temporary restraining order

The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian immigrants from the western Pacific. These settlers developed an economy around a feudal land tenure system in which one island high chief, the ali’i nui, controlled the land and assigned it for development to certain subchiefs. The subchiefs would then reassign the land to other lower ranking chiefs. All land was held at the will of the ali’i nui and eventually had to be returned to his trust. There was no private ownership of land. Beginning in the early 1800s, Hawaiian leaders and American settlers repeatedly attempted to divide the lands of the kingdom among the crown, the chiefs, and the common people. These efforts proved largely unsuccessful, however, and the land remained in the hands of a few. In the mid-1960s, after extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature discovered that the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49 percent of the State’s land while another 47 percent was in the hands of only 72 private landowners. The legislature further found that 18 landholders with tracts of 21,000 acres or more owned more than 40 percent of this land. The legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare. To redress these problems, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and transferring ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing lessees. In April 1977, the Hawaii Housing Authority held a public hearing concerning the proposed acquisition of some of appellees’ lands. It made the statutorily required finding that acquisition would effectuate the public purposes of the Act. In October 1978, it directed appellees to negotiate with lessees. When negotiations failed, the Authority ordered appellees to submit to compulsory arbitration. Rather than comply with the compulsory arbitration order, appellees filed suit in February 1979 in United States District Court. They asked that the Act be declared unconstitutional and that its enforcement be enjoined. The District Court temporarily restrained the State from proceeding against appellees’ estates. Three months later, while declaring the compulsory arbitration and compensation formulae provisions of the Act unconstitutional, the District Court refused preliminarily to enjoin appellants from conducting the statutory designation and condemnation proceedings. Finally, in December 1979, it granted partial summary judgment to appellants, holding the remaining portion of the Act constitutional under the Public Use Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. On applications of HHA and private appellants, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.

MITE Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary MITE Holdings, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal executive offices in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation, on January 19, 1979, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. MITE offered $28 per share, approximately $4 above the prevailing market price, but did not register the offer under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. On the same day MITE filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause, together with temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief. Chicago Rivet responded three days later by suing in Pennsylvania to enjoin the offer under that state's takeover disclosure law, but its efforts there proved unsuccessful. On February 1, 1979, the Illinois Secretary of State notified MITE of his intent to issue a cease-and-desist order. The following day Chicago Rivet informed MITE it would file suit in Illinois state court, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE's tender offer. MITE published its nationwide tender offer in the February 5, 1979, edition of the Wall Street Journal. Chicago Rivet simultaneously offered to purchase approximately 40 percent of its own shares at $30 per share. On February 9 the district court entered final judgment declaring the Illinois Act preempted by the Williams Act and violative of the Commerce Clause, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The parties then entered an agreement withdrawing both offers and granting MITE thirty days to examine Chicago Rivet's books and records. On March 2, 1979, MITE announced it would not proceed with any tender offer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.

In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.

Upon the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the House of Representatives. The General Assembly passed an initial reapportionment plan that included only one majority-black district. The Attorney General interposed an objection under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The objection stated that the plan could have included a second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern area with boundary lines no more irregular than those elsewhere in the proposal. Subsequently, the General Assembly enacted a revised plan creating District 12 as the second majority-black district along the Interstate 85 corridor in the north-central region. The district extends roughly 160 miles, often no wider than the highway itself, snaking through diverse areas and incorporating sufficient black population enclaves to achieve a majority. It splits multiple counties into three districts each, divides towns, and maintains contiguity at one location only by intersecting other districts at a single point. Appellants are five residents of Durham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Under the plan, two plaintiffs vote in District 12 and three in District 2. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately created the districts along racial lines, arbitrarily concentrating black voters without regard to compactness, contiguity, or political subdivisions. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds related to the Voting Rights Act and dismissed the claims against the state appellees by a 2-1 vote. The majority held that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim because the plan did not dilute white voting strength and was adopted to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The dissenting judge concluded that the irregular shape supported an inference of unlawful intent sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.