Also known as:predominant factors · predominant-factor test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in constitutional law
A standard for evaluating racial gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Race qualifies as the predominant factor when a legislature subordinates traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions to racial considerations in drawing district lines.
2
in contract law
A test for determining whether Article 2 of the UCC governs a mixed contract involving both goods and services. The test asks whether the predominant factor or thrust of the transaction is the sale of goods, with services incidentally involved, or the rendition of services, with goods incidentally involved.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Sense 1
1
in constitutional law
A standard for evaluating racial gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Race qualifies as the predominant factor when a legislature subordinates traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions to racial considerations in drawing district lines.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Cases
Examples6
Irregular District Triggers Strict Scrutiny
State officials drew District 12 to snake along a valley and enclose several majority-Latino farmworker towns while skipping nearby non-Latino towns. The resulting shape ignored compactness and county lines. Voters sued, claiming race was the predominant factor. The court applied strict scrutiny because traditional principles had been subordinated to racial goals.
School Assignment Plan Fails Predominance Test
Seattle assigned students to high schools using a racial tiebreaker when schools were oversubscribed. Parents challenged the plan. The court held that race was not the predominant factor because student choice alone determined placement in more than eighty percent of cases.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1551 U.S. 701, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007)
In the late 1990s the Seattle School District No. 1 adopted a student assignment plan for its ten regular public high schools. Incoming ninth graders ranked preferences among schools. The district applied a series of tiebreakers when schools were oversubscribed. The second tiebreaker classified students as white or nonwhite.
It selected students whose race would bring an integration-positive school within ten percentage points of the district-wide balance of 41 percent white and 59 percent nonwhite. The plan affected assignments at five oversubscribed schools in the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools filed suit in the Western District of Washington in July 2000 alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
Jefferson County Public Schools had been under a 1975 federal desegregation decree. The decree was dissolved in 2000 after a finding of unitary status. The district adopted a voluntary assignment plan in 2001. The plan required all nonmagnet schools to maintain black enrollment between 15 and 50 percent. The plan grouped elementary schools into clusters.
It assigned kindergartners and new students within clusters according to space and racial guidelines. It denied transfer requests that would push a school outside the guidelines. Approximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000 students were black. When Crystal Meredith moved into the district in August 2002 she sought to enroll her son Joshua in kindergarten at Bloom Elementary one mile from their home.
The district denied the intercluster transfer from Young Elementary because it would adversely affect desegregation compliance at Young which was then 46.8 percent black. Meredith filed suit in the Western District of Kentucky alleging an Equal Protection violation. The Seattle District Court granted summary judgment to the district in 2001. The Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed the federal constitutional ruling in 2005. The District Court found that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assignment plan was in all relevant respects narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases in 2006.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What must plaintiffs prove to show that race was the predominant factor in a redistricting plan?
Plaintiffs must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions to racial considerations. Direct evidence of legislative purpose or circumstantial evidence from district shape and demographics can establish this showing.
Supporting sources
Does maximizing the number of majority-minority districts constitute a compelling interest under strict scrutiny?
Sense 2
2
in contract law
A test for determining whether Article 2 of the UCC governs a mixed contract involving both goods and services. The test asks whether the predominant factor or thrust of the transaction is the sale of goods, with services incidentally involved, or the rendition of services, with goods incidentally involved.
See Our Sources· 1 source
Cases
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
How does the predominant factor test apply when a contract involves both goods and services?
Courts examine whether the predominant factor or thrust of the transaction is the sale of goods with services incidentally involved or the rendition of services with goods incidentally involved. If the predominant factor is the sale of goods, Article 2 of the UCC applies to the entire contract.
North Carolina created a district that stretched in a narrow, winding band across the state to connect distant Black populations. Residents sued under the Equal Protection Clause. The court found race was the predominant factor because the shape could not be explained by any traditional districting principle.
Shaw v. Reno509 U.S. 630 (1993)
Upon the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the House of Representatives.
The General Assembly passed an initial reapportionment plan that included only one majority-black district. The Attorney General interposed an objection under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The objection stated that the plan could have included a second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern area with boundary lines no more irregular than those elsewhere in the proposal.
Subsequently, the General Assembly enacted a revised plan creating District 12 as the second majority-black district along the Interstate 85 corridor in the north-central region. The district extends roughly 160 miles, often no wider than the highway itself, snaking through diverse areas and incorporating sufficient black population enclaves to achieve a majority. It splits multiple counties into three districts each, divides towns, and maintains contiguity at one location only by intersecting other districts at a single point.
Appellants are five residents of Durham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Under the plan, two plaintiffs vote in District 12 and three in District 2. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately created the districts along racial lines, arbitrarily concentrating black voters without regard to compactness, contiguity, or political subdivisions.
The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds related to the Voting Rights Act and dismissed the claims against the state appellees by a 2-1 vote. The majority held that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim because the plan did not dilute white voting strength and was adopted to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The dissenting judge concluded that the irregular shape supported an inference of unlawful intent sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Prison Segregation Policy Reviewed for Predominance
California housed new inmates by race for the first sixty days to prevent gang violence. An inmate challenged the policy. The court applied strict scrutiny after determining that race was the predominant factor in the assignment decision.
Johnson v. California543 U.S. 499 (2005)
The California Department of Corrections houses all new male inmates and inmates transferred from other facilities in reception centers for up to 60 days. During this period, double-cell assignments are based predominantly on race. The CDC has admitted that the chances of an inmate being assigned a cellmate of another race are pretty close to zero percent. The CDC further subdivides prisoners within each racial group, separating Japanese-Americans from Chinese-Americans and Northern California Hispanics from Southern California Hispanics. After the initial period, the rest of the prison facilities are fully integrated, and prisoners may choose their own cellmates.
Garrison Johnson, an African-American inmate in CDC custody since 1987, was double-celled with another African-American inmate upon his arrival at Folsom prison in 1987 and each time he was transferred to a new facility. Johnson filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on February 24, 1995, alleging that the CDC's reception-center housing policy violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. After the complaint was dismissed and reinstated on appeal, Johnson filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on July 5, 2000, seeking damages against former directors Rowland and Gomez and injunctive relief against Director Cambra.
Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, applying the deferential Turner standard. The Court of Appeals denied Johnson's petition for rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari to decide which standard of review applies. 540 U. S. 1217 (2004).
North Carolina drew two districts with fixed racial targets after census changes. Voters sued, pointing to the irregular shapes and internal documents showing racial percentages drove the lines. The court held race was the predominant factor and applied strict scrutiny.
Cooper v. Harris137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017)
In 2010 the census showed that North Carolina’s population had grown by nearly 1.5 million people. The General Assembly therefore had to redraw the State’s 13 congressional districts to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement.
State Senator Robert Rucho and State Representative David Lewis chaired the redistricting committees and hired Dr. Thomas Hofeller to prepare the new map. The legislature adopted a plan that significantly altered Districts 1 and 12.
District 1 had been substantially underpopulated. To comply with the Constitution’s one-person-one-vote principle, the State needed to place almost 100,000 new people within the district’s boundaries. Rucho, Lewis, and Hofeller chose to take most of those people from heavily black areas of Durham, requiring a finger-like extension of the district’s western line. With that addition, District 1’s BVAP rose from 48.6% to 52.7%.
District 12 was reconfigured by adding areas in Guilford County. The changes produced a net gain of 35,000 African-American voters of voting age and a net loss of 50,000 white voters of voting age, raising its black voting-age population from 43.8% to 50.7%.
Registered voters in the two districts, including David Harris and Christine Bowser, sued North Carolina officials. They alleged that both districts were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. After a bench trial a three-judge District Court held that racial considerations predominated in the design of both districts. The State appealed and the Supreme Court summarily vacated the District Court’s decision. On remand the District Court again found that the plaintiffs had produced sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence showing race as the predominant factor in drawing both districts.
Evidence at trial included the legislature’s own documents directing the creation of two majority-black districts. The map-drawing software allowed monitoring of racial composition. Public statements by Rucho and Lewis attributed changes in District 12 to Voting Rights Act concerns. Congressman Mel Watt credibly testified that Rucho disclosed a majority-minority target for District 12. An expert report by Dr. Stephen Ansolabehere showed that black registered voters in the six counties overlapping with District 12 were three to four times more likely than white registered voters to be placed in District 12. The District Court credited the plaintiffs’ evidence, including live testimony, over the State’s contention that politics alone explained the lines.
North Carolina created a district with an irregular shape to achieve a majority-Black population. Challengers proved race was the predominant factor through shape and legislative history. The court invalidated the district because maximizing majority-minority districts was not a compelling interest.
Shaw v. Hunt517 U.S. at 905-906
After the 1990 census, North Carolina’s congressional delegation increased from eleven to twelve members. The State General Assembly adopted Chapter 601, which created one majority-black district known as District 1 in the northeastern region of the state. The legislature submitted the plan to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights objected because the plan failed to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in the south-central to southeastern part of the state.
The legislature then enacted Chapter 7, which added a second majority-black district, District 12, located in the north-central Piedmont region rather than the area specified in the objection letter. The Attorney General precleared the revised plan. District 1 is hook shaped, extending from the northeast with finger-like extensions into the southern part of the state near the South Carolina border. District 12 stretches approximately 160 miles along the Interstate 85 corridor in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas.
Five North Carolinians filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against state officials. After the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s initial dismissal in Shaw v. Reno, the case proceeded to a six-day trial on remand. The District Court unanimously found that the plan’s lines were deliberately drawn to produce one or more districts of a specific racial composition. A majority of the District Court upheld the plan as constitutional, while one judge dissented, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Two of the appellants, Ruth Shaw and Melvin Shimm, reside in District 12.
No. Maximizing the number of majority-minority districts pursuant to a Justice Department policy is not a compelling state interest. A state may have a compelling interest in remedying the effects of its own past intentional discrimination, but a bare desire to increase minority representation does not suffice.
Supporting sources
What evidence shows that race predominated over traditional criteria in drawing district lines?
Evidence includes an irregular or bizarre district shape that cannot be explained by traditional principles, low compactness scores, splitting of political subdivisions without justification, and internal legislative materials referencing racial targets or federal guidelines encouraging majority-minority districts.
Supporting sources
Must plaintiffs prove that race was the sole factor to establish predominance?
No. Plaintiffs need only show that race was the predominant factor, meaning it subordinated traditional districting principles. Race may be considered along with other factors, but once it predominates, strict scrutiny applies even if other considerations were also present.
Supporting sources
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · Equal protectionUBEFoundational