Also known as: scope of risk analysis · scope-of-risk analyses · scope of the risk
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A method of determining proximate causation under which an actor remains liable for harm that occurs through intervening forces when the harm falls within the risks that made the conduct negligent or reckless. Liability is cut off only when the actual result is so remote or accidental that it would be unjust to impose responsibility.
Rico deliberately sold far more tickets than the venue could safely hold. When an unexpected rainstorm drove the crowd into a narrow corridor, several people were crushed. Because the crush injuries were the very type of harm that the overcrowding risked, scope-of-risk analysis holds Rico liable even though the storm intervened.
Lena skipped the required final road test on a repaired car. The next day the car suffered total brake failure on a steep hill and killed the driver. Scope-of-risk analysis treats the fatal crash as within the risk created by the omitted test, so causation is satisfied and liability attaches.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseScope-of-risk analysis requires both factual causation and that the harm fall within the risks that made the conduct culpable. A but-for link alone is insufficient if the result is too remote or of a different kind from the risks created.
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An intervening event breaks the chain only when the resulting harm is so remote or accidental that it would be unjust to hold the actor liable. Foreseeable weather or ordinary responses to the created danger do not sever liability.
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Yes. When a statute requires recklessly causing a result, the actual harm must be within the risk of which the actor was aware and not too remote or accidental to support liability.
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The harm must be of the same general kind that made the conduct risky. A gas-line explosion and distant death are too remote from the risk of obscured vision on a roadway, so liability fails.
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…to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails." (2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, supra, at p. 1018; fns. omitted.) [6a] This foreseeable risk may be of two types. The first class…