428 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. App. 1981)
Douglas purchased a whole life insurance policy on March 13, 1953, from Equitable, naming his wife at that time, Doris, as the beneficiary.1 On March 5, 1965, Douglas and Doris were divorced. The divorce decree made no provision regarding the insurance policy, but did state the following: “It is further understood and agreed between the parties hereto that the provisions of this agreement shall be in full satisfaction of all claims by either of said parties against the other, including alimony, support and maintenance money.”2
After the divorce Douglas ceased paying the premiums on his life insurance policy.3 Equitable notified him on July 2, 1965, that because the premium due on March 9, 1965, had not been paid, his whole life policy was automatically converted to a paid-up term policy with an expiration date of June 12, 1986.4 The policy contained the following provision with respect to beneficiaries requiring written notice to the Society for any change, effective only if endorsed on the policy.5
On December 24, 1965, Douglas married Margaret, and a son, Daniel, was born to them. On June 7, 1976, Douglas made a holographic will in which he bequeathed his insurance policy with Equitable Life to his wife and son, Margaret A. Cook & Daniel Joseph Cook.6 This will was admitted to probate in Bartholomew Superior Court after Douglas’s death on June 9, 1979.7
On August 24, 1979, Margaret filed a claim with Equitable for the proceeds of Douglas’s policy, but Equitable deposited the proceeds, along with its complaint in interpleader, with the Bartholomew Circuit Court on March 14, 1980.8 Discovery was made; interrogatories and affidavits were filed; and all parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact respecting Doris’s claim to the proceeds of the policy and entered judgment in her favor as to the amount of the proceeds plus interest, a total of $3,154.09, from which Margaret A. Cook, as administratrix, Margaret A. Cook, and Daniel J. Cook appealed.9
Whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in this case was contrary to Indiana law because the court entered judgment in favor of the named beneficiary of an insurance policy rather than in compliance with the insured testator’s intent as expressed in his will?10
Indiana law requires strict compliance with the terms of an insurance policy to effect a change of beneficiary.11 An attempt to change the beneficiary by will alone is ineffectual.12 The three exceptions to this rule are if the insurer has waived strict compliance and issued a new certificate, if it is beyond the power of the insured to comply literally, or if the insured has done all in his power to change the beneficiary but dies before the new certificate is issued.13 This rule protects the rights of the insurer, the insured, and the beneficiary to rely on the policy's change of beneficiary provisions.14
No. The established facts demonstrate that Douglas did not comply with the policy's requirement for written notice to Equitable to change the beneficiary from Doris.15 Although Douglas executed a holographic will in 1976 leaving the policy to Margaret and Daniel, he never notified Equitable of any intent to change the beneficiary after his divorce from Doris in 1965.16 The divorce decree made no provision for the policy.17 Douglas had fourteen years between the divorce and his death in 1979 to make the change but took no action other than the will.18
None of the exceptions apply because Douglas could have provided written notice to Equitable at any time but failed to do so.19 The facts further show that after the policy converted to term coverage in 1965, Douglas took no steps to satisfy the endorsement requirement, having had ample opportunity following his remarriage and the birth of his son.20 Therefore, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the named beneficiary Doris.21
The trial court’s entry of summary judgment was not contrary to Indiana law.22