Also known as: purposefully discriminate · purposeful discriminate · intentional discrimination · discriminatory intent
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A decisionmaker's undertaking a course of action because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Proof of this mental state is required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when a facially neutral policy produces a disparate impact.
During jury selection in Phuong Pham's robbery trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove all Black venire members. Pham's counsel made a prima facie showing of racial exclusion. The prosecutor offered only vague reasons tied to demeanor. The trial court concluded that purposeful discrimination had occurred and seated the struck jurors.
Pierce Patterson, a state personnel director, implemented an absolute veterans preference for civil service jobs knowing it would exclude nearly all women. Patterson adopted the rule to reward military service rather than to disadvantage women. Female applicants challenged the policy as gender discrimination. The court found no purposeful discrimination because the preference was enacted for a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose.
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Paula Pierce, a Muslim detainee, alleged that federal officials subjected her to harsh conditions solely because of her religion. Her complaint recited only that officials knew the policy would affect Muslims disproportionately. The court dismissed the claim because the pleadings failed to show the officials acted because of, rather than in spite of, the adverse effect on her group.
Patricia Patel, a Black defendant sentenced to death, offered statewide statistics showing Black defendants receive the death penalty more often when the victim is white. She presented no evidence that the prosecutor or jury in her own case acted because of race. The court held that the statistics alone could not prove purposeful discrimination in her particular proceeding.
Piper Patel challenged a local zoning ordinance that burdened her religious practices. Congress had enacted a statute purporting to restore strict scrutiny for such claims without findings of widespread purposeful discrimination by states. The Court held that the statute exceeded Congress's enforcement power because it attempted a substantive change rather than remedying proven purposeful discrimination.
Pablo Perez, a U.S. citizen seeking entry for his Syrian relatives, challenged a presidential proclamation restricting travel from several Muslim-majority countries. He pointed to campaign statements suggesting the policy targeted Muslims. The Court examined the proclamation's text and found no sufficient showing that the operative decision was made because of religious animus rather than national-security concerns.
No. Disparate impact alone is never sufficient. A plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker acted because of, not merely in spite of, the adverse effect on the group.
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The defendant must persuade the trial court that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation is pretextual and that the strikes were motivated by race. The court then determines whether purposeful discrimination has been established.
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No. A defendant must prove that the decisionmakers in his own case acted with discriminatory purpose. General statistics showing a pattern across many cases are insufficient without case-specific evidence.
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The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to show that the defendant undertook the challenged action because of its adverse effect on the protected group, not merely that the defendant was aware of the effect.
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…U. S., at 177 (since "jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination . . . create the risk of purposeful discrimination," Congress could "prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact" in those jurisdictions). Remedial legislation under § 5 "should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the…