Also known as: substantially comply · substantially complied · substantially complying
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine excusing minor deviations from formal requirements when the underlying purpose of the requirement is fulfilled and the deviation does not impair a material interest. The doctrine focuses on whether the attempted action supplies clear evidence of intent and achieves the protective or evidentiary goals the formality was designed to serve.
Sierra Santos created a revocable trust that required revocation only by a signed writing delivered in person to the trustee. After a dispute, Sierra mailed a signed revocation letter to the trustee and followed up with a phone call confirming receipt. The trustee treated the trust as revoked. Because Sierra's actions supplied clear evidence of intent and achieved the notice purpose of the formality, the revocation was effective.
Sofia Stern held a power of appointment that required the instrument of exercise to make specific reference to the power. Sofia executed a will that exercised the power over the appointive property but referred only to the trust containing the power. The donee knew of the power and intended to exercise it. The omission did not impair the donor's material purpose, so the appointment was valid.
Steven Silva was named trustee of a trust that stated acceptance occurred only by signing an acceptance page and recording a memorandum. Steven emailed the beneficiaries announcing he was taking over, collected rents from trust property, and negotiated new leases. His conduct demonstrated assent and exercise of trustee powers. The actions amounted to substantial compliance with the prescribed method.
Santiago Sanchez leased an apartment with several minor code violations that did not affect habitability. The landlord promptly repaired the defects after the tenant complained. Because the premises substantially complied with the housing code at the start of the lease and the violations posed no material risk, the lease remained enforceable.
Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.
View caseSimone Sanders marked a presidential ballot with a clear intent to vote for a candidate but used a check mark instead of the required fill-in circle. Election officials counted the ballot after determining the mark unambiguously expressed voter intent. The minor deviation from the printed instruction did not impair the statutory purpose of accurate vote recording.
On November 8, 2000, the day following the Presidential election, the Florida Division of Elections reported that petitioner Bush had received 2,909,135 votes and respondent Gore had received 2,907,351 votes, a margin of 1,784 for Governor Bush. Because Governor Bush's margin of victory was less than one-half of one percent of the votes cast, an automatic machine recount was conducted under section 102.141(4) of the Florida Election Code. This recount resulted in a substantially smaller margin of victory for Bush. Respondent Gore then sought manual recounts in four counties: Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade. The Florida Supreme Court enjoined certification until November 17, later directed inclusion of completed manual-recount results from Volusia and Palm Beach, and ordered Miami-Dade to finish its recount by November 22. On November 21 the court set a November 26 deadline for all manual recounts and for certification by the Secretary of State. On November 26 the Secretary certified Bush the winner by 537 votes. Gore filed a contest action in Leon County Circuit Court under section 102.168 alleging rejection of a sufficient number of legal votes to place the outcome in doubt. The circuit court denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court reversed in part on December 8, 2000, ordering a manual recount of all undervotes statewide under a clear-indication-of-voter-intent standard and directing inclusion of 215 net votes from Palm Beach County and 168 net votes from Miami-Dade County. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 9 after staying the Florida Supreme Court's order and heard argument on December 11. The dispute involved roughly 45,000 undervote ballots that machines had not tabulated plus partial manual counts already performed in three counties.
View caseSimon Stern, on behalf of an organization, produced a membership list in response to a subpoena but omitted a few names due to an administrative error. The list still identified the vast majority of members and allowed the requesting party to pursue its litigation goals. The production substantially complied with the order because the omission caused no material prejudice.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York. Its first Alabama affiliates were chartered in 1918, and in 1951 the Association opened a regional office in Alabama employing two supervisory persons and one clerical worker. The Association has never complied with Alabama's foreign corporation qualification statute. In 1956 the Attorney General of Alabama brought an equity suit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to enjoin the Association from further activities within the state and to oust it from Alabama. The bill alleged that the Association had opened a regional office, organized affiliates, recruited members, solicited contributions, given financial support and legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state university, and supported a Negro boycott of Montgomery bus lines. On the day the complaint was filed the Circuit Court issued an ex parte order restraining the Association pendente lite from engaging in further activities within the state and from taking steps to qualify to do business. The State moved for production of a large number of records including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama members and agents. Over the Association's objections the Circuit Court ordered production of a substantial part of the requested records including the membership lists and postponed the hearing on the restraining order. The Association answered the bill, admitted its Alabama activities substantially as alleged, and offered to qualify if the bar from qualification were lifted, but it did not produce the membership lists. For its failure to comply the Association was adjudged in civil contempt and fined $10,000, with the fine subject to increase to $100,000 if compliance was not forthcoming within five days. After the five-day period the Association produced substantially all requested data except the membership lists, and the Circuit Court increased the fine to $100,000. The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review the final contempt judgment, the first time for insufficiency of the petition's allegations and the second time on procedural grounds. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional questions presented.
View caseSubstantial compliance asks whether the formalities actually observed came close enough to the statutory requirements to fulfill their purposes. The harmless error rule instead asks whether clear and convincing evidence shows the testator intended the document to be a will regardless of the formal defects.
No. When the trust terms do not make the signature method exclusive, conduct such as taking delivery of trust property or exercising trustee powers constitutes acceptance under the substantial compliance standard.
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Courts look to the donee's overall conduct and statements. Knowledge and intent are established when the donee refers to the appointive property in an instrument and takes steps consistent with exercising the power, even if the instrument omits the exact reference the donor required.
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Yes, when the stated method is not expressly made exclusive. The settlor may revoke by substantially complying with the prescribed method or by any other method that supplies clear and convincing evidence of intent to revoke.
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…Comp. Laws § 168.799a(3) (Supp. 2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.453(3) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (looking to voter's intent where there is substantial compliance with statutory requirements); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 65.009(c) (1986); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-104(5)(b) (Supp. 2000) (standard for write-in votes), § 20A-4-105(6)(a) (standard for…