Also known as:scope of employment · scope of his employment · scope of her employment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Conduct by a servant that is of the kind the servant is employed to perform, occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits, and is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Manager Ignores Imminent Job-Site Danger
Scott Summers, a Sapphire Technologies technician, climbed a tower during a storm to complete an urgent repair assigned by his supervisor. The supervisor learned of the lightning risk but took no steps to recall Summers or provide shelter. Summers suffered a severe shock. Because the repair occurred while Summers acted in the scope of his employment, the company faced liability for failing to avert the known harm.
Injured Employee Left Without Aid
Selena Singh, a Silverline Industries driver, crashed the company truck while delivering parts on her route. A manager arrived, saw Singh pinned and bleeding, yet provided no first aid and delayed calling emergency services. Singh suffered worsened injuries. Because the delivery fell within the scope of Singh's employment, the company is liable for the negligent failure to render care.
Samantha Stone and Santiago Sanchez agreed to distribute controlled substances. Stone made statements to an undercover officer while Sanchez waited in the car outside. Because the statements were made during acts within the scope of the conspiratorial employment, they were admissible against Sanchez under agency principles.
Bourjaily v. United States483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo.
Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car.
Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.
Sasha Stone, president of Solstice Ventures, directed shipment of mislabeled drugs. The company was convicted, and Stone was charged even though he claimed no personal knowledge of the labels. Because Stone acted within the scope of his employment as the responsible corporate officer, he faced individual criminal liability.
United States v. Dotterweich320 U.S. 277 (1943)
The United States prosecuted Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., and its president and general manager Joseph Dotterweich by two informations consolidated for trial under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938. The company operated as a jobber purchasing drugs from manufacturers and shipping them repacked under its own label in interstate commerce.
Three counts reached the jury, consisting of two charges for shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce and one charge for shipping an adulterated drug. The jury disagreed regarding the corporation but convicted Dotterweich on all three counts.
The Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the evidence adequately supported the findings of adulteration and misbranding. It reversed Dotterweich's conviction, however, on the ground that only the corporation qualified as the person subject to prosecution under the Act.
After rehearing, the Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the construction of the statute limiting liability to the corporation.
When does an employee's tort fall within the scope of employment for vicarious liability?
Conduct falls within the scope when it is of the kind the servant is employed to perform, occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits, and is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.
Supporting sources
Does personal motive by the employee automatically take conduct outside the scope of employment?
No. Liability still attaches if the act is at least partly actuated by a purpose to serve the master even when anger or personal pique is also present.
Supporting sources
Can an employer be liable for an employee's criminal acts committed during work duties?
Yes. When the employee acts within the scope of employment, the employer faces vicarious liability even if the conduct violates criminal statutes, provided the acts occur while performing authorized tasks.
Supporting sources
483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987)
…rationale that an agent's acts or words could be attributed to his principle only so long as the agent was acting within the scope of his employment. See Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1161 (1954) (Levie); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal…