Also known as: statements of fact · statement of facts · factual statement
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An assertion that a particular fact exists or has existed. The assertion may be express or implied by conduct and is distinct from a statement of opinion that does not convey an underlying factual claim.
Lopez represents Rivera in a disciplinary hearing. Lopez states that no trust account discrepancies were ever found. After the hearing Lopez reviews the audit and learns it documented a short-term deficit. Lopez must inform the board that the earlier statement was inaccurate.
A newspaper publishes that Samuel Soto failed to disclose a prior regulatory inquiry on his bar application. Soto sues for defamation. The newspaper proves the statement is true. Soto cannot recover because truth defeats the claim.
An assistant district attorney circulates a questionnaire asking colleagues about office morale and transfer policies. Supervisors treat the questionnaire as critical statements of fact about office operations. The court evaluates whether the questionnaire addresses matters of public concern.
Sheila Myers worked as an Assistant District Attorney in the New Orleans office under District Attorney Harry Connick for approximately five and a half years. In early October 1980, Myers was informed she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court. She strongly opposed the transfer and expressed her objections to several supervisors including Connick. On October 6, 1980, Myers received formal notice of the transfer. Later that day she discussed her concerns with First Assistant District Attorney Dennis Waldron. That night Myers prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views of fellow Assistant District Attorneys on office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. The next morning, she typed and copied the questionnaire. She then distributed it to fifteen Assistant District Attorneys. Connick learned of the distribution shortly after noon on October 7. He returned to the office, informed Myers she was being terminated for refusing the transfer, and stated that distributing the questionnaire constituted insubordination. Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the termination violated her First Amendment rights. The District Court found the questionnaire was the real reason for discharge, submitted the motivating-factor question to a jury which answered in Myers' favor, and ordered reinstatement with backpay. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA magazine article states that an attorney is a Communist sympathizer who has participated in subversive activities. The attorney sues for defamation. The court requires the plaintiff to prove the statement of fact is false and made with actual malice.
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio. Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record. Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research. Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
View caseState officials order a grower to build in-state packing facilities before shipping cantaloupes. The grower challenges the order as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The parties file an agreed statement of facts describing the cost and delay the order would impose.
The appellee Bruce Church, Inc. is a company engaged in extensive commercial farming operations in Arizona and California. The appellant is the official charged with enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act. A provision of the Act requires that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must be packed in regular compact arrangement in closed standard containers approved by the supervisor. The company undertook to develop approximately 6,400 acres of uncultivated land in Parker, Arizona, pursuant to a 1964 lease, spending more than $3,000,000 in clearing, leveling, irrigating, and otherwise developing this land. The company began growing cantaloupes on part of the land in 1966. Because the company had no packing facilities at Parker, it transported its 1966 and 1967 Parker cantaloupe harvests in bulk loads to Blythe, California, 31 miles away, for sorting, packing, and shipping. In 1968 the appellant issued an order prohibiting the company from shipping its cantaloupes out of Arizona unless packed in approved containers. No such facilities were available to the company at Parker or nearby in Arizona, and the company faced imminent loss of its anticipated 1968 cantaloupe crop in the gross amount of $700,000. An agreed statement of facts stipulated that the practical effect of the order would be to compel the company to build packing facilities in or near Parker that would cost approximately $200,000. The company brought this action in federal court to enjoin the order. A three-judge court was convened, granted temporary relief, and after discovery issued a permanent injunction. This appeal followed.
View caseA pregnant woman challenges a state criminal abortion statute. The complaint alleges the statute imposes an unconstitutional restriction on her liberty. The court examines the factual record concerning the timing of her pregnancy and the statute's application.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseA lawyer must correct a prior statement of fact to a tribunal once the lawyer learns it was false in a material respect. The duty continues through the conclusion of the proceeding. Reasonable remedial measures begin with correcting the record on the lawyer's own initiative.
Yes. One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability if the statement is true. The defendant may raise truth as an affirmative defense.
A statement is treated as one of fact when a reasonable person would understand it to assert the existence of a particular fact rather than a subjective view. Pure opinion that does not imply undisclosed defamatory facts receives First Amendment protection.
…rights of others. Moose Lodge v. Irvis , 407 U. S. 163 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton , 405 U. S. 727 (1972). The Court's statement of facts in this case makes clear, however, that the record in no way indicates the presence of such a plaintiff. We know only that plaintiff Roe at the time of filing her complaint was a pregnant…