Also known as: separate property regimes · separate property system · separate property
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A system of marital property ownership under which each spouse retains individual title to assets acquired before marriage or received by gift, devise, or inheritance. Property acquired during the marriage is not automatically shared between the spouses. Courts assign each spouse's separate property to that spouse upon dissolution without regard to marital misconduct.
Samuel Soto purchased a delivery van in his own name using personal funds and titled it without any reference to his partnership. He later used the van for partnership deliveries. When the partnership dissolved, the other partners claimed an interest in the van. The court treated the van as Samuel's separate property because title was taken individually without partnership indication or partnership funds.
Sophia Singh owned a rental condominium purchased before her marriage and a portfolio of inherited stocks. During divorce proceedings her spouse sought an equal division of those assets. The court assigned the condominium and the stocks solely to Sophia as her separate property and divided only the assets acquired during the marriage.
Steven Silva and Sasha Stone lived together for several years without marrying. Steven bought a home in his name alone with his earnings and placed title solely in his name. When the relationship ended, Sasha claimed an interest in the home. The court awarded the home to Steven as his separate property because title reflected individual ownership and no partnership or marital presumption applied.
In October 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement. While the parties lived together, they would combine their efforts and earnings. They would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual or combined. They further agreed to hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife. Plaintiff would render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to defendant. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff agreed to give up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer. She did so to devote her full time to defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. In return, defendant agreed to provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life. The parties lived together from October 1964 through May 1970. During this period, as a result of their efforts and earnings, they acquired in defendant's name substantial real and personal property. This included motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support plaintiff until November 1971 but thereafter refused to provide further support. Plaintiff brought this action asserting two causes of action. The first, for declaratory relief, asked the court to determine her contract and property rights. The second sought to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. Defendant answered the complaint after an unsuccessful demurrer. Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial. When the case was called for trial, plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings. This was augmented by a stipulation that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967. The court granted the motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment. She asked leave to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after the divorce became final. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
View caseSydney Santos acquired land in State A before her marriage. After moving to State B, a divorce decree from State B purported to divide the land. Sydney's former spouse sought enforcement of the division in State A. The court in State A refused to alter title because the land remained Sydney's separate property and the foreign decree could not reach it.
The plaintiff and E. W. Fall were married in Indiana in 1876. Subsequently they moved to Nebraska, where by their joint efforts, accumulations, and earnings they acquired the land in controversy through a single conveyance. In 1889 the couple relocated to Washington and continued to reside there as husband and wife until their separation in January 1895. On February 27, 1895, E. W. Fall, then a resident of King County, Washington, filed suit for divorce against the plaintiff in the Superior Court of that county. He alleged that he owned the Nebraska land as his separate property purchased with money from his parents and prayed for a divorce together with a just and equitable division of the property. The plaintiff appeared by answer and cross-complaint, denied the allegations, asserted that the property was community property purchased with the proceeds of their joint labor after marriage, and prayed that the property be set apart to her as her separate property subject only to a $1,000 mortgage. The Washington Code provision then in effect authorized the court in granting a divorce to make such disposition of the property of the parties as appeared just and equitable. The Washington court entered a decree granting the plaintiff a divorce, setting apart the Nebraska land to her as her separate property forever free from any claim by E. W. Fall, and ordering him to convey all his right, title, and interest in the land within five days. When he failed to comply, the court appointed a commissioner who executed a deed conveying the land to the plaintiff. Thereafter E. W. Fall executed a mortgage on the land to W. H. Fall and subsequently conveyed the property by deed to defendant Elizabeth Eastin. In 1897 the plaintiff filed suit in Hamilton County, Nebraska, to quiet title to the land and to cancel the mortgage and deed as having been made without consideration and for the purpose of defrauding her. W. H. Fall disclaimed any interest and released the mortgage while Eastin answered putting in issue the legal sufficiency of the complaint and setting forth the loan transaction and deed in satisfaction of the debt. No personal service was had upon E. W. Fall in the Nebraska action. The Nebraska trial court entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, but after rehearing the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed that decree.
View caseUnder a separate property regime each spouse keeps individual ownership of assets acquired before marriage or by gift, devise, or inheritance. Assets acquired during marriage are not automatically shared. In contrast, community property systems treat most assets acquired during marriage as jointly owned by both spouses.
The court assigns each spouse's separate property to that spouse. Only property acquired during the marriage that qualifies as marital or community property is subject to division in just proportions.
Yes. Property acquired in a partner's individual name without any indication of partnership capacity and without partnership funds is presumed separate even if later used for partnership business.
A valid premarital agreement can confirm or alter the treatment of assets as separate property. The agreement must satisfy statutory requirements for voluntariness, disclosure, and execution to be enforceable.