Also known as: towit · namely · that is to say · viz.
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A phrase used to introduce a more particular specification or explanation of a preceding general statement. It signals that what follows narrows or clarifies the matter just mentioned. The phrase appears in formal legal drafting and opinions to ensure precision when identifying items or elements.
Thomas Thompson owned land in two states and sought to determine which law governed title. The court applied the most significant relationship test, to wit, the factors in Restatement section 6 that promote harmonious multistate relations and protect justified expectations. This led the court to select the law of the state where the land was situated.
Tobias Thomas sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction after an accident on state land. The court held that federal judges must apply state substantive law, to wit, the rule announced by the highest state court rather than any general federal common law. This prevented the creation of a separate body of federal tort rules.
Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He asserted that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. He further alleged that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that the Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseTara Tran operated a mill whose broken shaft halted production. She sued the carrier for lost profits, but the court limited damages to those reasonably foreseeable, to wit, ordinary losses that both parties would have contemplated at contracting. Extraordinary profits were therefore excluded.
The plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership at the City Steam-Mills in Gloucester and operated a steam-engine there to clean corn, grind it into meal, and dress it into flour, sharps, and bran. A crank shaft of the steam-engine broke, stopping the mill. The plaintiffs ordered a new crank shaft from W. Joyce & Co. at Greenwich, who required the broken shaft to be sent as a pattern so the replacement would fit the uninjured parts of the engine. On 13 May the plaintiffs' servant delivered the broken shaft to the defendants, who traded as Pickford & Co. and acted as common carriers, at their Gloucester office. The servant told the clerk the mill was stopped and the shaft must be sent immediately. The clerk stated that if the shaft were sent by twelve o'clock that day it would be delivered at Greenwich the following day. The defendants took the shaft before noon and the plaintiffs paid £2 4s. for its carriage the whole distance. The defendants delayed delivery of the shaft to Greenwich through neglect. As a result, the plaintiffs did not receive the new shaft until several days later than they otherwise would have. Their mill remained idle for five days beyond the time they otherwise would have been prevented from working. During that period the plaintiffs were unable to supply many customers with flour, sharps, and bran, were obliged to buy flour for some customers, lost the opportunity to sell their products, and had to pay wages to workmen they could not employ. The defendants paid £25 into court in satisfaction of the claim under the second count. At trial before Crompton, J., at the Gloucester Assizes the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs with £25 damages in excess of the amount paid into court. A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained on the ground of misdirection.
View caseTyler Taylor sought a commission withheld by the executive branch. The court declared that it possessed authority to review the constitutionality of statutes, to wit, the power to declare acts repugnant to the Constitution void. This established the foundation for judicial supremacy over legislative enactments.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
View caseTheresa Tucker challenged a municipal zoning ordinance restricting land use. The court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police power, to wit, a measure substantially related to public health, safety, and welfare. The ordinance therefore survived constitutional attack.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseTheo Thomas filed an antitrust complaint alleging parallel conduct by competitors. The court required factual allegations that plausibly suggest an agreement, to wit, enough to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of collusion. Conclusory assertions alone were held insufficient.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseThe phrase signals a precise narrowing of a general term and is conventional in formal legal instruments and opinions. It appears in lists of archaic but still recognized drafting terms alongside 'therein' and 'witnesseth'.
It performs no independent substantive function. It simply introduces an explanatory specification already required by the governing rule or instrument.
Direct testing is rare, but the phrase appears in older case excerpts and Restatement comments that remain fair game for reading-comprehension questions.
Supporting sources
…entitled. A justice of the peace in the District of Columbia is not removable at the will of the President. At the last term, viz. December term, 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel Charles Lee, late Attorney General of the United States, severally moved the…