seriatim

An indictment was returned on January 27, 1936. The first count charged that appellees conspired beginning May 29, 1934, to sell fifteen machine guns in the United States to Bolivia, a country then engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco. The sales allegedly violated the Joint Resolution of Congress approved May 28, 1934, and the presidential proclamation issued the same day. The Joint Resolution stated that if the President found the prohibition of arms sales might contribute to peace and if he consulted with other American Republics and secured their cooperation, he could proclaim the prohibition effective. It then became unlawful to sell arms to the countries in the Chaco conflict. President Roosevelt issued the proclamation on May 28, 1934. He declared that he had made the required findings and that the prohibition applied to Bolivia and Paraguay. On November 14, 1935, the President revoked the proclamation. The revocation stated that the prohibition was no longer necessary but expressly preserved all penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities already incurred. Appellees demurred to the indictment. They argued that the joint resolution effected an invalid delegation of legislative power, that the President had failed to find essential jurisdictional facts, and that the revocation ended any liability. The district court sustained the demurrers on the delegation ground but overruled them on the other two grounds. The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act.

Fibreboard Corporation, primarily a timber company, manufactured asbestos-containing products for high-temperature industrial applications from the 1920s through 1971. Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s, Fibreboard faced thousands of personal injury claims each year from asbestos exposure. From May 1957 through March 1959, Continental Casualty Company issued Fibreboard a comprehensive general liability policy with per-occurrence and per-claim limits but no aggregate limit. Pacific Indemnity Company issued a similar policy for 1956-1957. Fibreboard initiated coverage litigation against both insurers in California state court in 1979. In 1990 the California trial court held the insurers responsible for indemnification of claims involving exposure before their policies expired and required them to pay full defense costs. Fibreboard began structured settlements in 1988, initially paying 40 percent up front with the balance contingent on coverage victory, then shifting in 1991 to full assignments of coverage rights. By December 1992 Fibreboard had deferred settlement obligations exceeding $1.2 billion, all contingent on prevailing in the coverage dispute. After the insurers lost at trial in early 1993, they joined global settlement negotiations conditioned on achieving "total peace" through a mandatory class action. Negotiators reached the Global Settlement Agreement shortly before midnight on August 27, 1993, providing $1.525 billion from the insurers and $10 million from Fibreboard to fund a trust for class claims. The Trilateral Settlement Agreement, executed the same night as a backup, committed the insurers to supply up to $2 billion if the global settlement failed. On September 9, 1993, named plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas seeking certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) that included persons exposed to Fibreboard asbestos who had not sued or settled before August 27, 1993, persons who had dismissed claims without prejudice, and their relatives, but that excluded pending claimants and those who had settled while retaining malignancy rights. After Continental and Pacific had obtained leave to intervene as party-defendants, the District Court provisionally granted class certification, enjoined commencement of further separate litigation against Fibreboard by class members, and appointed a guardian ad litem to review the fairness of the settlement to the class members. After an 8-day fairness hearing, the District Court certified the class and approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. After this Court vacated and remanded in light of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Fifth Circuit reinstated its affirmance in a per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Roger Reeves worked for Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. for forty years until his discharge in October 1995 at the age of fifty-seven. He supervised the regular line in the Hinge Room, where Joe Oswalt supervised the special line and Russell Caldwell managed the department. Reeves's duties included recording employee attendance and hours and reviewing weekly attendance reports. In the summer of 1995, after being told that production was down due to employee absences and tardiness, manufacturing director Powe Chesnut ordered an audit of the Hinge Room timesheets for July, August, and September. The audit uncovered numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut, along with vice presidents Dana Jester and Tom Whitaker, recommended to company president Sandra Sanderson that Reeves and Caldwell be fired, and Sanderson discharged both in October 1995. Reeves filed suit in June 1996 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired for failing to maintain accurate attendance records, while Reeves introduced evidence that his records were accurate and that Chesnut had shown age-based animus toward him. The jury found in Reeves's favor, awarding thirty-five thousand dollars in compensatory damages and determining that the discrimination was willful, resulting in a seventy-thousand-dollar judgment plus an award of front pay. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment, concluding that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated the employment decision even though he may have shown the company's explanation was pretextual. The court considered factors such as the context of Chesnut's comments, the ages of other decisionmakers, and the fact that multiple supervisors were accused of recordkeeping issues. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the evidentiary requirements in such discrimination cases.

In November 1973, Buena Park police officers seized four copies of the film "Deep Throat" from the Pussycat Theatre under four separate search warrants issued on November 23 and 24. On November 26, an eight-count criminal misdemeanor complaint was filed in Orange County Municipal Court against two theater employees, and the Superior Court of Orange County issued an order to show cause why the film should not be declared obscene. The theater owners appeared on November 26, objected on state-law grounds, purported to reserve federal questions, and declined further participation; the next day the Superior Court viewed the film, took evidence, declared it obscene, and ordered all copies seized from the theater. On November 29, 1973, the theater owners Vincent Miranda, doing business as Pussycat Theater, and Walnut Properties, Inc., filed this action in federal district court against four Buena Park police officers, the Orange County District Attorney, and the Assistant District Attorney. The complaint sought a declaration that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutional and an injunction ordering return of the seized films. A single district judge denied a temporary restraining order, and a three-judge court was designated on January 8, 1974; service of the complaint was completed on January 14. On January 15, 1974, the Municipal Court complaint was amended to name the theater owners as additional defendants and to add four conspiracy counts. The three-judge court issued its judgment on June 4, 1974, declaring the obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordering return of the films. Appellants informed the court of the Supreme Court's dismissal of Miller II and of the Superior Court Appellate Department's reversal of an earlier suppression order in the criminal case. On September 30 the three-judge court denied rehearing, reaffirmed its rulings, and amended the injunction to require appellants to petition the Municipal Court for return of three of the four prints. Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court from both the June 4 judgment and the September 30 amended judgment; the Court postponed further consideration of its jurisdiction to the merits.