Also known as: relinquish · relinquished · relinquishing · relinquishments · surrender of rights
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An intentional abandonment of a right or interest indicated by conduct respecting its authorized use. The conduct must demonstrate a clear decision to forgo the right rather than mere nonuse.
A voluntary and intentional renunciation of citizenship or a protected right. Conduct alone does not suffice without evidence that the individual affirmatively consented to the loss.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
An intentional abandonment of a right or interest indicated by conduct respecting its authorized use. The conduct must demonstrate a clear decision to forgo the right rather than mere nonuse.
A voluntary and intentional renunciation of citizenship or a protected right. Conduct alone does not suffice without evidence that the individual affirmatively consented to the loss.
Raymond Ramos owns the servient estate burdened by an access easement held by Riverstone Manufacturing. After Riverstone stops using the path for five years, Raymond builds a permanent fence across it and plants trees. When Riverstone later sues to enforce the easement, the court finds the fence and plantings constitute relinquishment by conduct.
Renee Rogers faces an unarmed trespasser on her property who poses no serious threat. She could safely retreat into her home but instead uses force to eject him. The court holds she was not privileged to use force because she could have avoided the confrontation by relinquishing her privilege to remain on the disputed spot.
Rhea Reynolds swings a baseball bat at an assailant who threatens only minor injury. The court examines whether the bat was intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm under the circumstances. It concludes the means chosen exceeded what was privileged because the resulting injury differed in kind from the threatened harm.
2 common questions
No. The Restatement requires intentional relinquishment indicated by conduct respecting the authorized use. Mere nonuse does not satisfy the standard.
Supporting sources
A defendant must relinquish the exercise of a right or privilege if retreat or compliance is reasonable under the circumstances and would avoid the need for force.
Supporting sources
Roger Ramirez receives Miranda warnings but remains silent for two hours while officers continue questioning. He eventually makes incriminating statements. The court finds no valid relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment privilege because the prolonged interrogation and lack of affirmative waiver show the statements were not voluntary.
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
View caseRavi Reddy sues the state of Maine in state court for overtime wages under federal law. Maine asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court holds that the state did not relinquish its immunity by participating in the federal system and may assert the defense even in its own courts.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
Rita Russell demands to represent herself at trial after receiving appointed counsel. The court conducts a colloquy confirming her knowing and intelligent decision. It grants the request, recognizing that she has relinquished the right to counsel through a valid waiver.
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1 common questions
No. The Fourteenth Amendment requires voluntary and intentional relinquishment. Automatic statutory loss based on conduct alone violates this rule.
Supporting sources
…the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.…