320 U.S. 277 (1943)
The United States prosecuted Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., and its president and general manager Joseph Dotterweich by two informations consolidated for trial under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938.1 The company operated as a jobber purchasing drugs from manufacturers and shipping them repacked under its own label in interstate commerce.2
Three counts reached the jury, consisting of two charges for shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce and one charge for shipping an adulterated drug.3 The jury disagreed regarding the corporation but convicted Dotterweich on all three counts.4
The Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the evidence adequately supported the findings of adulteration and misbranding.5 It reversed Dotterweich's conviction, however, on the ground that only the corporation qualified as the person subject to prosecution under the Act.6
After rehearing, the Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the construction of the statute limiting liability to the corporation.8
Whether the opportunity to present views under section 305 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a prerequisite to prosecution?9
Section 305 requires the Administrator to give a suspect an opportunity to present views before reporting a violation for prosecution, yet this step is not a prerequisite to prosecution under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.10
No. The established facts show that Dotterweich received no opportunity to present views before the United States filed the two informations charging violations of section 301(a).11 The Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held that the statutory language and legislative history demonstrate Congress did not intend to add a substantive prerequisite when it reenacted the provision in 1938.12 The Supreme Court therefore treats the absence of the opportunity as immaterial to the validity of the prosecution that followed.13
The opportunity to present views is not a prerequisite to prosecution.14
Whether a jury may convict an individual corporate officer after failing to convict the corporation?15
A jury's acquittal or failure to convict one defendant does not prevent conviction of another defendant on the same evidence, because juries may reach inconsistent verdicts for reasons of compromise, leniency, or other motives that remain beyond judicial inquiry.16
Yes. The established facts record that the jury disagreed as to Buffalo Pharmacal Company on all counts yet returned guilty verdicts against Dotterweich on the two misbranding counts and the one adulteration count.17 The Circuit Court of Appeals correctly refused to set aside those verdicts on inconsistency grounds.18 The Supreme Court confirms that such outcomes fall within the recognized latitude juries possess under Dunn v. United States.19
A jury may convict an individual corporate officer after failing to convict the corporation.20
Whether the term 'person' in the Act subjects corporate officers to criminal liability for violations committed through the corporation?21
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act makes any person who introduces or delivers for introduction into interstate commerce an adulterated or misbranded drug guilty of a misdemeanor; the Act defines person to include corporation, and settled principles of criminal law hold every individual who shares a responsible relation to the forbidden distribution equally accountable.22
Yes. The established facts establish that Buffalo Pharmacal Company shipped repacked drugs in interstate commerce and that Dotterweich, as president and general manager, stood in a responsible relation to those shipments.23 The Act's text imposes liability on any person, and the only way a corporation can act is through its officers; therefore Dotterweich falls within the statute's reach even though the jury did not convict the corporation.24 The Supreme Court rejects the narrower reading that would confine liability to proprietors alone, because that construction would defeat the 1938 Act's purpose to enlarge rather than narrow the penal net.25
The term person in the Act subjects corporate officers to criminal liability for violations committed through the corporation.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Reed And Justice Rutledge
Justice Murphy dissents on the ground that the Act contains no clear and unambiguous language imposing vicarious criminal liability on corporate officers who lack personal knowledge or participation.27 He notes the absence of any reference to officers in the definition of person and emphasizes that earlier drafts expressly covering officers were deleted before enactment.28 In his view the majority's resort to general criminal-law doctrines and prosecutorial discretion violates the principle that penal statutes must give unequivocal warning before stigma attaches.29
He concludes that the conviction cannot stand without legislative specification of such liability.30