Also known as: specific-intent · specific intention
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A culpable mental state that requires the defendant to intend not only the prohibited act but also a further specified consequence or circumstance. This mental element goes beyond the basic intent to perform the physical act and must be proved as an element of the offense. The requirement distinguishes certain crimes from those that demand only general intent to engage in the conduct.
Sean Steele approached Stella Shapiro at a bar and offered her cash to set fire to a rival's warehouse that night. He gave her the exact address, entry point, and timing so the fire would destroy the building. The prosecution proved Sean acted with the purpose that Stella actually commit the arson. The specific intent element was satisfied at the moment of the request even though Stella never acted.
Sterling Manufacturing listed its solar panels online as having a twenty-percent efficiency rating under standard conditions. Sophia Singh reviewed the listing and purchased the panels for her installation business. The panels performed at only twelve percent efficiency. The court held that an express warranty arose from the description even though Sterling had no subjective intention to create a warranty.
Samuel Soto organized meetings where he urged members to prepare for the violent overthrow of the government as soon as conditions allowed. The government proved that Soto's purpose was to bring about the overthrow rather than merely to discuss abstract ideas. The specific intent requirement supplied the constitutional limit that allowed the conviction to stand.
Petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 11, for the period April 1945 to July 1948. A pretrial motion to quash the indictment on constitutional grounds was denied, the trial was set, and a jury returned verdicts of guilty on October 14, 1949. The trial lasted nine months, six devoted to evidence and producing a 16,000-page record. The indictment charged petitioners with knowingly and wilfully conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United States of America as a society that teaches and advocates overthrow of the Government by force and violence. It also charged them with conspiracy knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of such overthrow. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to two questions: whether §§ 2 or 3 of the Smith Act, inherently or as construed and applied in this case, violate the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights; and whether those sections, inherently or as construed and applied, violate the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. The Court of Appeals held the record amply supported the jury's necessary finding that petitioners, as leaders of the Communist organization, intended violent revolution when circumstances were propitious. The court described the Party as highly disciplined, adept at infiltration, using aliases and double-meaning language, rigidly controlled, intolerant of dissension, and during the period in question advocating overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.
View caseSolomon Silver recorded conversations with an informant who had agreed to wear a transmitter. The government showed that Silver acted with the purpose of obtaining evidence of the informant's statements rather than merely listening. The specific intent element determined whether the recordings violated the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances.
In 2008 defendant William White, leader of the American National Socialist Workers Party, operated the website Overthrow.com. On September 11, 2008, White posted an article titled "Hale Seeks To Have Sentence Overturned" with the sub-headline "Gay Jewish Anti-Racist Led Jury." The post included a photograph of Mark Hoffman, who had served as foreperson on the jury that convicted Matthew Hale in 2004, along with Hoffman's date of birth, address at 6915 Hamilton #A Chicago IL 60645, cell phone number, home phone number, and office number, and described Hoffman as living with his "gay black lover" and cat "homeboy." The posts appeared the same day a Chicago Sun-Times article discussed Hale's post-conviction motion challenging Hoffman's jury service on grounds including Hoffman's sexual orientation and race of his partner. White posted a virtually identical version on the blog section of the site and, after Northwestern University removed Hoffman's photo, posted an update the next day noting the block and repeating the same personal information. The site at the time also displayed links to other articles including one titled "Kill Richard Warman" and a magazine cover image showing crosshairs over Barack Obama's head titled "Kill This Nigger?" Hoffman received a harassing phone call from a Virginia number on September 11, 2008, asking about his jury service, followed by text messages containing offensive content. Hoffman contacted Northwestern security and FBI Agent Sara Lopez. FBI agents later executed search warrants at properties associated with White in Roanoke, Virginia, seizing the server used to run Overthrow.com and confirming through forensic analysis that White created the Hoffman posts. The government charged White with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 373 by soliciting or endeavoring to persuade another person to injure Hoffman based on his jury service in the Hale case. A prior district judge dismissed the superseding indictment, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, and an anonymous jury returned a guilty verdict. White moved for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. At trial the evidence revealed that all of the information in the posts was in the public domain. Former ANSWP members Philip Anderson and Michael Burks testified about the organization's structure, conference calls, and their interactions with White, including White's post-arrest instructions to Anderson to contact other white supremacists to determine whether anyone planned to harm Hoffman. The government introduced dozens of prior Overthrow.com posts in which White had published addresses and expressed violent wishes toward other individuals.
View caseStephen Shaw, a reporter, learned the contents of a forthcoming column and traded on that information before publication. The government proved that Shaw acted with the purpose of converting the newspaper's confidential information for personal gain. The specific intent finding supported the mail and wire fraud convictions.
In 1981, R. Foster Winans joined the Wall Street Journal as a reporter. In the summer of 1982, he became one of the two writers of its daily “Heard on the Street” column, which discussed selected stocks or groups of stocks and offered investment perspectives. The column had the potential to affect the price of the stocks it examined, although the columns at issue contained no corporate inside information. The Journal maintained an official policy that the contents and timing of the column were confidential prior to publication. In October 1983, Winans entered into a scheme with Peter Brant and Kenneth Felis, both connected with the Kidder Peabody brokerage firm, and with David Clark, a client of Brant, to supply advance information about the column’s timing and contents. The group bought or sold securities based on the probable market impact of the column. The group agreed to share the profits. Over a four-month period the brokers executed prepublication trades tied to 27 columns, generating net profits of about $690,000. Kidder Peabody noticed correlations between the “Heard” articles and trading in the Clark and Felis accounts in November 1983 and began inquiries. The Securities and Exchange Commission later opened an investigation. After the conspirators quarreled, Winans and petitioner David Carpenter, Winans’ roommate, disclosed the entire scheme to the SEC on March 29, 1984. Brant, who had pleaded guilty under a plea agreement, testified for the government at the subsequent bench trial. Winans, Felis, and Carpenter were convicted of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, and the conspiracy statute. Carpenter was convicted as an aider and abettor. With a minor exception the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSapphire Technologies spent corporate funds on political advertisements opposing a candidate. The government proved that the corporation acted with the purpose of influencing the election rather than merely expressing a viewpoint. The specific intent element shaped the analysis of whether the expenditures received First Amendment protection.
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations. In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie. The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand. In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million. The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge. To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad. Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address. Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections. Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections. BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication. An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.
View caseSpecific intent requires proof that the defendant intended a consequence or circumstance beyond the actus reus itself. General intent requires only that the defendant intended to perform the physical act. Voluntary intoxication can negate specific intent but not general intent.
Yes. The solicitor must act with the purpose that the person solicited commit the crime. Mere approval or agreement with the idea does not satisfy the element. The offense is complete upon the solicitation regardless of any response.
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No. Embezzlement requires intent to defraud that is equivalent to larceny's specific intent to permanently deprive the owner. A mistaken claim of right or intent to return the property itself defeats the mental element.
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No. Common-law arson requires malice but not a specific intent to burn the dwelling. Malice is satisfied if the defendant intends the structure to burn, knows it will burn, or consciously disregards a substantial risk that it will burn.
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