Also known as:testamentary transfers · testamentary disposition
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A transfer of property effected by a will. The transfer may convey something less than absolute ownership and is subject to the rules governing classification of devises as specific, general, demonstrative, or residuary.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Specific Devise of Farmland
Tara Tran executes a will leaving her 200-acre farm to her niece. At death the farm remains in the estate. The probate court classifies the gift as a specific devise under the Restatement classification and directs distribution of that identified asset to the niece rather than from general estate funds.
Pension Annuity Preemption
Theresa Tucker's will attempts to pass a portion of her deceased husband's ERISA-governed survivor annuity to their sons. The Supreme Court holds that the attempted testamentary transfer conflicts with the federal antialienation provision and is therefore preempted.
Isaac Boggs began working for South Central Bell in 1949 and remained employed until his retirement in 1985. He was married to Dorothy Boggs from 1949 until her death in 1979, and the couple had three sons. After Dorothy died, Isaac married Sandra Boggs in 1980, and they remained married until Isaac's death in 1989.
Upon retirement, Isaac received a lump-sum distribution of $151,628.94 from the Bell System Savings Plan, which he rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account worth $180,778.05 at his death. He also received 96 shares of AT&T stock from the Bell South Employee Stock Ownership Plan and a monthly annuity of $1,777.67 from the Bell South Service Retirement Program. Dorothy's will bequeathed one-third of her estate to Isaac outright along with a lifetime usufruct in the remaining two-thirds, with naked ownership passing to the sons. A 1980 Louisiana judgment of possession ascribed to Dorothy's estate a community property interest in Isaac's Savings Plan account valued at $21,194.29.
After Isaac's death, Sandra began receiving a survivor annuity and other benefits. The sons filed suit in Louisiana state court claiming a portion of the retirement benefits under Dorothy's will and Louisiana community property law. Sandra then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting that ERISA preempts the sons' claims. The District Court granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Tori Taylor executes a revocable trust amendment that redirects assets away from her children. The court treats the amendment as an attempted testamentary transfer and invalidates it because the donor lacked capacity at the time of execution.
Newman v. Dore9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937)
Ferdinand Straus died on July 1, 1934, leaving a last will and testament dated May 5, 1934, which contained a provision for a trust for his wife for her life of one-third of the decedent’s property both real and personal. On June 28, 1934, three days before his death, he executed trust agreements by which, in form at least, he transferred to trustees all his real and personal property.
The beneficiary named in the trust agreement brought this action to compel the trustees to carry out its terms. The widow challenged the validity of the transfer to the trustees.
The trial court found that the trust agreements were made, executed and delivered by said Ferdinand Straus for the purpose of evading and circumventing the laws of the State of New York, and particularly sections 18 and 83 of the Decedent Estate Law. The trial court also found that the settlor reserved the enjoyment of the entire income as long as he should live, and a right to revoke the trust at his will, and in general the powers granted to the trustees were in terms made subject to the settlor’s control during his life.
Tristan Thompson's will names his children as beneficiaries of his ERISA plan. After divorce the ex-spouse remains the designated beneficiary on plan records. The Supreme Court holds that state law attempting to revoke the designation by operation of the will is preempted.
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff532 U.S. 141 (2001)
Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff. Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy and a pension plan. Both plans were governed by ERISA, and Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both.
In April 1994, the Egelhoffs divorced. Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident. At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy and the pension plan. The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her.
Respondents Samantha and David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law. They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds. In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits.
The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy and the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases. The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed. Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy and the pension plan. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed.
Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Talia Torres's will directs that her house be destroyed after her death. The court refuses to enforce the direction because the testamentary transfer of the house cannot be conditioned on its destruction, which would violate public policy.
Estate of Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences.
Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate.
Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community.
During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity.
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Tiffany Torres delivers a letter declaring an immediate gift of a painting to her son while reserving a life estate for herself. The court upholds the transfer as a valid inter vivos gift rather than an ineffective testamentary disposition because donative intent and delivery occurred during life.
Gruen v. Gruen496 N.E.2d 869
In 1959, Victor Gruen purchased a painting by Gustav Klimt entitled Schloss Kammer am Attersee II for $8,000. Victor Gruen, an architect with residences in New York and Los Angeles, had a son, Michael Gruen, the plaintiff in this action. On April 1, 1963, Victor wrote a letter to Michael, then a student at Harvard, stating that he was giving him the painting for his twenty-first birthday but wished to retain possession during his lifetime. This original letter was later destroyed at Victor's direction.
Subsequently, on May 22, 1963, Victor sent Michael another letter explaining that his lawyer advised against mentioning the life estate in writing for tax reasons and enclosed a substitute letter dated April 1, 1963, that conveyed the painting without reference to any retained interest. Michael retained both letters. The painting remained in Victor's possession, except for a brief loan to exhibitions between 1964 and 1965, and moved with him to Beverly Hills and then to Vienna, Austria.
Victor Gruen died on February 14, 1980. After his death, Michael requested the painting from his stepmother, the defendant, who refused to turn it over. Michael then commenced this action seeking a declaration that he owned the painting. Following a seven-day nonjury trial, Special Term found that no valid inter vivos gift had been made. The Appellate Division reversed that determination and remitted the matter for a determination of the painting's value. After the value was set at $2,500,000, the defendant appealed directly to the Court of Appeals from the final judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff.
How does a court classify a devise of a specifically identified asset under the Restatement?
The Restatement classifies such a gift as a specific devise. Classification determines whether doctrines such as ademption apply and how the gift is satisfied from estate assets.
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Does ERISA preempt a state-law attempt to pass pension benefits by will?
Yes. Federal antialienation provisions bar the testamentary transfer of ERISA survivor annuities, so state probate orders awarding those benefits are preempted.
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When is property received by will treated as individual rather than marital property in divorce?
Property acquired during marriage by a disposition at death from a third person to one spouse alone is classified as that spouse's individual property under marital-property statutes.
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What happens when a will attempts to devise a fee-tail interest?
The tenant in tail has no power to devise the land. Title passes according to the original deed creating the fee tail rather than under the will.
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of ownership; if the intention is to make a
testamentary disposition
effective only after death, the gift is invalid unless made by will ( see, McCarthy v Pieret , 281 NY 407, 409; Gannon v McGuire , 160 NY 476, 481; Martin v Funk , 75 NY 134,…