suretyship relation

The United States entered into a contract with the Rice Shipbuilding Corporation for the construction of eleven navy personnel boats. The contract included a provision allowing the Government to terminate upon default and require the contractor to transfer title and deliver all completed and uncompleted work along with manufacturing materials. Petitioners furnished materials to Rice for use in building the boats. Upon Rice's default, the Government exercised its option with respect to ten of the boat hulls still under construction. Rice executed an itemized Instrument of Transfer of Title conveying the hulls and materials on hand to the United States. The Government then removed all of these properties to out-of-state naval shipyards for completion of the boats. Petitioners had not been paid for their materials at the time of the transfer. Petitioners claimed they held valid liens under Maine law on the hulls and the materials at the time of transfer. Maine law provided that whoever furnishes labor or materials for building a vessel has a lien on it and on the materials before they become part of the vessel. Because the transfer made the liens unenforceable due to sovereign immunity, petitioners sought just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Claims held that petitioners never acquired valid liens on the hulls or materials transferred to the Government. It relied on prior precedent and concluded there had been no taking of any property owned by the petitioners. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

In November 1969 the City Bureau of Buildings declared the single-family residence rented on a month-to-month basis for $100 per month by appellants Donald and Edna Lindsey and other tenants from appellee Normet unfit for habitation because of substandard conditions including rusted gutters, broken windows, broken plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation. The tenants requested repairs which the landlord refused except for one minor item. After paying the November rent they withheld the December rent. On December 15 the landlord's attorney sent a letter threatening court action unless the accrued rent was paid immediately. On January 7, 1970, before any state eviction proceedings had begun, the tenants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.160, was unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its continued enforcement. A three-judge district court was convened. It issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the tenants to pay rent into an escrow account during the proceeding. The parties entered a lengthy stipulation of facts, submitted exhibits and depositions, and the district court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Oregon statute established a summary procedure for resolving disputes over possession of real property. Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date. A tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on the tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue if the plaintiff ultimately prevails. The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true. A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. The district court upheld the validity of the statutes under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tenants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

In 1970, the Perlitches entered into a 25-year sublease with Robert Bixler for 14,400 square feet of hangar space at the San Jose Municipal Airport to conduct an airplane maintenance business. The sublease covered an original five-year term plus four five-year options to renew. The rental rate was to be increased every ten years in the same proportion as rents increased on the master lease from the City of San Jose. The premises were to be used by Bixler for the purpose of conducting an airplane maintenance business. The lease provided that written consent of the lessor was required before the lessee could assign his interest, and that failure to obtain such consent rendered the lease voidable at the option of the lessor. Subsequently, the Perlitches assigned their interest to Ernest Pestana, Inc. In 1981, Bixler agreed to sell the business, equipment, inventory, improvements, and the existing lease to Jack Kendall, Grady O'Hara, and Vicki O'Hara. The proposed assignees had a stronger financial statement and greater net worth than Bixler and were willing to be bound by the lease terms. Bixler requested consent from Ernest Pestana, Inc., but the lessor refused, claiming an absolute right to withhold consent arbitrarily and demanding increased rent and other more onerous terms as a condition of consent. The proposed assignees filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the refusal was unreasonable. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal affirmed.