Also known as: reasonably should have known · knew or should have known · constructive knowledge · imputed knowledge
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legal standard imputing knowledge to a party based on facts that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have discovered or understood.
Roberto Reyes filed suit against a misnamed corporate defendant within the limitations period. The correct entity received service shortly afterward and realized from the complaint allegations that it was the intended target. The court permitted the amendment to relate back because the entity knew or should have known of the mistake in identity.
Ralph Richardson moved into a new jurisdiction and began operating a business subject to a registration ordinance. Local records and public notices were available at the courthouse and online, yet he never checked them. When prosecuted for failure to register, the court held that Richardson reasonably should have known of the duty from the readily accessible information.
In 2012 Austin Lynn Miller was convicted of one count of possession of a methamphetamine precursor and one count of maintaining a vehicle or dwelling for sale or delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 16 to 20 months and placed him on 36 months of supervised probation. Effective 1 January 2012 the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.52A, which required retailers to submit purchaser information for pseudoephedrine products to the National Precursor Log Exchange system before completing any sale and to generate stop-sale alerts when quantity limits would be exceeded. Effective 1 December 2013 the legislature added subsection (c) to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d1)(1), making it unlawful for any person previously convicted of possession or manufacture of methamphetamine to possess a pseudoephedrine product and classifying any violation as a Class H felony. On 7 January 2014 Miller purchased one 3.6-gram box of allergy and congestion relief medicine containing pseudoephedrine from the Boone Walmart. The transaction was recorded in the NPLEx system and no stop-sale alert was issued. Detective John Hollar of the Watauga County Sheriff's Office reviewed the weekend NPLEx logs, identified Miller's purchase, visited the store, and obtained a receipt bearing Miller's electronic signature even though the surveillance video system had not functioned. On 23 January 2014 Hollar obtained an arrest warrant that he served on Miller at his probation officer's office the following day. On 4 August 2014 Miller was indicted under the new subsection. On 4 February 2015 he filed a motion to declare the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The case was tried at the 2 February 2015 criminal session of Watauga County Superior Court before Judge Eric C. Morgan. After a pretrial hearing at which the State compared the statute to the felony-firearm possession law, the trial court denied the motion. The State presented testimony from Detective Hollar and the Walmart pharmacy manager. The court denied Miller's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court imposed a suspended sentence of 6 to 17 months together with 24 months of supervised probation. Miller indicated at sentencing that he wished to appeal but did not give oral notice after entry of judgment or file written notice within fourteen days as required by N.C. R. App. P. 4(a). On 5 June 2015 Miller filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. The State filed a response acknowledging the court's discretion to grant the petition. By order entered 24 June 2015 the petition was referred to the panel, which allowed it and addressed the merits of the appeal.
View caseRajesh Rao, a government official, ordered a search based on information that a reasonable officer would have recognized as stale. The plaintiff sued under section 1983. The court denied immunity because Rao reasonably should have known that the warrant lacked probable cause under clearly established law.
In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald. As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment. Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRenee Rogers accepted several valuable items from a stranger at a suspiciously low price and without any bill of sale. When charged with receiving stolen property, the court instructed the jury that it could infer guilty knowledge if Rogers reasonably should have known the goods were stolen under the circumstances.
In June and July 1971, petitioner James Edward Barnes opened a checking account under the name Clarence Smith. He later deposited four United States Treasury checks totaling over $800 into that account. The checks had been mailed by the United States Disbursing Office in San Francisco on July 1 and July 3 to four individuals: Nettie Lewis, Albert Young, Arthur Salazar, and Mary Hernandez. Each check bore endorsements in the payees' names and a second endorsement by Clarence Smith. At trial in the United States District Court, the four payees testified that they had never received, endorsed, or authorized endorsement of the checks. A government handwriting expert testified that Barnes had made the Clarence Smith endorsements on all four checks and the payees' signatures on two of them. A postal inspector testified regarding statements Barnes made after his arrest, in which Barnes claimed he received the checks from door-to-door furniture salespeople, that the checks were already signed when he received them, and that he could not identify the salespeople or provide records of the transactions. Barnes did not testify at trial. The District Court instructed the jury that possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, ordinarily permits an inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all six counts, and the court imposed concurrent three-year prison sentences. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions on the possession counts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseRachel Ramirez, defense counsel, held a press conference revealing details about an ongoing prosecution. The state bar charged her with violating a rule against prejudicial statements. The court upheld discipline because Ramirez reasonably should have known that the disclosures would create a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the proceeding.
Gentile, a Las Vegas criminal defense attorney, represented Grady Sanders, the owner of Western Vault Corporation. On January 31, 1987, undercover police officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department reported that four kilograms of cocaine and almost $300,000 in travelers' checks were missing from a safety deposit vault at Western Vault. The items had been used as part of an undercover operation conducted by Metro's Intelligence Bureau. Sheriff John Moran held a press conference on February 2, 1987, naming the police and Western Vault employees as suspects. Over the following year, press reports indicated that investigators focused on Sanders and Western Vault rather than the two police officers who enjoyed free access to the vault. Reports described other customers claiming missing items, Western Vault suffering heavy losses and going out of business, police officers being cleared after passing lie detector tests administered by Ray Slaughter, and Sanders refusing a police polygraph. One report noted that $264,900 in currency had been seized from an unrented box at Western Vault. Hours after Sanders was indicted, Gentile held a press conference on February 5, 1988. He stated that the evidence would prove Sanders innocent, that Detective Steve Scholl was the person most likely to have stolen the drugs and checks, and that four of the other alleged victims were known drug dealers and convicted money launderers who had been pressured by police after getting into trouble themselves. Gentile had researched Rule 177 the evening before with two colleagues and concluded that the timing six months before trial and the general nature of his comments placed the statements within the rule's safe harbor. Six months later the criminal case was tried to a jury in August 1988 and Sanders was acquitted on all counts. The trial judge questioned the jury venire about publicity, but not a single juror indicated any recollection of Gentile or his press conference. The State Bar of Nevada then filed a complaint against Gentile alleging a violation of Rule 177. Following a hearing, the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board found that Gentile had made the statements and recommended a private reprimand. Gentile appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the board.
View caseRaymond Ramos, a city employee, sent personal text messages on a department-issued pager after receiving a policy memo warning that all messages were subject to review. When the city audited the pager, Ramos claimed a privacy violation. The court rejected the claim because Ramos reasonably should have known that the messages were not private.
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View caseThe standard centers on what the party to be charged knew or should have known within the relevant time frame. The plaintiff's own knowledge or lack of diligence is not the controlling inquiry.