Rule 32

In a New York state court, a jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial lasted more than two weeks. The appellant was represented by three appointed lawyers who conducted his defense with fidelity and zeal. The jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge imposed a sentence of death. About five weeks after the verdict, a statutory pre-sentence investigation report was submitted to the judge. The defendant was brought to court for sentencing. He protested his innocence. After his three lawyers appealed to the court to accept the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the judge gave reasons for imposing death. The judge referred to the pre-sentence investigation revealing the appellant's involvement in thirty other burglaries in the same vicinity. Some of these the appellant had confessed to, and he had been identified as the perpetrator of others. The judge also noted activities indicating a morbid sexuality and classification as a menace to society. The accuracy of these statements was not challenged by the appellant or his counsel. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the conviction and sentence. The affirmation was over the contention that the death sentence was based upon information supplied by witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal. The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

On November 21, 1973, Troy Gregg and Floyd Allen were hitchhiking north in Florida when they were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore in their car. Their car broke down. Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, the group picked up Dennis Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p.m. A short time later the four men stopped for a rest along the highway in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The next morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a nearby ditch. On November 23, after reading about the shootings in an Atlanta newspaper, Weaver communicated with the Gwinnett County police and related information concerning the journey with the victims, including a description of the car. The next afternoon, Gregg and Allen, while in Simmons' car, were arrested in Asheville, North Carolina. In the search incident to the arrest a .25-caliber pistol, later shown to be that used to kill Simmons and Moore, was found in Gregg's pocket. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing a written waiver, Gregg signed a statement admitting he shot Simmons and Moore but claiming self-defense. At the guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, a medical examiner testified that Simmons died from a bullet wound in the eye and that Moore died from bullet wounds in the cheek and in the back of the head. The examiner further testified that both men had several bruises and abrasions about the face and head. Gregg testified claiming self-defense after Simmons and Moore allegedly attacked with a pipe and knife, but the jury convicted him of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. At the penalty stage before the same jury, neither side presented additional evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could recommend either a death sentence or a life prison sentence on each count. The judge further charged the jury that in determining the sentence it was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The judge instructed that death could not be imposed unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the aggravating circumstances. The jury found the first and second aggravating circumstances and returned verdicts of death on each count. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the death sentences for murder after reviewing the record and comparing the sentences to similar cases, but it vacated the death sentences for armed robbery. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the death sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Victor Rita was convicted after a jury trial of perjury, making false statements, and obstructing justice in connection with an investigation into InterOrdnance, a gun company. Prosecutors had been examining whether buyers of InterOrdnance's PPSH 41 machinegun parts kits could assemble machineguns without proper registrations. Rita had purchased one such kit, allowed an ATF agent to inspect it after initially sending it back to the company, and provided a different kit that did not amount to a machinegun. When brought before the grand jury, Rita denied under oath that the agent had asked for the PPSH kit and that he had spoken to InterOrdnance about it shortly thereafter. A probation officer prepared a presentence report that grouped the five counts of conviction as stemming from a single incident and calculated a Guidelines sentencing range. The report determined a base offense level of 20 by treating the perjury as accessory after the fact to the underlying gun registration violation. It placed Rita in criminal history category I due to no countable prior offenses more than 10 years before the present offense. The report recommended a sentence of 33 to 41 months' imprisonment. The report noted no circumstances warranting a departure. At the sentencing hearing, Rita presented evidence and argument seeking a sentence below the Guidelines range based on his poor physical condition, fear of retaliation in prison due to his prior work in government criminal justice, and his lengthy military service of over 25 years with 35 commendations, awards, or medals. The Government did not seek a sentence above the range but noted that Rita's perjury had interfered with its case against InterOrdnance and that Rita should have known better as a former employee. The district judge listened to the arguments, found the Guidelines range appropriate, and imposed a sentence of 33 months' imprisonment. Rita appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his sentence was unreasonable because it did not adequately account for his history and characteristics and was greater than necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, applying a presumption that a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. Rita then petitioned for certiorari, noting a circuit split on the use of such a presumption, and the Supreme Court granted review.

Respondent Freddie Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The jury heard evidence that he possessed 92.5 grams in his duffel bag and found him guilty. Based on the jury's findings and his criminal history, the Guidelines called for a base sentence of 210 to 262 months. At sentencing, the district judge found by a preponderance that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and had obstructed justice. These findings raised the range to 360 months to life. The judge imposed 360 months. In the companion case, respondent Ducan Fanfan was convicted of conspiracy involving at least 500 grams of cocaine. The jury verdict authorized up to 78 months. The judge found additional facts that would have raised the range to 188 to 235 months but declined to apply them after Blakely. The Seventh Circuit held Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under Blakely and Apprendi. It remanded for resentencing based on jury findings. The Government sought certiorari in both cases, which the Court granted.

In 1995 Amanda Mitchell and 22 other defendants were indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in Allentown from 1989 to 1994. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and three counts of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school or playground. Without a plea agreement she pleaded guilty to all four counts. She reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count. The District Court advised her that quantity would be determined at sentencing. Before accepting the plea the District Court conducted the Rule 11 colloquy. It informed Mitchell that the range of punishment was complex because the amount of cocaine had not yet been established. She faced a mandatory minimum of ten years if held responsible for at least five kilograms. Mitchell stated under oath that she had done "some of it." After consulting counsel she reaffirmed her intention to plead guilty to all charges. The court accepted the plea. In 1996 nine codefendants went to trial. Three cooperating codefendants who had pleaded guilty testified at Mitchell's sentencing hearing. They adopted their trial testimony. One furnished additional information on the amount of cocaine petitioner sold. According to him, petitioner worked two to three times a week, selling one and one-half to two ounces of cocaine a day, from April 1992 to August 1992. Then, from August 1992 to December 1993 she worked three to five times a week, and from January 1994 to March 1994 she was one of those in charge of cocaine distribution for Riddick. Mitchell offered no evidence and did not testify. Her counsel argued that only the three documented sales to undercover buyer Alvitta Mack totaling two ounces should be credited. The District Court ruled that Mitchell had no right to remain silent at sentencing because of her guilty plea. It expressly relied on her failure to testify in crediting the codefendants' testimony. The court found her responsible for more than five kilograms and imposed the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence together with six years of supervised release and a $200 special assessment. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.