Also known as: required party · necessary parties
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person whose joinder in an action is compulsory because the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties without that person or because the person's absence may impair the person's ability to protect an interest or subject an existing party to multiple or inconsistent obligations.
Liberty Trust initiates foreclosure on Sun Charity's building after default. Atlantic Coalition holds a recorded option to purchase upon default, and several tenants hold recorded long-term leases. Liberty Trust names only Sun Charity as defendant and proceeds to sale. The omitted parties' recorded interests survive because they were required for the proceeding to extinguish junior claims.
Heirs challenge the validity of a fee tail estate created by a prior conveyance. The first donee's living issue hold interests that could be defeated if the estate is invalidated. The living issue are not joined as parties. The court cannot adjudicate the estate's validity without them because their interests would be impaired.
Plaintiffs seek certification of a class of asbestos claimants against Fibreboard for a global settlement. Thousands of future claimants hold interests that would be bound by the settlement terms. The court refuses certification because those claimants are required parties whose absence prevents adequate representation and complete relief.
Fibreboard Corporation, primarily a timber company, manufactured asbestos-containing products for high-temperature industrial applications from the 1920s through 1971. Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s, Fibreboard faced thousands of personal injury claims each year from asbestos exposure. From May 1957 through March 1959, Continental Casualty Company issued Fibreboard a comprehensive general liability policy with per-occurrence and per-claim limits but no aggregate limit. Pacific Indemnity Company issued a similar policy for 1956-1957. Fibreboard initiated coverage litigation against both insurers in California state court in 1979. In 1990 the California trial court held the insurers responsible for indemnification of claims involving exposure before their policies expired and required them to pay full defense costs. Fibreboard began structured settlements in 1988, initially paying 40 percent up front with the balance contingent on coverage victory, then shifting in 1991 to full assignments of coverage rights. By December 1992 Fibreboard had deferred settlement obligations exceeding $1.2 billion, all contingent on prevailing in the coverage dispute. After the insurers lost at trial in early 1993, they joined global settlement negotiations conditioned on achieving "total peace" through a mandatory class action. Negotiators reached the Global Settlement Agreement shortly before midnight on August 27, 1993, providing $1.525 billion from the insurers and $10 million from Fibreboard to fund a trust for class claims. The Trilateral Settlement Agreement, executed the same night as a backup, committed the insurers to supply up to $2 billion if the global settlement failed. On September 9, 1993, named plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas seeking certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) that included persons exposed to Fibreboard asbestos who had not sued or settled before August 27, 1993, persons who had dismissed claims without prejudice, and their relatives, but that excluded pending claimants and those who had settled while retaining malignancy rights. After Continental and Pacific had obtained leave to intervene as party-defendants, the District Court provisionally granted class certification, enjoined commencement of further separate litigation against Fibreboard by class members, and appointed a guardian ad litem to review the fairness of the settlement to the class members. After an 8-day fairness hearing, the District Court certified the class and approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. After this Court vacated and remanded in light of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Fifth Circuit reinstated its affirmance in a per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA plaintiff sues a government official for alleged constitutional violations. The official asserts qualified immunity and seeks immediate appeal from denial of the defense. The court evaluates whether the asserted right can be protected only if the official participates at the threshold stage. The official's absence would impair the claimed right not to stand trial.
In 1970, the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned that members of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives had planned to blow up heating tunnels linking federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. The group had also discussed kidnapping National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. On November 6, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap on the telephone of William Davidon, a Haverford College physics professor and group member. The stated purpose was gathering intelligence in the interest of national security. The FBI installed the tap in late November 1970 and it remained in place until January 6, 1971. During that period the Government intercepted three conversations between Davidon and respondent Keith Forsyth. Forsyth learned of the wiretap in 1972 while facing unrelated criminal charges. He moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3504 for disclosure of any electronic surveillance to which he had been subjected. The Government's response revealed that Forsyth had participated in conversations overheard during surveillance expressly authorized by the President acting through the Attorney General. An affidavit from then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated the surveillance was authorized under the President's national security authority in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). Shortly after this Court decided United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), Forsyth filed suit against Mitchell and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. He sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages. Discovery and preliminary proceedings continued for five and a half years. By early 1978 both parties had filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court found no genuine dispute that the FBI had informed Mitchell of the ECCSL plots, that Mitchell had authorized the warrantless tap on Davidon's phone, and that the ostensible purpose was national-security intelligence gathering. The court rejected Mitchell's claim to absolute prosecutorial immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman but held that he could assert qualified immunity. Neither side had established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his good faith, so the court denied both summary-judgment motions. Mitchell appealed the denial of absolute immunity. The Third Circuit remanded for further factfinding on whether the authorization was necessary to a decision to initiate a criminal prosecution. On remand the District Court held a hearing and concluded that Mitchell's authorization was not intended to facilitate any prosecutorial decision. After this Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the District Court reconsidered qualified immunity, denied Mitchell's motion for summary judgment, granted Forsyth's motion on liability, and scheduled proceedings on damages. Mitchell again appealed. The Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the absolute-immunity denial but that the qualified-immunity denial was not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, and it remanded for further proceedings. Mitchell petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted.
View caseOne spouse files for divorce and property division in federal court. The other spouse holds a direct interest in the marital estate but receives no notice and is not joined. The court cannot enter a binding decree dividing the property because the absent spouse is a required party whose interests would be defeated without participation.
Hiram Barber and Huldah Adeline Barber were married in the State of New York in 1840. Huldah, through her next friend George Cronkhite, a citizen of New York, applied for a divorce a mensa et thoro in the court of chancery for the fourth district of New York. The defendant appeared and resisted the application. The cause was heard on the pleadings and proofs, resulting in a decree that Hiram had been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment and had abandoned and refused to provide for his wife. The New York court decreed that the parties be separated from bed and board forever, referred the cause to a master to ascertain alimony, overruled the defendant's exceptions to the master's report, and entered a final decree awarding Huldah $360 per year in quarterly installments for her support, with $960 due retroactively from July 1, 1844, plus costs, and future quarterly payments during her life, vested in her as separate estate. A transcript of the authenticated New York record formed the basis for the subsequent federal suit. Hiram left New York shortly after the decree without paying any alimony and without leaving assets there to satisfy it, establishing residence in Wisconsin. In April 1852 he obtained a divorce a vinculo from the Circuit Court of Dodge County, Wisconsin, without disclosing the New York proceedings. Huldah remained in New York as her domicil. Huldah, by her next friend, filed suit on the equity side of the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin against Hiram, a Wisconsin citizen, alleging $4,242.15 due on the New York decree with interest. Hiram demurred on grounds including that the case was not within chancery jurisdiction and that relief could only be had in New York; the demurrer was overruled. He answered, admitting the New York decree and his nonpayment but asserting the Wisconsin divorce rendered Huldah a feme sole who could not sue by next friend and that any remedy lay at law. After a general replication, hearing on pleadings and proofs, the district court decreed $5,936.80 due for principal and interest to the date of the bill, ordering payment with costs.
View caseA defendant may raise the defense by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(7), in a responsive pleading, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or even at trial. The defense is not waived by answering on the merits first.
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The court examines whether complete relief can be accorded among existing parties, whether the absent person claims an interest that may be impaired, and whether an existing party faces substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations. Each factor is assessed on the specific facts.
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Failure to join the mortgagor, junior lienholders, tenants, or others with recorded interests may prevent the sale from extinguishing those interests. State statutes define the required parties, and notice must be given.
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The court must decide whether to proceed without the party or dismiss the action after weighing factors under Rule 19(b), including prejudice to the absent party and whether an adequate judgment can be rendered.
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