Also known as: probable consequences · natural and probable consequence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An effect or result that is more likely than not to follow its supposed cause.
Lina operates an organic farm next to Mark's conventional fields. Pesticide drift threatens her certification and recurring crop losses. She seeks an injunction limiting Mark's spraying schedule. The court compares the probable consequences of restricting spraying against the probable consequences of repeated damage awards and denies the injunction because damages would adequately address the harm without disrupting Mark's operations.
Pierre stabs Patricia during an argument. She receives prompt medical care yet dies fifteen months later from complications. The prosecution must show the death was a probable consequence of the stabbing rather than an unrelated intervening event. Because medical evidence establishes the link, the jury may convict Pierre of murder even though the death occurred well after the year-and-a-day period.
Wilbert K. Rogers stabbed James Bowdery with a butcher knife on May 6, 1994. One of the stab wounds penetrated Bowdery's heart. During surgery to repair the wound to his heart, Bowdery went into cardiac arrest but was resuscitated and survived the procedure. As a result, however, he had developed a condition known as cerebral hypoxia, which results from a loss of oxygen to the brain. Bowdery's higher brain functions had ceased, and he slipped into and remained in a coma until August 7, 1995, when he died from a kidney infection. Approximately 15 months had passed between the stabbing and Bowdery's death which, according to the undisputed testimony of the county medical examiner, was caused by cerebral hypoxia secondary to a stab wound to the heart. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee state court of second degree murder. The state's criminal homicide statute makes no mention of the year and a day rule. It defines criminal homicide simply as the unlawful killing of another person. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could convict Rogers of murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's death was a natural and probable consequence of the stabbing, even if it occurred more than a year later. The jury convicted Rogers of second degree murder. Rogers appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. That court affirmed after holding that the state's 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act had abolished all common law defenses in criminal actions. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. It observed that the year and a day rule had been part of the common law of the state despite the paucity of case law on the rule. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePenelope grows marijuana solely for personal medical use under state law. Federal agents seize the plants and charge her with violating the Controlled Substances Act. The government argues that the aggregate effect of similar home production substantially affects the interstate marijuana market. The court upholds the federal prohibition because that aggregate impact supplies the necessary commerce-clause connection.
In 1996 California voters enacted the Compassionate Use Act authorizing limited marijuana use for medicinal purposes by seriously ill state residents upon a physician’s recommendation or approval. Angel Raich and Diane Monson, California residents suffering from serious medical conditions, began using marijuana after their licensed physicians determined that conventional medicines failed to provide relief and that marijuana was the only effective treatment available. Raich, unable to cultivate her own supply, relies on two caregivers who grow and provide locally grown marijuana at no charge, which she then processes into oils, balms, and foods. Monson cultivates her own marijuana plants and ingests the drug by smoking or vaporization. On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrived at Monson’s home. County officials concluded after investigation that Monson’s use complied with California law, but after a three-hour standoff the federal agents seized and destroyed all six of her cannabis plants. Raich and Monson filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of the DEA. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief barring enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act to the extent it prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for personal medical use, and they submitted affidavits describing their medical conditions, failed conventional treatments, and physicians’ recommendations. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered the district court to enter the injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePaula lies in a persistent vegetative state after an accident. Her parents seek to discontinue artificial nutrition. The state requires clear evidence that Paula would have refused treatment. The court finds clear and convincing evidence from her prior statements that she would have refused continued feeding and therefore permits withdrawal of the feeding tube.
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
View casePhoebe is charged with aggravated assault after striking a bystander during a fight. The trial judge instructs the jury that a person of sound mind intends the natural and probable consequences of her acts. The instruction creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption, so the prosecution must still prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt without shifting any burden to the defense.
Tavaris Smith was indicted for the malice murder of his wife on August 26, 2003. The crime occurred on June 5, 2003. A jury found Smith guilty of malice murder on August 15, 2005. The evidence showed that Smith and his wife had marital difficulties. Smith had threatened to kill her. Smith had put a gun to her head on a previous occasion. Ms. Smith was thinking of divorcing Smith. Before trial, Smith indicated his intent to present evidence, including expert testimony. He had a physiological sleep disorder that caused him, while asleep or in a state of confusional arousal due to the disorder, to shoot his wife without any intent to do so and without any awareness that he was doing so. Smith did not file notice of an intent to assert an insanity defense under OCGA § 17-7-130.1. The trial court concluded that Smith was asserting a claim of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court appointed an expert under OCGA § 17-7-130.1 to examine him over Smith's objection. At trial, when the court-appointed expert witness was called to testify, the court instructed the jury that it had classified Smith's defense as an insanity defense. At the end of the trial, the court charged the jury on the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court specifically charged the jury that Smith had the burden to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith again objected to the imposition of the insanity defense. Smith's own expert testified that he did not meet the legal definition of insanity. He may have committed the crime in question during a period of unconsciousness due to sleep disorders from which he was suffering. The court-appointed expert also testified that Smith did not suffer from any psychiatric problems. He may have possibly suffered from narcolepsy and confusional arousal. After the guilty verdict, Smith moved for a new trial on August 29, 2005. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on July 16, 2007. Smith filed a notice of appeal on August 15, 2007. The appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court of Georgia on October 16, 2007. The Supreme Court of Georgia heard oral argument on February 11, 2008.
View casePortia drives her friend to a location knowing he intends to sell cocaine but claims she did not know a gun would be used. The prosecution must prove that the gun's presence was a probable consequence of the drug transaction she facilitated. Because carrying firearms is a common feature of drug sales, the jury may find Portia liable for the firearm offense as well.
Justus Rosemond participated in a drug transaction arranged by Vashti Perez to sell a pound of marijuana to Ricardo Gonzales and Coby Painter. Perez drove to a local park accompanied by Ronald Joseph and Rosemond to complete the exchange. Upon arrival, Gonzales entered the backseat of the vehicle to inspect the marijuana while Painter remained outside. Instead of paying, Gonzales punched the backseat passenger and fled with the drugs. As Gonzales and Painter ran away, one of the male passengers exited the car and fired several shots from a semiautomatic handgun before the three individuals pursued the buyers in their vehicle. A police officer responding to a dispatcher's alert pulled over the car before the pursuers could catch Gonzales and Painter. The Government subsequently charged Rosemond with violating 18 U.S.C. §924(c) by using a gun in connection with a drug trafficking crime or, alternatively, aiding and abetting that offense under 18 U.S.C. §2. Because the identity of the shooter remained disputed, the prosecution pursued both theories at trial: that Rosemond himself fired the weapon or that he aided and abetted Joseph's use of the firearm. At trial, the District Judge instructed the jury on aiding and abetting principles. A person aids or abets if he willfully and knowingly associates himself with the crime and seeks by some act to help make it succeed. The judge further instructed that Rosemond could be convicted of aiding and abetting the §924(c) offense if he knew his cohort used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime and knowingly and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime. Rosemond had proposed an alternative instruction requiring that he intentionally took action to facilitate or encourage the use of the firearm specifically. The jury convicted Rosemond of the §924(c) violation along with other offenses, resulting in a consecutive 120-month sentence for that count. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, upholding the District Court's aiding and abetting instructions against Rosemond's challenge. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the requirements for aiding and abetting liability under these circumstances.
View caseThe court compares the probable consequences of granting the injunction with the probable consequences of relying on alternative remedies such as repeated damage awards. The analysis is forward-looking and practical rather than a mechanical exhaustion requirement.
The actual result must be a probable consequence of the actor's conduct. This requirement prevents liability when the harm is too remote or accidental even though strict liability removes the mens rea element.
A properly worded instruction creates only a permissive inference that the jury may accept or reject. It does not relieve the prosecution of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt or create a mandatory presumption.
…her to accept medical treatment forbidden by her religious principles, and previously refused by her with full knowledge of the probable consequences"). : The Missouri court appears to be alone among state courts to suggest otherwise , 760 S.W.2d, at 419 and 423, although the court did not rely on a distinction between…