Also known as: race discrimination · racially discriminatory · race-based discrimination
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Differential treatment of persons according to race that the Constitution subjects to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause when imposed by state actors and that Congress may prohibit in private transactions as a badge or incident of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Rosalind Reed, a Black buyer, offered to purchase a newly built home from a private subdivision developer. The developer refused solely because of Reed's race under an informal legacy-family policy. A federal statute enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment barred the refusal, and Reed prevailed because Congress may reach purely private racial barriers in property transactions.
Ruby Rivera, a Black resident, sought a marriage license to wed her white fiancé. State officials denied the license under a statute prohibiting interracial marriage. The denial violated the Fourteenth Amendment because racial classifications in marriage receive the most rigid scrutiny and the freedom to marry a person of another race is fundamental.
Rebecca Ross sued a private company in state court. During jury selection the company's counsel used peremptory challenges to remove all Black venire members. The strikes constituted state action because jury selection is a traditional public function performed with court participation, so the racially discriminatory use violated equal protection.
Ricardo Rojas was turned away from a privately owned resort because of his race. The resort's operations involved interstate commerce through equipment and supplies. A federal statute prohibiting the exclusion was upheld as a valid regulation of activities substantially affecting commerce.
Rina Rahman challenged a state rule that conditioned certain benefits on compliance with racially restrictive marriage criteria. The rule implicated the fundamental right to marry and triggered strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause because it imposed an invidious racial classification.
Raymond Ramos, a Black defendant, faced a prosecutor who used peremptory challenges to strike all Black jurors. The pattern raised an inference of purposeful racial discrimination that the state had to rebut with race-neutral explanations under equal protection standards applicable to jury selection.
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseYes. Congress may enact statutes that reach purely private conduct when the discrimination constitutes a badge or incident of slavery, and courts uphold such legislation even without state involvement.
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Jury selection is a traditional public function performed with significant court participation, so private parties may not exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.
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Racial classifications receive the most rigid scrutiny and cannot stand absent a legitimate purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination. The freedom to marry a person of another race is fundamental.
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…in a “constitutional anomaly,” ante , at 886, the First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of speech, a “constitutional nor[m],” not an “anomaly.” Ibid. Nor would application of our established free exercise doctrine to this case necessarily be incompatible with…