doctrine.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California.
A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet.
The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house.
The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing.
After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
Does the public trust doctrine apply only to tidal waters?
No. The doctrine applies to navigable waterways and tidelands in most states. It guarantees public rights to use those areas for navigation, fishing, and recreation even after the state transfers title to private owners.
Can private parties create servitudes that override public trust rights?
No. The Restatement expressly excludes public-trust and littoral rights from the definition of servitudes. Private agreements attempting to convert those rights into running interests are ineffective.
Supporting sources
What happens when a trust becomes too small to administer economically?
A court may modify or terminate the trust or replace the trustee when the value of the trust property is insufficient to justify administration costs. The court must protect the interests of nonconsenting beneficiaries when ordering relief.
Supporting sources
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
…dissent. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. I do not understand the Court's opinion in this case to implicate in any way the public-trust doctrine. The Court certainly had no reason to address the issue, for the Court of Appeal of California did not rest its decision on Art. X, § 4, of the California Constitution. Nor did the parties…