same offense

In 1939 and 1940, petitioners Kotteakos, Lekacos, Regenbogen and other defendants obtained loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration by submitting applications through Simon Brown, president of the Brownie Lumber Company, that contained false statements about the purpose of the loans, property ownership, purchase prices, and financial details. Brown prepared the applications, received the loan proceeds from lending institutions, paid the sellers, and divided the difference with the defendants who had procured each application. Each petitioner or small group of defendants dealt exclusively with Brown on distinct transactions and had no knowledge of or connection to the activities of any other group. The indictment named thirty-two defendants and charged them with one conspiracy to defraud the United States by making false statements and representations to the Federal Housing Administration for the purpose of obtaining credit. Nineteen defendants were brought to trial, and the jury acquitted seven, disagreed as to four, and convicted the remaining twelve petitioners. The Government's evidence established at least eight separate and independent groups of defendants, each acting independently with Brown as the sole common link and without any agreement or communication among the groups. Brown pleaded guilty and testified at trial. No evidence showed that any defendant knew of or participated in the transactions of defendants outside his own group. The trial court instructed the jury that the indictment charged a single conspiracy, that the jury must find each defendant was a member of that conspiracy to convict, and that the acts or statements of any conspirator could be considered against all defendants once membership was established. The court did not instruct the jury that it could convict only upon finding the single conspiracy charged or that it must keep evidence of separate transactions separate. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, recognizing that the proof showed multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged but concluding that the variance and instructional error were not prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.

In August 1964 Jackie Washington, an 18-year-old youth from Dallas, Texas, had been dating Jean Carter until her mother forbade further contact; Carter then began dating another young man who later became the deceased. On the night of August 29, 1964, Washington and several other boys drove around Dallas searching for a gun, eventually obtaining a shotgun from Charles Fuller along with shells from another source. The group went to Carter's home where some boys threw bricks; Washington and Fuller remained in front with the shotgun. The deceased and Carter's mother came onto the porch, a shot was fired, and the deceased was fatally wounded. Washington and Fuller then ran back to the waiting car. Washington was tried in Dallas County for murder with malice. He testified in his own defense that Fuller, who was intoxicated, had taken the gun from him, that he had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Fuller to leave, and that he had run back to the car before the shot was fired. In support of this account Washington offered the testimony of Fuller, who had already been convicted of the same murder and sentenced to fifty years in prison and who was then confined in the Dallas County jail. Fuller would have testified that Washington pulled at him, tried to persuade him to leave, and ran before Fuller fired the fatal shot. At the time of trial two Texas statutes provided that persons charged or convicted as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime could not testify for one another, although they remained free to testify for the State. On the basis of these statutes the trial judge sustained the State's objection and refused to allow Fuller to testify. Washington's conviction followed and was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 400 S. W. 2d 756. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Jerry Helm was convicted in South Dakota of third-degree burglary. In 1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, in 1973 of grand larceny, and in 1975 of third-offense driving while intoxicated. All six offenses were nonviolent and alcohol contributed to each. In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a no-account check for $100. He told the trial court he had been drinking in Sioux Falls, ended up in Rapid City with more money than he started with, and did not remember the incident, then pleaded guilty. Because he had three prior felony convictions in addition to the principal felony, the South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the recidivist statute. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a 3-2 decision. After Helm served two years, he asked the Governor to commute the sentence so he could become eligible for parole after serving three-fourths of a fixed term; the Governor denied the request in May 1981. Helm filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, which denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment question.