Also known as:Sullivan rules · actual malice standard · NY Times v. Sullivan
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional standard requiring a public official or public figure plaintiff in a defamation action to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the statement with actual malice. Actual malice exists when the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth.
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Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Public Figure Defamation Claim
Scott Summers, a nationally known sports commissioner, sued a sports blog after it published an accusation that he fixed playoff schedules. The blog relied on an unverified leaked thread and refused to disclose its source. Summers must show the publisher knew the charge was false or published it despite serious doubts about its accuracy.
Reckless Disregard Finding
Selena Singh, a state transportation secretary, sued a television network that broadcast claims she concealed train safety defects. The network's producers noted an unresolved conflict between their source's timeline and public records yet aired the story without further checks. A jury could find actual malice from the conscious avoidance of contradictory information.
St. Amant v. Thompson390 U.S. 727 (1968)
On June 27, 1962, petitioner St. Amant, a candidate for public office, delivered a televised speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, during which he read a series of questions he had posed to J. D. Albin, a member of a Teamsters Union local, along with Albin's answers concerning the activities of E. G. Partin, the local's president, and Partin's alleged ties to St. Amant's political opponent.
One of Albin's answers referenced Herman A. Thompson, an East Baton Rouge Parish deputy sheriff, stating that the union knew of money that had passed from Partin to Thompson and of Thompson's connections with the sheriff's office, which prevented them from seeking help there.
Thompson promptly filed suit against St. Amant for defamation, claiming the publication imputed gross misconduct. The case was tried before the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and the trial judge ruled in Thompson's favor, awarding $5,000 in damages.
After the New York Times decision, the trial court considered the motion for new trial but upheld the judgment. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence of actual malice. The Louisiana Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court, concluding there was sufficient evidence of reckless disregard.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. For purposes of the case, the determinations that the material charged Thompson with criminal conduct, that the charge was false, and that Thompson was a public official are accepted.
Sean Steele, owner of a small construction firm, sued a credit reporting agency for a false report that damaged his business reputation. Because Steele is not a public figure, the Sullivan rule does not apply and he may recover on a showing of negligence rather than actual malice.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.472 U.S. 749 (1985)
In July 1976, Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency that provides subscribers with confidential financial and related information about businesses under subscription agreements prohibiting further disclosure, sent a report to five subscribers stating that Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a construction contractor, had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.
The report was false and grossly misrepresented respondent's assets and liabilities because the petition had actually been filed by one of Greenmoss's former employees. On the same day, Greenmoss's president learned of the report while discussing the possibility of future financing with the company's bank, immediately called Dun & Bradstreet's regional office to explain the error, requested a correction, and asked for the names of the firms that had received the report so he could assure them of the company's solvency.
Dun & Bradstreet promised to investigate but refused to divulge the names. After confirming the report was inaccurate, it issued a corrective notice on or about August 3, 1976, to the five subscribers stating that a former employee had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss continued in business as usual. Greenmoss expressed dissatisfaction with the notice and again requested the subscriber names, which Dun & Bradstreet again refused to provide.
Greenmoss then brought a defamation action in Vermont state court alleging injury to its reputation and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. At trial, evidence established that the error had been caused by a 17-year-old high school student paid to review Vermont bankruptcy pleadings who inadvertently attributed the petition to Greenmoss, and that Dun & Bradstreet did not attempt to verify the information with the company before reporting it despite routine practice to do so. The jury awarded Greenmoss $50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.
The trial court granted Dun & Bradstreet's motion for a new trial due to dissatisfaction with its charge to the jury. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Public Employee Speech Context
Stella Shapiro, a civilian director at a federal agency, sued an aerospace blog that accused her of falsifying safety certifications. The blog relied on a single insider account without independent verification. Shapiro must satisfy the Sullivan rule by proving the publisher acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.
Waters v. Churchill511 U.S. 661 (1994)
Cheryl Churchill worked as a nurse in the obstetrics department at McDonough District Hospital, which was operated by petitioners including the State of Illinois and hospital officials Cynthia Waters, Kathleen Davis, and Stephen Hopper. On January 16, 1987, during a dinner break at work, Churchill spoke with Melanie Perkins-Graham, another nurse considering a transfer to the obstetrics department, and the conversation was partially overheard by nurses Mary Lou Ballew and Jean Welty and by Dr. Thomas Koch, the clinical head of obstetrics.
A few days later, Ballew reported to Waters that Churchill had taken Perkins-Graham aside for at least twenty minutes to criticize Waters and describe how bad things were in obstetrics, causing Perkins-Graham to lose interest in the transfer, after which Waters and Davis interviewed Perkins-Graham, who confirmed that Churchill had made unkind and inappropriate negative comments about Waters and Davis, and they also interviewed Ballew a second time for confirmation.
Churchill's account differed because she stated that the conversation had primarily concerned the hospital's cross-training policy, which she believed was designed only to cover staff shortages and threatened patient care, and she had defended Waters while encouraging Perkins-Graham to transfer; Koch's and Welty's recollections matched Churchill's version, although Churchill had previously complained about the cross-training policy to Davis and Waters. Waters and Davis never spoke with Koch or Welty, and after receiving the reports the hospital discharged Churchill.
Churchill filed an internal grievance, Hopper met with Churchill to hear her side of the story, reviewed the written reports from Waters and Davis, and directed Bernice Magin to interview Ballew one more time before denying the grievance. Churchill then sued petitioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The district court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Credibility Assessment Evidence
Simon Stern, a state treasurer, sued a financial newsletter that accused him of diverting pension funds. The publisher relied on unnamed sources and an ambiguous draft document while ignoring readily available official records. Internal notes showing awareness of the discrepancy support a finding that the publisher entertained serious doubts yet published anyway.
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton491 U.S. 657, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562
In 1983, petitioner Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., published the Journal News, a newspaper in Hamilton, Ohio, that endorsed the reelection of incumbent municipal judge James Dolan. Respondent Daniel Connaughton was the Democratic candidate challenging Dolan in the November 8 election. A grand jury was investigating bribery allegations against Billy Joe New, the director of court services, who had resigned and been arrested. On September 17, 1983, Connaughton conducted a tape-recorded interview at his home with Patsy Stephens and her sister Alice Thompson regarding New's handling of cases. Stephens later passed a lie detector test arranged by Connaughton, after which he filed a complaint leading to New's indictment and conviction.
Late in October 1983, Alice Thompson contacted the Journal News through New's lawyer and gave a tape-recorded interview on October 27 in which she alleged that Connaughton had offered her and Stephens jobs, a trip to Florida, a restaurant for their parents, and other benefits in exchange for their help in the investigation and to keep the matter quiet. The newspaper's editorial director and a reporter interviewed Connaughton on October 31 for 55 minutes, during which he denied making any promises or quid pro quo offers but acknowledged some speculative discussions about jobs and trips. The Journal News did not interview Stephens, who had been present at the September meeting, nor did it listen to the tapes of that interview despite Connaughton making them available. On November 1, the newspaper published a front-page article reporting Thompson's allegations under the headline "Bribery case witness claims jobs, trip offered."
Connaughton filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging defamation. After a four-week trial featuring six days of testimony, three taped interviews, and 56 exhibits, the jury returned special verdicts finding by a preponderance that the article was defamatory and false and by clear and convincing evidence that it was published with actual malice. The jury awarded Connaughton $5,000 in compensatory damages and $195,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied the newspaper's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment after conducting its own review of the record. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the sufficiency of the evidence and the standard of review applied below.
Quotation Alteration Issue
Sylvia Santos, a prominent climate scientist, sued a magazine that published an interview containing fabricated quotations accusing her of data manipulation. The magazine altered her statements to create a more damaging impression. Santos must prove the alterations were made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth of the attributed statements.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989)
Jeffrey M. Masson served as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives until his termination.
In 1983, Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New Yorker magazine detailing the circumstances of Masson's departure from the Archives and his disputes with board members including Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna Freud. The article drew primarily from tape-recorded interviews Malcolm conducted with Masson and was subsequently published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
Masson claimed that several quotations attributed to him in the article did not appear on the tape recordings of his conversations with Malcolm. Among the challenged passages were statements that he changed his middle name because it sounded better, that he was viewed as an intellectual gigolo, that Freud's theory was the product of moral cowardice, that Anna Freud's house would have been a place of sex, women, fun, and that he would be considered the greatest analyst who ever lived after Freud.
On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Malcolm, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Knopf. He alleged that the defendants had libeled him and placed him in a false light by fabricating quotations and by misleadingly editing his statements to portray him as unscholarly, irresponsible, vain, and lacking in honesty and moral integrity. Masson further alleged that The New Yorker and Knopf knew of Malcolm's misconduct prior to publication.
The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that Masson had failed to establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Masson appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard argument on June 16, 1988, and issued its decision on August 4, 1989.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What level of fault must a public figure prove under the Sullivan rule?
A public figure must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice. Actual malice requires a showing that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth.
Supporting sources
Does failure to investigate alone establish actual malice under the Sullivan rule?
No. Failure to investigate does not by itself prove reckless disregard. The plaintiff must show the defendant entertained serious doubts about the truth or consciously avoided confirming facts that would have revealed falsity.
Supporting sources
When does the Sullivan rule apply to a plaintiff who is not an elected official?
The rule applies when the plaintiff is a public figure by virtue of pervasive fame or by voluntarily thrusting herself into a particular public controversy. A civilian director with substantial responsibility over governmental affairs may also qualify as a public official subject to the same standard.
Supporting sources
What evidence supports a finding of reckless disregard under the Sullivan rule?
Evidence that the publisher knew of an unresolved conflict between sources and public records, relied on a retracted report, or deliberately avoided verification can support reckless disregard. Internal notes acknowledging doubts yet proceeding with publication are particularly probative.
Supporting sources
Does the Sullivan rule require proof of special damages for slander per se?
No. The Sullivan rule addresses the fault element for public figures. Whether special damages must be shown is governed by common-law slander rules, which permit recovery without special damages when the statement imputes serious sexual misconduct or other per se categories.
Supporting sources
's
actual malice standard
protects even the reporter who negligently misquotes a subject. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, , 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). The real…
announced in New York
Times
Co. v.
Sullivan
, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), the court actually applied a less severe
standard
that merely required a showing of " highly unreasonable conduct…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · First Amendment freedomsUBEFoundational