preclearance requirement

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address the long-standing problem of racial discrimination in voting that had persisted in parts of the country for nearly a century. Prior civil rights acts from 1957, 1960, and 1964 had proven largely ineffective because case-by-case litigation was slow, expensive, and inadequate to overcome widespread and persistent discrimination. South Carolina filed an original bill of complaint in the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that selected provisions of the Act were invalid and an injunction against enforcement by the Attorney General. The case proceeded on original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, after the Court dispensed with a special master and expedited the hearing due to South Carolina's desire for a ruling before its June 1966 primary elections. The Act's coverage formula applied to any state or political subdivision that maintained a test or device on November 1, 1964, and where less than 50 percent of voting-age residents were registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election. South Carolina was brought within the formula on August 7, 1965, along with Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, twenty-six counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona. The challenged provisions included the suspension of literacy tests and similar devices under section 4(a), the preclearance requirement for new voting rules under section 5, and the authorization for the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners under section 6(b). South Carolina had altered its voting laws in 1965 to extend polling hours from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. but had not submitted the change for federal review. The Court invited all states to participate as amici curiae, several of which submitted briefs or argued orally.

After the 1990 census showed that Georgia's population entitled it to an eleventh congressional seat, the General Assembly adopted redistricting guidelines requiring equal population, contiguity, nondilution of minority voting strength, and compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act before considering other factors such as preserving political subdivisions. The legislature submitted an initial plan creating two majority-minority districts and one additional district with a 35 percent black voting-age population, but the Department of Justice refused preclearance on January 21, 1992, stating that the plan failed to recognize certain minority populations. The General Assembly enacted a second plan that increased black populations in three districts, yet the Department of Justice again refused preclearance, pointing to alternative plans that created three majority-minority districts through a Macon/Savannah trade. Using the ACLU's max-black plan as a benchmark, the legislature then passed a final plan that created the Eleventh District by transferring black populations from Macon to the Second District and extending the Eleventh to include Savannah, resulting in a district that split twenty-six counties. On January 13, 1994, five white voters registered in the Eleventh District filed suit against state officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging that the district was a racial gerrymander. A three-judge panel received evidence including the Justice Department's objection letters, testimony from the operator of Georgia's reapportionment computer, the State's admissions that portions of Effingham and Chatham Counties were added solely to increase the black population, and expert reports showing fractured political and economic interests within the district. The District Court found that race was the overriding and predominant factor explaining the Eleventh District's irregular boundaries and invalidated the plan. Appellants appealed, the Supreme Court granted a stay, and later noted probable jurisdiction over the direct appeal.

Upon the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the House of Representatives. The General Assembly passed an initial reapportionment plan that included only one majority-black district. The Attorney General interposed an objection under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The objection stated that the plan could have included a second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern area with boundary lines no more irregular than those elsewhere in the proposal. Subsequently, the General Assembly enacted a revised plan creating District 12 as the second majority-black district along the Interstate 85 corridor in the north-central region. The district extends roughly 160 miles, often no wider than the highway itself, snaking through diverse areas and incorporating sufficient black population enclaves to achieve a majority. It splits multiple counties into three districts each, divides towns, and maintains contiguity at one location only by intersecting other districts at a single point. Appellants are five residents of Durham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Under the plan, two plaintiffs vote in District 12 and three in District 2. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately created the districts along racial lines, arbitrarily concentrating black voters without regard to compactness, contiguity, or political subdivisions. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds related to the Voting Rights Act and dismissed the claims against the state appellees by a 2-1 vote. The majority held that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim because the plan did not dilute white voting strength and was adopted to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The dissenting judge concluded that the irregular shape supported an inference of unlawful intent sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.

In 2000 Arizona voters approved Proposition 106, an initiative that amended the state constitution to remove congressional redistricting authority from the Arizona Legislature and vest it in a new Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. The measure responded to recurring redistricting controversies that had produced rejected plans or denied preclearance in every cycle since the 1970s. After the 2010 census the Commission adopted final congressional district maps in January 2012. The Arizona Legislature filed suit on June 6, 2012, in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Commission, its five members, and the Secretary of State. The complaint sought a declaration that the Commission and its maps violated the Elections Clause and an injunction barring use of the maps after the 2012 election. A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2284(a), unanimously denied a motion by the AIRC to dismiss the suit for lack of standing. On the merits, dividing two to one, the District Court granted the AIRC’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court postponed jurisdiction and instructed the parties to address two questions: (1) Does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring this suit? (2) Do the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and 2 U. S. C. §2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts? The District Court’s judgment was affirmed. Arizona’s Constitution establishes the electorate as a coordinate source of legislation on equal footing with the representative legislative body. The initiative, housed under the article of the Arizona Constitution concerning the Legislative Department and the section defining the State’s legislative authority, reserves for the people the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution.

In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in response to concerns over defective devices such as the Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive. The amendments established a regulatory framework classifying devices into three classes based on risk, with Class III devices like pacemakers requiring premarket approval unless they qualified for an exemption. In October 1982, Medtronic, Inc. notified the FDA that its Model 4011 pacemaker lead was substantially equivalent to pre-1976 devices, and the FDA cleared it for marketing under the §510(k) process. In 1982, Lora Lohr underwent surgery in Florida to receive a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with the Model 4011 lead. Five years later, on December 30, 1990, the device failed, allegedly causing a complete heart block that required emergency surgery; her physician attributed the failure to a defect in the lead. Lohr and her husband subsequently filed suit in Florida state court in 1993, asserting claims for negligent design, negligent manufacture, failure to warn, and strict liability based on an unreasonably dangerous product. Medtronic removed the action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court initially denied Medtronic's motion for summary judgment but later dismissed the entire complaint after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in a related case, concluding that the claims were preempted by the MDA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the design defect claims were not preempted while the manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims were preempted by general federal regulations. The Lohrs and Medtronic both petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted review to address the conflict among the circuits regarding the preemptive scope of the MDA's preemption provision. The case was argued on April 23, 1996, and decided on June 26, 1996.