Also known as: rules of approximation · cy pres · cy-près
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A judicial doctrine permitting a court to modify the terms of a charitable trust when the original purpose becomes impossible, impracticable, or wasteful. The court directs the trust assets toward a purpose as close as possible to the settlor's charitable intent without allowing the property to revert or the trust to fail.
Raymond Ramos created a charitable trust to maintain a historic library in his hometown. After the library building was destroyed by fire and rebuilding proved impossible, the trustee petitioned the court. The court applied the doctrine to redirect the remaining assets to support a nearby community reading program that aligned with the original educational purpose.
Rosalind Reed left property in trust for a park open only to white residents. After the restriction was held unconstitutional, the court refused to apply the doctrine to save the trust for a different use. The property therefore reverted to the settlor's heirs rather than continuing under a modified charitable purpose.
In 1911, United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised a tract of land to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon for use as a park and pleasure ground exclusively for white people, with control vested in a Board of Managers composed entirely of white persons, and the will expressed the Senator's view that the two races should be forever separate while providing that the property under no circumstances was to be devoted to any other purpose. The city accepted the trust and initially operated the park on a segregated basis, but after it began allowing Negroes to use the park, members of the Board of Managers sued in state court to remove the city as trustee and appoint new trustees, prompting Negro citizens to intervene in the proceedings. Following the city's resignation as trustee, the Georgia courts appointed private trustees, but in Evans v. Newton the United States Supreme Court held that the park must be operated without racial discrimination, leading the Georgia Supreme Court to determine that the purpose of the trust had become impossible to fulfill and to remand the case for further proceedings. The trial court declined to apply the cy pres doctrine, ruled that the trust had failed, and determined that the property had reverted to Senator Bacon's heirs, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; petitioners, the Negro citizens of Macon who had sought integration of the park, challenged the termination of the trust, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseRoger Ramirez established a trust to fund scholarships for students at a specific local school that later closed. The court found the exact purpose impossible and applied the doctrine to redirect the funds to scholarships at a comparable nearby institution serving the same student population.
Charles B. Henry, a resident of Winchester, Virginia, died testate on April 23, 1949. His will dated April 21, 1949, was admitted to probate and the Shenandoah Valley National Bank of Winchester qualified as the designated executor and trustee. Subject to two inconsequential provisions, Henry's entire estate valued at $86,000 was left in trust to be known as the Charles B. Henry and Fannie Belle Henry Fund. The trustee was directed to invest and reinvest the estate, collect the income, and on the last school day before Easter and before Christmas each year divide the net income into equal parts and pay one part to each child then enrolled in the first, second, and third grades of the John Kerr School in Winchester, with the payments to be used by each child in the furtherance of his or her education. The John Kerr School is a public primary school with an enrollment of approximately 458 pupils. If the school were discontinued, payments would be made instead to children in the same grades of any successor school or schools as determined by the Winchester School Board. The trustee was granted broad power and discretion to retain, sell, invest, and reinvest estate assets as it deemed in the best interest of the trust. Henry left no children or near relatives. His heirs and distributees upon intestacy were first cousins and more remote kin. One next of kin filed suit against the executor and trustee challenging the trust provisions. The bill alleged that the trust did not constitute a charitable trust and was invalid because it violated the rule against perpetuities. Other heirs joined the suit and sought to have the trust declared void with the estate distributed among the next of kin. The cause was heard on the bill and a demurrer filed by the executor and trustee. The demurrer was overruled and decrees were entered adjudicating the principles of the cause. From those decrees this appeal was awarded.
View caseRiley Rivera created a trust to support a facility for incurables at a particular location. When that facility merged with another hospital system, the court applied the doctrine to permit the assets to continue supporting similar care at the successor institution rather than allowing reversion.
Dr. Jesse C. Coggins executed six wills with multiple codicils over his lifetime, beginning in January 1944. In every will he directed that the residue of his estate pass in trust with the corpus ultimately distributed to the Keswick Home, formerly Home for Incurables of Baltimore City, for construction of a new building to be known as the Coggins Building. Dr. Coggins and his wife maintained close ties to Keswick, including regular patient transfers from their Laurel Sanitarium and Mrs. Coggins's service on Keswick's Board of Directors; she later resided in an integrated Coggins Building. Dr. Coggins executed his final will on December 27, 1962, and died on January 21, 1963. Paragraph (f) of ITEM 5 directed that, upon termination of the trust, the assets be paid to Keswick "to house white patients who need physical rehabilitation," with the further provision that "[i]f not acceptable to the Keswick Home, then this bequest shall go to the University of Maryland Hospital to be used for physical rehabilitation." The racial limitation and alternative gift first appeared in this final will. The trust terminated on September 10, 1998, upon the death of Dr. Coggins's widow, the last surviving annuitant. By the time the trust terminated, Keswick had already constructed the Coggins Building in 1974. Keswick expended nearly $11 million in construction costs and capitalized repairs for the Coggins Building using its own funds, a bank loan, and a federal Hill Burton Act grant. Keswick had designated the building in honor of Dr. Coggins in 1969, dedicated it in 1975, and later made major renovations and additions while serving approximately 160 residents receiving physical rehabilitation services. Keswick had also presented plans for an additional $15.5 million in construction funded from the trust proceeds. In 1999 the trustee, Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Company, filed an interpleader action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-221. The court designated Keswick as plaintiff and University of Maryland Medical System Corporation (University Hospital) as defendant. Both parties moved for summary judgment on a stipulation of facts together with numerous documents, including the will, correspondence from 1963, board minutes, and trust memoranda. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted University Hospital's motion for summary judgment and ordered that the trust proceeds in the amount of $28,834,000 plus interest be paid to University Hospital. Keswick appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.
View caseA court applies the doctrine when the original charitable purpose has become impossible, impracticable, or wasteful. The court then directs the assets toward a purpose consistent with the settlor's intent rather than allowing the trust to fail or the property to revert.
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No. A gift-over to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails over the power to apply the doctrine only if the settlor is still living when the provision takes effect or fewer than twenty-one years have elapsed since the trust's creation.
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The court may still apply the doctrine to modify the trust and direct the assets toward a purpose as close as possible to the settlor's original charitable intent. The trust does not automatically fail or revert to the settlor's heirs.
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Yes. When modification is not feasible, the court may terminate the trust and distribute the assets in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes rather than allowing reversion.
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