Also known as: splits · splitting
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An act of dividing a legal right, obligation, or cause of action into separate parts or interests. The division may occur by agreement, operation of law, or court ruling and often affects enforcement, privity, or remedies available to the parties.
Santiago Sanchez purchased a newly built home from its first owner. Defects in construction later appeared. When Santiago sued the builder directly, the court examined whether the implied warranty of habitability could be enforced without privity, revealing how authority splits on extending protection to remote buyers.
Sophia Singh originated a mortgage loan and later transferred only the note to a secondary-market buyer while retaining the mortgage document. The transferee sought to foreclose. The court held that the split left the note unsecured and denied enforcement until the mortgage interest was also conveyed.
Skylar Sullivan was prosecuted in state court for conduct that also violated federal law. She argued that the federal government could not compel state courts to hear the claim. The court explained that the Constitution splits sovereignty between two independent orders of government, each with its own direct relationship to the people.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
View caseSolomon Silver bought stock after corporate statements that omitted merger talks. When the talks became public the price fell. Plaintiffs invoked the fraud-on-the-market presumption. The court noted that circuits had split on the standard of materiality for preliminary merger discussions and applied the presumption to certify the class.
Basic Incorporated was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in manufacturing chemical refractories for the steel industry. As early as 1965 or 1966 Combustion Engineering expressed interest in acquiring Basic but was deterred by antitrust concerns. In 1976 regulatory action removed the antitrust barrier and Combustion's strategic plan listed an objective to acquire Basic for thirty million dollars. Beginning in September 1976 Combustion representatives met and spoke by telephone with Basic officers and directors about a possible merger. During 1977 and 1978 Basic issued three public statements denying that merger negotiations were under way. On December 18 1978 Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its shares and announced it had been approached by another company concerning a merger. The next day Basic's board endorsed Combustion's offer of forty-six dollars per share. On December 20 1978 Basic publicly announced approval of Combustion's tender offer for all outstanding shares. Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's October 21 1977 public statement and before the December 1978 trading suspension. Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors alleging that the three statements violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by misleading the market and causing sales at artificially depressed prices. The District Court certified the class under a presumption of reliance but granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that any misstatements were immaterial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSimone Sanders was charged with murder and raised an extreme-emotional-disturbance defense. The state statute placed the burden of proving the defense on the defendant. The court upheld the allocation, observing that jurisdictions remain split on whether due process requires the prosecution to disprove affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseSofia Stern, a law student, objected to paying a mandatory university fee that subsidized certain student publications. She claimed the fee forced her to support speech she opposed. The court acknowledged a split among lower courts on whether such challenges succeed and evaluated the fee under First Amendment compelled-speech principles.
The University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia, maintains a Student Activities Fund financed by a mandatory $14 per semester fee assessed to each full-time student. The fund supports extracurricular student activities related to the University's educational purpose through payments to third-party contractors for approved groups that qualify as Contracted Independent Organizations. To obtain CIO status, a student group must be composed primarily of University students, file its constitution, pledge nondiscrimination, and agree to a disclaimer stating that it is independent of the University. CIO publications are eligible for printing-cost reimbursement if their content is related to the University's educational purpose, but the Guidelines expressly exclude funding for any activity that primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. In 1990, University of Virginia undergraduates formed Wide Awake Productions as a CIO and began publishing Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The first issue contained articles on racism, crisis pregnancy, prayer, C. S. Lewis, and reviews of religious music, each marked by a cross; subsequent issues addressed homosexuality, missionary work, eating disorders, and Christian theology, with advertisements from churches and Christian bookstores. In 1991, Wide Awake Productions requested $5,862 from the Student Activities Fund to cover printing costs for one issue. The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied the request on the ground that the publication constituted a religious activity under the Guidelines. Wide Awake Productions appealed the denial through the Student Council and the Student Activities Committee, which upheld the decision. The group and three of its student editors and members then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the refusal to pay printing costs violated their rights under the First Amendment Speech, Press, and Free Exercise Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for the University. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe note becomes unsecured as a practical matter. Enforcement of the mortgage is barred until the interests are reunited because separating the rights produces an economically wasteful result and an unwarranted windfall to the mortgagor.
No. Under the Model Business Corporation Act a board may amend the articles to triple each issued and unissued share of the single outstanding class without shareholder approval because the change is proportional and creates no class-based conflict.
The court examines the completeness and specificity of the document itself. A ten-page insurance policy that sets out coverages, exclusions, limits, and deductibles is presumptively integrated, so prior oral assurances contradicting its terms are excluded.
A buyer may accept conforming commercial units and reject nonconforming ones when the tender fails in any respect to conform. Each color batch of headphones constituted a separate commercial unit, allowing partial acceptance and rejection.