Also known as: successor in title · successors-in-title · successors · assigns
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Persons who acquire the legal title or interest previously held by another through conveyance, inheritance, succession, or assignment.
Solomon Silver and Sierra Santos each own fifty percent of the shares in a close corporation as successors in title to the original founders. At the last two annual meetings they vote against each other's slate, leaving expired director terms unfilled. A court grants dissolution because the shareholders have failed for two consecutive meetings to elect successors to the directors.
Sophia Singh conveys land to a grantee while retaining a future interest limited in favor of her successors in title. Because the retained interest is neither a remainder nor an executory interest, it need not satisfy the rule against perpetuities. Later grantees take subject to that retained interest without perpetuities challenge.
Scott Summers, as successor in title to a dissolved corporation's assets, seeks to introduce a deposition taken in an earlier suit involving the same subject matter. The later action is between the same parties or their successors in interest. The court permits use of the deposition to the same extent as if taken in the present case.
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View caseSarah Sullivan acquires land as successor in title to a prior owner who received a limited railroad easement. When the railroad abandons the line, the successors in title to the original grantor assert full ownership. The Supreme Court holds that the successors take the fee without the easement burden once the railroad use ends.
In 1908 the Laramie, Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railroad obtained a 200-foot-wide right of way across public lands in Wyoming under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875. The railroad completed construction of its line in 1911. The line later passed through several owners and was used primarily to transport timber and cattle. In 1976 the United States issued a land patent conveying an 83-acre parcel in Fox Park, Wyoming, to Melvin and Lulu Brandt. The patent conveyed to the Brandts fee simple title to the land "with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever nature, thereunto belonging, unto said claimants, their successors and assigns, forever." The patent stated that the land was granted "subject to those rights for railroad purposes as have been granted to the Laramie[,] Hahn's Peak & Pacific Railway Company, its successors or assigns." The right of way crossed approximately ten acres of the patented parcel. In 1996 the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad notified the Surface Transportation Board of its intent to abandon the right of way. After removing the tracks and ties and obtaining Board approval, the railroad completed abandonment in 2004. In 2006 the United States filed suit seeking a judicial declaration of abandonment and an order quieting title to the right of way in the Government. The complaint named the owners of 31 parcels crossed by the abandoned right of way, including Marvin Brandt who held the Fox Park parcel through a family trust. Brandt contested the claim and filed a counterclaim asserting that the right of way was a mere easement extinguished by abandonment. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSpencer Silver purchases property subject to a mortgage as successor in title to the original mortgagor. A state statute extends the redemption period during an economic emergency. The Court upholds the extension against a contracts-clause challenge because the successors in title assumed the mortgage subject to existing state regulatory power.
The Blaisdells executed a mortgage on their property in Minneapolis to the Home Building & Loan Association on August 1, 1928. The mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement. After default, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to the Association on May 2, 1932, for $3700.98. The period of redemption under the law then in effect was set to expire on May 2, 1933. On April 18, 1933, Minnesota enacted Chapter 339 of the Laws of 1933, known as the Mortgage Moratorium Law. The statute authorized district courts to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales for such additional time as the court deemed just and equitable, not beyond May 1, 1935, upon condition that the mortgagor pay a reasonable part of the income or rental value toward taxes, insurance, interest, and principal. The Blaisdells applied to the District Court of Hennepin County for an extension of the redemption period. The district court found that the reasonable rental value of the property was $40 per month and the present market value was $6000. It extended the redemption period to May 1, 1935, requiring the Blaisdells to pay $40 per month to the Association. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the order. The Home Building & Loan Association appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reviewed the judgment sustaining the statute as applied to the preexisting mortgage.
View caseSummit Bank acquires title as successor in interest to a purchaser who received land under a legislative grant containing restrictive covenants. A later repeal attempt by the state is challenged. The Court holds that the grant created vested rights that bind the state and all successors in title.
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of Georgia. The contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that state. The first count set forth a breach in the covenant that the legislature of the state of Georgia at the time of passing the act of sale had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the said act. The second count assigned as a breach that the original grantees had promised and assured members of the legislature an interest in the lands if they voted for the bill. The third count alleged that a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under which the conveyance to the original grantees was made. The fourth count assigned as a breach that the right to the soil was in the United States and not in Georgia. In the circuit court there were demurrers to three pleas and a special verdict found on an issue joined on the fourth plea. The pleas were all sustained and judgment was rendered for the defendant. After the opinion of the court was delivered on the initial demurrers, the parties agreed to amend the pleadings and the cause was continued for further consideration. The special verdict found the grant of Carolina by Charles the second to the Earl of Clarendon and others. It found the subsequent erection of Georgia as a colony. It found the surrender of the grantees to the crown in 1752. It found the appointment of governors with commissions describing the boundaries. It found the 1763 proclamation creating new colonies and reserving lands on the western waters for the use of the Indians. It found the 1787 convention between South Carolina and Georgia settling their boundary line. The verdict described the situation of the lands in such manner that their lying within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763, in the treaty of peace, and in the convention between that state and South Carolina has not been questioned. The case comes before this court on the amended pleadings consisting of sundry demurrers and the special verdict.
View caseA deposition lawfully taken may be used in a later action involving the same subject matter between the same parties or their representatives or successors in interest to the same extent as if taken in the later action.
Subject to a narrow exception for reserved options to repurchase, any interest that is neither a remainder nor an executory interest and is left in or limited in favor of the conveyor or the successors of the conveyor need not comply with the rule against perpetuities.
Yes. The term mortgagor includes successors in ownership of the original mortgagor other than leasehold tenants, so nonassuming grantees remain personally liable for waste even though they are not liable on the secured obligation.
Property not required for the intended use must be distributed to the settlor if then living, otherwise to the settlor's successors in interest.
…established a Constitution those principles are fundamental and intended to be permanent. The government of the United States assigns to different departments respective powers and establishes limits not to be transcended. The Constitution is written to define limits; if those limits may be passed by those intended to be…