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The quality of being sufficiently precise and particular in a legal statement or description. This requirement ensures that objections, writings, pleadings, or identifications can be evaluated without ambiguity or guesswork.
Serena Soto served interrogatories on Sapphire Holdings seeking details on contract performance. Sapphire responded with a blanket objection that the requests were overly broad but provided no further explanation. Because the objection lacked the required particularity, the court deemed all unstated grounds waived.
Santiago Sanchez and Southland Foods signed a detailed supply contract that listed every delivery term and payment schedule. When Santiago later sought to introduce evidence of an alleged side agreement on pricing, the court treated the writing as integrated because its completeness and particularity reasonably indicated a final expression.
Sasha Stone filed an antitrust complaint against Spectrum Financial alleging parallel pricing but offered only conclusory assertions of agreement. The court dismissed the action because the allegations failed to supply enough particular facts to raise a plausible claim of conspiracy.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseSydney Santos was prosecuted under a state law that criminalized treating the flag with contempt. The court struck down the statute because the phrase failed to define forbidden conduct with enough particularity to avoid unconstitutional vagueness.
In 1984, during the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a political demonstration organized by the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and Dallas-based corporations. The demonstration began with a march through the city streets where participants chanted slogans and carried signs critical of the administration and corporations. At several points the group staged die-ins to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war, and on some occasions spray-painted buildings and overturned plants, though Johnson took no part in those acts. The march concluded in front of Dallas City Hall. There Johnson was handed an American flag that had been removed from a flagpole at one of the corporate locations visited during the march. Johnson then poured kerosene on the flag and set it on fire. As the flag burned the demonstrators chanted America the red white and blue we spit on you. After the flag was consumed the group dispersed. No one was physically injured or threatened during the event although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Of the approximately 100 demonstrators Johnson was the only one arrested. He was charged with desecration of a venerated object under Texas Penal Code Annotated section 42.09(a)(3). Following a trial Johnson was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of two thousand dollars. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
View caseSofia Stern sued her employer after termination and showed that the stated reason for her firing was false. The court required her to advance evidence of particular facts demonstrating that the false reason was a pretext for discrimination rather than relying solely on disbelief of the employer's explanation.
St. Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources, hired Melvin Hicks as a correctional officer in August 1978. Hicks, who is black, received a promotion to shift commander, one of six supervisory positions at the facility, in February 1980. In 1983 the department conducted an investigation of St. Mary's administration that produced extensive supervisory changes the following January. John Powell became chief of custody and Hicks's immediate supervisor, while Steve Long became superintendent. Beginning in March 1984 Hicks was subjected to repeated disciplinary actions. He was suspended for five days on March 3 for violations committed by his subordinates, received a letter of reprimand on March 21 after an inmate brawl during his shift, was demoted from shift commander to correctional officer for failing to log a vehicle use on March 19, and was discharged on June 7 after a heated exchange with Powell on April 19. Hicks filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against St. Mary's and Long. He alleged that the demotion and discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they were motivated by his race. The case proceeded through discovery to a full bench trial. After trial the District Court entered judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSpencer Silver, the special prosecutor, sought presidential tapes through a subpoena that identified specific conversations by date and participants. The court upheld enforcement because the request demonstrated the necessary particularity to establish relevance and admissibility without constituting a fishing expedition.
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with offenses including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although not designated in the indictment, the grand jury named President Richard M. Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President requiring production of tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to precisely identified meetings between the President and others. The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations on April 30, 1974, including 20 subject to the subpoena. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c) along with a claim of privilege. At a subsequent hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury's action naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator and for protective orders were filed by counsel for the President. On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and ordered production of the materials by May 31, 1974. The court rejected claims that the dispute was a nonjusticiable intra-executive conflict and that the Judiciary lacked authority to review executive privilege. On May 24, 1974, the President appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Special Prosecutor petitioned for certiorari before judgment, which was granted. The case was set for argument on July 8, 1974. The proceeding is a pending federal criminal prosecution in United States v. Mitchell et al. set for trial on September 9, 1974.
View caseAny ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court excuses the failure for good cause. This rule prevents parties from raising new objections after the deadline has passed.
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A writing that appears complete and particular in view of its terms is presumed to be the final expression of the parties' agreement. Other evidence cannot contradict those terms unless the writing is shown not to be final.
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The objection must state whether it applies to the objector, a subset, or the entire class and must detail the specific grounds. This requirement allows the court to evaluate and address objections efficiently.
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An indictment lacking particularity in charging an offense may be dismissed because the defendant must receive fair notice of the charges. Courts examine whether the charging document identifies the offense with enough detail to permit a defense.
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