Also known as: recuses · recused · recusing · recusal · recusals · recusable · recusation · recusations · recusement · recusant · disqualification · judicial recusal
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A judge's voluntary or compelled withdrawal from a case due to actual or apparent bias or conflict of interest. The withdrawal prevents participation when impartiality might reasonably be questioned under objective standards.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A federal judge learns midway through trial that his spouse owns stock in the defendant corporation. The judge discloses the interest on the record under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) and asks the parties to consider waiver. After full disclosure the parties agree without the judge present that the judge may continue. The agreement is placed on the record.
A federal judge issues judgment after learning post-trial that he had served as university trustee while the university negotiated a major deal with the prevailing party. The court of appeals vacates the judgment because the objective standard of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) was violated even without actual knowledge at the time of decision.
A judge subject to disqualification under Rule 2.11 discloses the basis on the record and asks the parties to consider waiver outside the judge's presence. The parties agree the judge should not be disqualified. The agreement is incorporated into the record and the judge continues.
A party's extraordinary financial support for the judge's recent election campaign creates a serious risk of actual bias. Due process requires the judge to recuse even without proof of subjective bias because a realistic appraisal shows an unconstitutional probability of bias.
A federal judge issues a judgment in a contract dispute. Months later the losing party discovers that the judge had served as a university trustee while the university negotiated a major deal with the prevailing party. The court of appeals vacates the judgment because the objective standard of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) was violated even without actual knowledge at the time of decision.
Ruby Rivera sues her former employer. The defendant's lead counsel served as campaign treasurer for the assigned state judge's most recent election. Rivera moves to disqualify the judge. The court grants the motion because the close political relationship creates an appearance of partiality that requires automatic recusal.
A judge subject to disqualification under Rule 2.11 (other than for bias) may disclose the basis on the record and ask the parties to consider waiver outside the judge's presence. If the parties agree without the judge participating, the judge may continue and the agreement is placed on the record.
Erroneous deprivation of chosen counsel is structural error requiring automatic reversal without any showing of prejudice, but the question of judicial recusal itself is governed by the objective standard of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
…of the Legislature from supplying the omissions." Id. , at 123. Dickinson's argument was rejected; and, after eliminating the disqualification of debtors and the limitation to "landed" property, the Convention adopted Mason's proposal to instruct the Committee of Detail to draft a property qualification. Id. , at 116-117. The…
…she quotes in part, post , at 819, from Laird v. Tatum, 409 U. S. 824, 836, n. 5 (1972): " In terms of propriety, rather than disqualification
…Brennan and Justice Powell, concluded that "the strong statutory policy" contained in the 1875 criminal statute prohibiting disqualification
…is only one of many factors in decisions to hire or promote, the fact that blacks score lower does not automatically result in disqualification
…All right." [^maj-4]: Judge Lydick, United States District Judge, to whom the case had been assigned following the initial disqualification
Rule 2.11 governs judicial disqualification. A judge must recuse when impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Waiver is permitted only for grounds arising under subsection (a) after full disclosure.
A judge who discovers a disqualifying financial interest after a decision must promptly divest. If divestiture occurs before further involvement and the interest is de minimis, recusal may not be required, but recusal remains necessary if impartiality could still reasonably be questioned.
No. The statute imposes an objective standard. Post-decision discovery of a disqualifying interest can still require vacatur when the violation is neither harmless nor trivial.
Yes. The relationship is sufficiently close and politically significant that a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality, triggering automatic recusal.