Also known as: strict scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The most demanding standard of judicial review. A law or classification subject to this standard must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest and must actually achieve that interest through the least restrictive means.
City officials enacted a rule banning a particular animal-slaughter technique used only by members of one religious group. Simone Sanders, a practitioner, faced prosecution under the ordinance. Because the rule singled out religious conduct for disfavored treatment, the court applied strictest scrutiny and invalidated the measure after finding no compelling interest that justified the targeted prohibition.
A county board reserved a fixed percentage of public contracts for businesses owned by members of designated racial minorities. Sasha Stone, owner of a non-qualifying firm, challenged the program. The court subjected the racial preference to strictest scrutiny and struck it down because the county offered only generalized assertions of past discrimination rather than particularized evidence tied to the local industry.
A municipal agency adopted a rule barring foster-care organizations from declining to certify same-sex couples yet retained discretion to grant case-by-case waivers. Seth Shapiro, director of a religiously affiliated agency, refused certification on faith-based grounds and lost his contract. The court applied strictest scrutiny because the waiver authority rendered the policy not generally applicable and held the rule unconstitutional.
Federal law prohibited registration of any mark that a substantial portion of the public would find disparaging. Sabrina Shah attempted to register a mark containing a term some found offensive. The court treated the bar as a viewpoint-based restriction on private speech and invalidated it under strictest scrutiny because the government may not suppress expression merely because it disapproves of the message.
A state statute limited inheritance rights of children born outside marriage unless paternity had been formally acknowledged. Selena Singh, an illegitimate child whose father died intestate, was excluded from the estate. The court applied strictest scrutiny to the illegitimacy classification and held the statute unconstitutional because the distinction lacked a sufficiently weighty justification.
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child. Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
View caseA state criminal statute prohibited married couples from using or receiving information about contraceptives. Samantha Stone and her husband were denied access at a local clinic. The court subjected the ban to strictest scrutiny as an infringement on a fundamental privacy right and invalidated the law for failing to demonstrate a compelling interest narrowly served by the prohibition.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseStrictest scrutiny applies when a law classifies on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin or burdens a fundamental right. The government must then prove the classification is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. Generalized assertions of past societal discrimination are insufficient to satisfy this standard.
Supporting sources
A policy that permits individualized exemptions is not generally applicable. Such a policy triggers strictest scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause because it invites officials to decide which religious claims receive relief. The government must then show the policy is necessary to a compelling interest and narrowly tailored.
Supporting sources
The government must identify specific past discrimination in the relevant industry and jurisdiction and demonstrate that the preference is narrowly tailored to remedy that discrimination. Broad societal discrimination does not suffice. The program must also avoid over- or under-inclusiveness relative to the identified harm.
Supporting sources
…law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin , 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were concerned by its…