Also known as: realtors · real estate agent · real estate broker
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A member of the National Association of Realtors entitled to use the servicemark. The designation signals adherence to the association's code of ethics and professional standards.
A member of the National Association of Realtors entitled to use the servicemark. The designation signals adherence to the association's code of ethics and professional standards.
The city landmarks commission included a realtor among its required members when it designated Penn Central's terminal as a historic site. The realtor's professional expertise informed the commission's evaluation of the building's architectural significance. The designation triggered the regulatory process that later produced the takings challenge.
Any real estate agent or broker who assists in the sale or rental of property. The term is often used interchangeably with broker even when the individual is not a member of the National Association of Realtors.
Renata Russo, a real estate broker, located Riverfront Developments as a purchaser willing to pay the full listed price for a waterfront warehouse under an exclusive listing agreement. The parties executed a written contract with no financing contingency. When the seller later refused to close and withheld the commission, the broker's production of a buyer meeting the seller's terms entitled her to recover the six percent fee.
Any real estate agent or broker who assists in the sale or rental of property. The term is often used interchangeably with broker even when the individual is not a member of the National Association of Realtors.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View case1 common questions
No. The capitalized term is a servicemark reserved for association members, but the lowercase term is commonly used to refer to any real estate agent or broker regardless of membership.
A realtor joined Defenders of Wildlife as a plaintiff asserting injury from federal funding decisions affecting overseas habitats. The realtor claimed professional interest in the affected regions but lacked concrete plans to visit the sites. The court examined whether that interest satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas. Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad. Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA realtor filed suit against a manufacturing plant for failing to file required environmental reports under federal law. The complaint sought civil penalties payable to the government rather than to the realtor personally. The court first addressed whether the realtor possessed standing before reaching the merits of the reporting violation.
Citizens for a Better Environment, an association of individuals interested in environmental protection, sued Steel Company, a small manufacturing company located in Chicago, alleging that Steel Company had failed since 1988 to complete and submit the annual hazardous-chemical inventory forms and toxic-chemical release forms required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986. The forms must list the name and location of the facility, the name and quantity of each specified chemical on hand, the waste-disposal method employed, and the annual quantity of toxic chemicals released into each environmental medium, with inventory forms due each March 1 and release forms due each July 1. In 1995 the association sent the required 60-day notice to Steel Company, the EPA Administrator, and Illinois authorities, accurately alleging that Steel Company had never filed the required forms. Upon receiving the notice, Steel Company filed all of the overdue forms with the appropriate agencies. The EPA took no enforcement action, and after the waiting period expired the association filed its complaint in federal district court. The complaint, brought on behalf of the association and its members, sought a declaratory judgment that Steel Company had violated EPCRA, authorization for periodic inspections of Steel Company's facility and records at Steel Company's expense, an order compelling Steel Company to provide the association with copies of all compliance reports submitted to the EPA, civil penalties of $25,000 per day for each violation, and an award of the association's investigation and litigation costs including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees. The district court agreed with Steel Company on both points and dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with the Sixth Circuit's decision in a factually indistinguishable case.
View caseA realtor petitioned the city after it conditioned approval of a commercial development on dedicating land for a bike path and drainage easement. The realtor argued the conditions lacked an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the project's impacts. The dispute centered on whether the exactions violated the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbing and electric supply store located on a 1.67-acre parcel of land in the business district of the city of Tigard, Oregon. The store is on a parcel that includes a 9,700-square-foot building, and Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern corner of the lot within the 100-year floodplain. In the early 1970's, the city developed a comprehensive plan for managing surface water drainage in the Fanno Basin serving the area where the property is located. The comprehensive plan also contained provisions for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway system throughout the city, one of which was to follow along Fanno Creek. In 1988, petitioner applied for a permit to expand her store and pave the parking lot. The city planning commission granted the permit but required petitioner to dedicate a portion of her property for the construction of a public greenway along Fanno Creek and an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the greenway for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway. The dedication required encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or roughly 10% of the property. Petitioner requested a variance from the city's dedication requirements. The planning commission denied the variance, and the city council affirmed the denial. Petitioner then filed suit in Oregon state court claiming an uncompensated taking. The Oregon trial court upheld the city's requirements. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Oregon Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The question presented was what standard of review applies to a claim that a city's exaction of a dedication of private property as a condition of a building permit constitutes an uncompensated taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
View caseA realtor advised a property owner on rental practices that resulted in racial steering of prospective tenants. The owner defended on the ground that the conduct reflected private preferences rather than state action. The court considered whether the realtor's involvement triggered constitutional scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1963, the Mulkeys filed an action in California superior court against Reitman and other property owners under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. They alleged that the owners had refused to rent them an apartment solely because of their race and sought an injunction and damages. After the filing of the complaint, California voters approved Proposition 14 in the November 1964 statewide election, which added section 26 to Article I of the California Constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the new provision had rendered the statutory claims invalid. The trial court granted the motion, and the Mulkeys appealed to the California Supreme Court. In December 1964, the Prendergasts filed a separate suit in superior court against Snyder to enjoin their eviction from an apartment. They alleged that the eviction was motivated by racial prejudice and would violate sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. Snyder filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial declaration that he was entitled to terminate the month-to-month tenancy even if his action was based on racial considerations. The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint with prejudice after concluding that judicial enforcement of a racially motivated eviction would violate the Equal Protection Clause, without addressing the validity of Proposition 14. Snyder appealed to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court heard the two cases together. In the Mulkey appeal it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In the Prendergast appeal it affirmed the dismissal of the cross-complaint. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments because the cases presented an important issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the adoption of Proposition 14, the California Legislature had enacted several statutes addressing racial discrimination in housing. The Unruh Act of 1959 prohibited certain discriminations in business establishments. The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 prohibited racial discriminations in the sale or rental of private dwellings containing more than four units and was enforceable by the State Fair Employment Practice Commission. Proposition 14 provided that neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge the right of any person to decline to sell, lease or rent residential real property to such person or persons as he in his absolute discretion chooses. The two cases arose after the passage of Proposition 14 and presented challenges to its effect on prior antidiscrimination legislation and on claims of racial discrimination in housing.
View case3 common questions
A realtor earns the commission by producing a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase on the seller's terms or upon execution of the contract of sale, depending on the listing agreement. The seller may not in bad faith refuse to complete the transaction and then deny the commission.
An oral contract to employ a realtor and pay a commission is generally not within the statute of frauds as a contract for the sale of land. Many states, however, have enacted separate statutes that expressly require a writing for any agreement to pay a real estate broker's commission.
Recovery in restitution is barred when the purpose of the statute would be frustrated by allowing the realtor to recover the same amount promised under the unenforceable contract. The statute's goal of requiring written evidence of the commission agreement would be undermined by such restitution.
…that it include at least three architects, one historian qualified in the field, one city planner or landscape architect, one realtor, and at least one resident of each of the city’s five boroughs. N. Y. C. Charter § 534 (1976). In addition to the ordinance’s requirements concerning the composition of the Commission,…